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JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
Woman has ovaries, a uterus; these peculiarities imprison her in
her own subjectivity, circumscribe her within the limits of her own
nature. It is often said that she thinks with her glands. Man superbly
ignores the fact that his anatomy also includes glands, such as
testicles, and that they secrete hormones. He thinks of his body as
a direct and normal connection with the world, which he believes
he apprehends objectively, whereas he regards the body of woman
as a hindrance, a prison, weighted down by everything peculiar
to it .... Thus humanity is male and man defines woman not in
herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous
being. . . . He is subject, he is Absolute - she is the Other!
SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX xv-xvi (trans. by H.M.
Parshley 1952)
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most difficult problems that confronts our time is the ef-
fect of technological developments, particularly in the chemical industry,
on the health of industrial workers' and on the environment. 2 The dilem-
ma that we as a technological society have to face and resolve is whether
we are willing to compromise the health of the present generation and
that of future generations for the sake of progress or innovation.3 Con-
gress has enacted several pieces of legislation aimed at protecting the
environment 4 and the health of industrial workers.5 An in-depth analysis
of this health and safety legislation seems to indicate that it does not
satisfactorily address the issue of safeguarding the health of future genera-
tions, 6 but seeks to protect the well being of the present American
workforce exclusively.
7
'See generally G. NOTHSTEIN, THE'LAw OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (1981);
M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW (2d ed. 1983).
2 See generally Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL SOURCE BOOK (A. McRae and L. Whelchel
ed. 1978); B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE, NATURE, MAN AND TECHNOLOGY (1971);
R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
See generally Davies, The Effects of Federal Regulation on Chemical Industry In-
novation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1983, at 41; Ashford and Heaton, Regula-
tion and Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1983, at 109; Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Con-
ceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1263 (1981).
1 See, e.g., Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982);
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982), Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1982); Resource
Conservation & Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976).
- See, e.g., Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (1982);
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982); Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976); Federal Mine Safety & Health Amendments Act of 1977,
30 U.S.C. §§ 951-955 (1982).
6 See infra notes 177-247 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 248-309 and accompanying text.
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The challenge faced by many chemical companies regarding their role
and responsibility for the health of tomorrow's generations came into
sharp focus in cases involving American Cyanamid's Willow Island plant
and Olin Corporation's Pisgah Forest plant.8 These companies use
chemical substances in their manufacturing processes which have been
scientifically proven to adversely affect the reproductive system of women
and the health of the fetus. 9 Based on this scientific evidence women
workers were excluded or removed from jobs that exposed them to the
toxic chemicalso which endangered their reproductive ability and, poten-
tially, the well-being of the conceptus. 11
In the fall of 1977, American Cyanamid implemented a medical pro-
tection policy which provided that women of childbearing capacity, bet-
ween the ages of sixteen and fifty-five, were not to be employed in jobs
which required exposure to certain chemical substances at levels which
were deemed to be hazardous to the fetus.12 The program was confined
strictly to the company's pigments department where employees were
exposed to lead, a well known fetotoxic agent. 13 Further, the policy pro-
vided that women between the ages of sixteen and fifty-five would be
allowed to work in this department only upon proof of surgical steriliza-
tion.14 Between February and July of 1978, five women underwent
sterilization. Two women who refused the surgery were transferred to
other departments at lower wages.15
Essentially, American Cyanamid's protection policy forced women to
either forgo fertility by giving up their ability to have children, or face
unemployment. Our society must never place anyone in the position of
being forced to choose sterility over unemployment. Therefore, legal
methodologies and protections should be found and implemented so that
no employee will ever have to face such a dilemma again.
Olin Corporation's fetal vulnerability policy was somewhat different
from that adopted by Cyanamid. Olin's approach was to classify jobs
based on their degree of hazard to the female reproductive system and
8 See Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l. Union v. American Cyanamid Co.,
741 F.2d 444 (D.C.Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin, 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982); Wright
v. Olin, 585 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D.N.C. 1984); Christman v. American Cyanamid Co.,
92 F.R.D. 441 (N.D.W.W. 1981).,
9 See infra notes 99-159 and accompanying text.
10 In this article toxicity is defined as the property of a chemical substance which
causes adverse effects in an organism. 40 C.F.R. § 162.4 (nn). Toxicology is the study
of the dose-response effect of toxic substances on biological systems. See generally 2A
PATTY'S INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE AND TOXICOLOGY (G. Clayton & F. Clayton ed. 1981); N.
PROCTOR & J. HUGHES, CHEMICAL HAZARDS OF THE WORK PLACE (1978).
See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
12 Christman v. American Cyanamid, 92 F.R.D. 441, 445 (1981).
13 Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l. Union v. American Cyanamid Co.,
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to the health of the fetus. 6 The program instituted at the Pisgah Forest
facility contained three job classifications. "Restricted jobs" were those
jobs which required exposure to "known or suspected abortifacient or
teratogenic agents.' 1 7 Fertile women employees were excluded from these
jobs. "' Women who wanted to be assigned to "restricted jobs" were re-
quired to show medical proof of their inability to bear children.
The second category of jobs was classified as "controlled jobs." These
jobs required very limited contact with fetally hazardous chemicals.' 9
Non-pregnant female employees were allowed to work in such jobs as
long as they did not become pregnant.20 The third job category consisted
of "unrestricted jobs" in which employees were not exposed to hazar-
dous chemicals that would affect either the pregnant woman or the fetus.21
These jobs were open to all female employees.
Even though Olin's program appears to be better planned and executed
than American Cyanamid's, problems remain that are common to both.
The bottom line regarding both companies' corporate fetal protection
policies is that women are forced to choose whether to retain their abili-
ty to bear children or to be employed in a job for which they would
otherwise be qualified, but which might physically harm them or their
offspring. The Willow Island and Pisgah Forest scenarios are not un-
common. The same exclusionary policies are now pursued by several
major chemical companies such as Allied Chemical, 22 B.F. Goodrich,
Sun Oil, Gulf Oil, Union Carbide, Monsanto, DuPont and Dow
Chemical.23 The choice confronting women employees in these companies
1b Wright v. Olin Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1447 (1984).
17 Id. at 1448.
18 Id. See also Krause, A Company Program To Control Toxic Exposures, NAT'L.
SAFETY NEWS, February 1979, at 52.
19 585 F. Supp. at 1448.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Bronson, Allied Chemical Compensates 5 Women Laid Off to Protect Childbear-
ing Ability, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1979, at 1, col. 1. Allied's policy was aimed at preven-
ting exposure "which may endanger reproductive capacity or which may adversely af-
fect the health or the viability of the fetus." Id. The company's general counsel stated
that this policy was used only in situations "where there [was] actual evidence of a medical
effect, looking to employer experience in animal test data and not mere suspicion." Id.
(emphasis added).
23 See generally Lebowitz, Overview: The Health of Working Women, in WOMEN,
WORK AND HEALTH: CHALLENGES TO CORPORATE POLIcY 27 (D. Walsh and R. Egdahl ed.
1980). Doctor Bruce Karrh, corporate medical director at DuPont stated, "When we
remove a woman, it is not to protect her reproductive capacity, but to protect her fetus."
Shabecoff, Industry and Women Clash Over Hazards in Workplace, N.Y. Times, Jan.
3, 1981, at 9, col. 1. Some companies justify the exclusion of female employees from
hazardous work environments on the basis that the cost of reducing the level of toxic
substances is prohibitive. 'The difficulty and cost of implementing good industrial hygiene
shouldn't be used as a blanket excuse to exclude women. But if the cost is going to rise
exponentially to reach a certain level for uniquely fetal toxins, it's justified to take a
woman out of the work place then." Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1981 (statement of Perry J.
[Vol. 1:141
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is whether, for the sake of tomorrow's generation, they will today re-
ject or be excluded from good paying jobs that may potentially expose
their fetuses to harm from toxic chemicals. 21 Striking the balance bet-
ween protecting women's reproductive capacity from chemical harm and
fetuses from the consequences of their mothers' exposure to toxic work
environments on the one hand, and equal employment opportunities on
the other, is a quandary fraught with controversy and emotionalism.25
The difficulties inherent in addressing and possibly solving this problem
present a complexity of ethical, social, political and legal dilemmas.
This article will address the legal issues involved in establishing an
equitable balance between women's rights to equal employment oppor-
tunities and the right of future generations to be free from disease caus-
ed by parental exposures to hazardous chemical work environments. In
the author's opinion the present regulatory framework provided by the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHAct), 26 the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA),2 7 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 196428 is inadequate to provide the requisite degree of protection to
employees and, particularly, to their offspring.
Part II of the article will examine some of the available scientific and
medical data regarding the reproductive effects of a few of the most com-
monly used industrial chemicals.
In Part III the statutory scheme provided by the OSHAct, TSCA, and
Title VII will be analyzed. As stated above, the discussion will reveal
that these statutes do not adequately answer the thorny problem of
Gehring, Director of Health and Environmental Services at Dow Chemical). See also
Rawls, Reproductive Hazards in the Work Place, 58 CHEM. ENG'G. NEWS 30 (Feb. 11,
1980); Note, Employment Rights of Women in the Toxic Work Place, 65 CALIF. L. REV.
1113, 1119-21 (1977).
24 Recent labor statistics indicate that in 1983 41,004,000 women over 20 years of
age were employed in the United States. 107 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR STATISTICS 8, Feb. 1984. From 1960 to 1981 the number of female blue collar workers
rose from 3,637,000 to 5,828,000. This figure represents 31.7% of the labor force
employed in manufacturing. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings.
25 See, e.g., Ashford and Caldart, The Control of Reproductive Hazards in the Work
Place: A Prescription for Prevention, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 523 (1983); Rothstein, Employee
Selection Based on Susceptibility to Occupational Illness, 81 MIcH. L. REV. 1379 (1983);
Sloan, Employer's Tort Liability When a Female Is Exposed to Harmful Substances, 3
EMP. REL. L.J. 506 (1978); Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Recon-
ciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69
GEO. L.J. 641 (1981); Howard, Hazardous Substances in the Workplace: Implications
for the Employment Rights of Women, 129 U. PA. L. Rev. 798 (1981); Warshaw, Non-
Medical Issues Presented by the Pregnant Worker, 21 J. OccuP. MED. 89 (1979); Kuntz,
The Pregnant Woman in Industry, AM. INDUS. HYc. Ass'N. J. 423 (July 1976).
26 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
27 15 U.S.C. § 2601-2629 (1976).
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
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reproductive and fetal health protection from the damaging effects of
toxic substances. The primary reason for this inadequacy is that the
statutes were never designed nor intended to deal with the health pro-
blems facing future generations of American workers, but rather,
specifically focus on the present generation of employees.
Part IV of the article presents a statutory proposal in the form of an
amendment to the OSHAct aimed at accommodating the societal needs
for fetal protection, without weakening the mandate of equal employ-
ment rights legislation. The proposed statute is designed to address the
scientific reality that both women's and men's reproductive systems might
be adversely affected by certain toxic chemicals. Therefore, both classes
of employees should be legally protected from exposures to hazardous
work environments by designating nondiscriminatory standards designed
to best achieve this goal. Additionally, guidelines will be recommended
for use by the courts to scrutinize employers' defenses regarding the
establishment of exclusionary policies.
II. REPRODUCTIVE RISK MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC DATA
The first step in examining the issues involved in choosing a proper
employment policy aimed at protecting fetal health through non-
discriminatory schemes is an investigation of the available scientific
evidence on the effects of toxic substances29 upon the human reproduc-
tive system. While this article focuses on the legal issues associated with
the protection of the reproductive ability of women of child bearing age
and of the health of their fetuses, the effects of toxic work environments
on the male reproductive system will also be evaluated. 30 This examina-
tion is necessary: 1) to insure that any proposed program adequately
29 A toxic material has been defined as "[olne which demonstrates the potential to
induce cancer; to produce long-term disease or bodily injury; to affect health adversely;
to produce acute discomfort; or to endanger the life of man or animals through exposure
via the respiratory tract, skin, eye, mouth, or other routes." Slow Progress Likely in
Development of Standards for Toxic Substances and Harmful Physical Agents Found
in Work-places, REPORT To THE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, U.S. SENATE,
BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES (September 28, 1973). It is the ob-
jective of occupational health specialists to eliminate or minimize the effects of exposures
to toxic work environments. The objectives of occupational health are "the promotion
and maintenance of the highest degree of physical, mental, and social well-being of
workers in all occupations; the prevention among workers of departures from health
caused by their working conditions, the protection of workers in their employment from
risks resulting from factors adverse to health; the placing and maintenance of the worker
in an occupational environment adapted to his physiological and psychological condi-
tion." World Health Organization, WHO TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES 4, No. 66 (1963)
as quoted in N. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORK PLACE: OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND IN-
JURY 130 (1976).
30 See generally Clement Associates, Inc., Chemical Hazards to Human Reproduc-
tion, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 11-1-3 (1981); Manson and Simons, Influence
of Environmental Agents on Male Reproductive Failure, in V. HUNT, WORK AND THE
HEALTH OF WOMEN 155 (1979).
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protects fetal health by focusing on the effects of the toxic work environ-
ment on both prospective parents; and 2) to provide a thorough and
realistic background for an in-depth discussion of Title VII and the legal
defenses available to employers.
A. The Susceptibility of the Human Reproductive System to
Toxic Chemical Substances
1. The Male Reproductive System
The reproductive functions of the human male have three major
aspects: 1) spermatogenesis, i.e., the generation of the sperm; 2) perfor-
mance of the male sexual act; and 3) hormonal regulation and control
of male sexual functions.31 Toxic substances may affect each and every
one of these phases and, consequently, the fetus.32
The production of the sperm, i.e., spermatogenesis, occurs in two
separate steps. The first stage consists of the growth of spermatogonia
(stem cells) into considerably enlarged cells called primary sper-
matocytes. 33 The primary spermatocytes contain 46 chromosomes each,
which autocatalytically synthesize a new chromosome of its own type.
Following this process each spermatocyte contains 92 chromosomes. The
primary spermatocyte then undergoes a division into two secondary sper-
matocytes, each containing 46 chromosomes. The secondary sper-
matocytes each divide by meiotic division (without replication of the
chromosomes) to form spermatids, 34 each containing only 23 chromo-
31 A. GUYTON, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 1119 (3rd ed. 1968); Noceti,
Reproduction in MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 992 (V. Mountcastle ed., 12th ed. 1968). The male
reproductive system is composed of the primary sex organs, the testes, and the accessory
sex structures-the vas deferens, the seminal vesicles, the ejaculatory ducts, the penis,
the prostate and the bulbo-urethral glands. Noceti, supra at 1016. The testes are com-
posed primarily of Sertoli, Leydig and germ cells. The Testes in Normal and Infertile
Men 97, cited in Manson and Simons, supra note 30, at 156. The testes perform two
major functions: 1) a cytogenetic function, i.e. the production of viable cells, the sperm;
2) the secretion of the male sex steroid, androgen. Noceti, supra, at 1016. The androgen
is responsible for (a) the development and maintenance of the secondary sexual
characteristics; (b) the development and maintenance of the size and secretory activity
of the accessory structures; (c) inhibitory activity on the pituitary; and (d) an effect on
general body metabolism. Id. The primary androgen secreted by the Leydig cells of the
testes is testosterone. Testosterone begins to be excreted by the male about the second
month of embryonic life. A. GUYTON, supra, at 1127. See also Sohval, Anatomy and
Endocryne Physiology of the Male Reproductive System in THE ENDOCRYNOLOGY OF
REPRODUCTION 243 (J.T. Veludro, ed. 1958); Connell and Connell, The Interstitial Tissue
of the Testis, in 4 THE TESTIS 333 (A.D. Johnson and W.R. Gomes, ed. 1977), cited in
Manson and Simons, supra note 30, at 156.
32 See infra notes 54-98 and accompanying text.
3- A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1120; Noceti, supra note 31, at 1016.
34 Control of the sperm (germ cells) differentiation is exercised by the Sertoli cells.
The spermatids attach themselves to these cells and it is believed that the Sertoli cells
provide the necessary hormonal or enzymatic nutrient to cause the change from sper-
matids to spermatozoa. Clement Associates, supra note 30, at 11-2; A. GUYTON supra
note 31, at 1121.
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somes, none of which are paired. 3 The spermatids lose most of the
cytoplasm and undergo transformation into spermatozoa. Both processes
take place in the seminiferous tubules of the testes. When first released
from the seminiferous tubules the sperm are still immature, and must
mature in the epididymis before they become motile and able to fertilize
the ovum.
36
The production and maturation of sperm and male reproductive func-
tions are controlled by various hormonal secretions. The principal hor-
monal secretion of the testes is testosterone. 37 Testosterone is an androgen
that is responsible for the development and functionality of male sexual
accessory structures and secondary characteristics. 3 The function of the
testes and therefore the secretion of testosterone is controlled by the
pituitary gland. This gland, also called the adenohypophysis, secretes
three different gonadotropic hormones: 1) follicule stimulating hormone
(FSH); 2) luteinizing hormone (LH), also called interstitial cell stimulating
hormone (ICSH); and 3) luteotropic hormone (LTH). 39 Only LH and FSH
are involved in the control of male sexual functions.
Testosterone is produced by the Leydig cells of the testes upon stimula-
tion by LH. The quantity of testosterone secreted is regulated by the
amount of LH available.4" FSH acts upon the Sertoli cells by affecting
" Clement Associates, supra note 30, at 11-2; A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1120;
Noceti, supra note 31, at 1016. A similar reduction in the number of chromosomes oc-
curs in the ovum during maturation. Then, when the spermatozoa combines with the
ovum, the full complement of 46 chromosomes is established in the new organism. A.
GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1120.
36 Clement Associates, supra note 30, at 11-2; A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1121;
Manson and Simons, supra note 30, at 157.
3' Noceti, supra note 31, at 1016; A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1126; Clement
Associates, supra note 30, at 11-2.
11 Clement Associates, supra note 30, at 11-2; A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1127.
Testosterone is produced in small quantities during fetal development, but no hormone
is produced during childhood. Testosterone secretion increases during puberty and lasts
throughout the rest of the male's life. During puberty, testosterone causes the matura-
tion of primary sex organs and of the secondary sexual characteristics such as distribu-
tion of body hair, voice, musculature. A. GuYrON, supra note 31, at 1127-28.
31 Manson and Simons, supra note 30, at 156; A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1129;
Clement Associates, supra note 30, at 11-2. The secretion of gonadotropins is controlled
and regulated by the hypothalamus. During childhood, i.e. the first ten years of life,
the male child does not secrete any significant amount of gonadotropins, and, conse-
quently, no testicular hormones. At about age ten, the pituitary (the adenohypophysis)
begins to secrete increasing amounts of gonadotropins with subsequent increase in
testicular function. By approximately age thirteen, the male child reaches full sexual
maturity. A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1130-31.
40 It appears that the amount of LH secreted by the pituitary is controlled through
a feedback mechanism or rather through negative feedback. Animal experimentation
has demonstrated that injection of testosterone into either a male or female animal in-
hibits the secretion of LH. Therefore the mechanism operates to maintain a constant
level of testosterone through the inhibition of LH when testosterone is in excess. Con-
versely when the testosterone levels are low the pituitary releases increased LH which
acts upon the Leydig cells to produce more testosterone. A. GUYTON, supra note 31,
[Vol. 1: 141
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the initiation of spermatogenesis at puberty and also has an important
role in maintaining proper sexual functioning in adulthood. 41 To com-
plete the process of spermatogenesis, testosterone must be secreted in
small amounts by the Leydig cells which mediate the process. 42
Generally, toxic substances may affect either directly or indirectly
various male sexual organs and reproductive functions. 43 Thus, children
whose fathers were occupationally exposed to toxic substances may be
adversely affected by their fathers' exposures. 44
2. The Female Reproductive System
The female reproductive system is comprised of the primary sex organs,
the ovaries, and the accessory structures which include the fallopian tubes,
the uterus, and the vagina. 4- The female sexual functions are characterized
by a periodic (monthly) pattern known as the female sexual cycle.46
The reproductive process starts with the development of the ova in
the ovaries. 47 In the middle of the cycle a mature ovum is released from
an ovarian follicle into the abdominal cavity. The ovum is then
transported through one of the fallopian tubes into the uterus. The uterine
wall (endometrium) is prepared for implantation should the ovum be
fertilized by a sperm.48
at 1130; Manson and Simons, supra note 30, at 156.
41 Manson and Simons, supra note 30, at 157; A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1130-31;
Clement Associates, supra note 30, at 11-2.
42 Manson and Simons, supra note 30, at 157; A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1129.
43 See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 103-07, 110-15, 133-35 and accompanying text.
41 Noceti, supra note 31, at 1001; A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1134. The ovary
has (1) a cytogenetic function in that it produces and releases the ova, and (2) a secretory
function in that it secretes the sex hormones which control the female sexual functions
and secondary characteristics. Noceti, supra note 31, at 1001.
46 The average normal cycle varies between 28 to 45 days. Abnormal cycle length
has been associated with decreased fertility. A. GuYroN, supra note 31, at 1135. See
also infra notes 119, 123, 137 and accompanying text.
41 At birth the two ovaries contain approximately 500,000 primary oocytes. A.
GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1151. The primary oocytes do not undergo any changes dur-
ing childhood until puberty when ovulation starts with the onset of the monthly cycle.
Clement Associates supra note 30, at 11-4; A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1151. The
transformation of the primary oocytes into the mature ovum takes place in the follow-
ing manner. Before the ovum is released from the follicle, the first polar body is expell-
ed from the nucleus of the ovum to form a secondary oocyte. The secondary oocyte
then expels a second polar body. During these divisions, each of the 23 pairs of
chromosomes loses one of the partners so that 23 unpaired chromosomes remain in the
ovum that is now ready to be fertilized. Id.
11 The fertilized ovum implanted in the uterus develops into a fetus, a placenta,
and fetal membrane. A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1134-45.
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The female sexual cycle is controlled by pituitary hormonal secretions.
Throughout childhood the ovaries are dormant since practically no
gonadotropic secretions take place. 49 The pituitary in the female generally
secretes the same hormones as in the male, 50 but they function differently,
particularly with respect to their interaction with female sexual hormones.
There are two types of female sexual hormones: estrogen and pro-
gesterone.51 The estrogens affect primarily the female reproductive system
and the secondary sexual traits. 2 Progesterone mainly prepares the uterus
for the implantation of the fertilized ovum, i.e., for pregnancy.5 3
The pregnancy or gestation period involves the development of the
fertilized ovum into a fetus.- 4 During the first weeks of pregnancy the
placenta 5s and the fetal membranes develop at a much greater rate than
the fetus itself .56 Within the first month of gestation the organs of the
49The pituitary (adenohypophysis) starts secreting gonadotropic hormones when
the female is about eight years old. The secretions increase progressively and reach a
maximum level with the initiation of monthly cycles during puberty. A. GUYTON, supra
note 31, at 1135; Noceti, supra note 31, at 1001. The pituitary secretes three hormones
which act upon the ovaries: 1) follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH); 2) luteinizing hor-
mone (LH); and 3) luteotropic hormone (LTH). A. GuYroN, supra note 31, at 1135;
Noceti, supra note 31, at 1104.
50 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
11 A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1137; Noceti, supra note 31, at 1003-04.
52 Estrogens play a major role in the cellular proliferation and growth of sexual
organs. They are active during puberty when the female sexual organs increase in size.
Estrogens also act on the development of the mammary glands from a structural view
point, but are not directly involved in the milk production. A. GUYTON, supra note 31,
at 1139-40; Noceti, supra note 31, at 1004-06; ASSESSMENT OF RiSKS TO HUMAN REPRODUC-
TION AND TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN CONCEPTUS FROM EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMEN-
TAL SUBSTANCES 5, Proceedings of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, October 1-3,
1980, Atlanta, Georgia, and December 7-10, 1980, St. Louis, Missouri [hereinafter cited
as Environmental Risks to Human Reproduction].
53 Progesterone causes a decrease in spontaneous uterine contractions thus helping
the gestation process by preventing the expulsion of the fertilized ovum which has im-
planted itself in the uterus wall. Progesterone also affects the maturation of the breast
but does not actually cause the secretion of milk. Noceti, supra note 31, at 1012; A.
GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1141.
54 A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1151. During the first four months of gestation
the fertilized ovum is called the embryo, and after the fourth month the embryo is call-
ed the fetus and it is clearly recognizable as a human being. J. WILSON AND C. FRASER,
3 HANDBOOK OF TERATOLOGY 79-80 (1977).
- The permeability of the placenta permits the diffusion of nutrients and oxygen
from the mother's blood into the fetus's blood. Conversely, it permits the diffusion of
excretory products, including carbon dioxide, from the fetus into the mother. During
pregnancy, the placenta secretes several hormones including chorionic gonadotropin,
estrogens, and progesterone. Chorionic gonadotropin aids in the retention of the fer-
tilized ovum in the uterus by preventing the normal involution of the corpus luteum
at the end of the sexual month. It also causes the corpus luteum to secrete increased
quantities of estrogen and progestrone so that there is a continuous increase in the uterine
wall. A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1157-58; Noceti, supra note 31, at 1015. See also
supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
516 A. GUYTON, supra note 31 at 1157.
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fetus are "blocked out," that is, they are clearly delineated. During the
following two to three months the organs develop to the approximate
configurations of the organs of the newborn child.5 7 Significantly, even
though the organs are formed from a gross anatomical viewpoint dur-
ing the first four months of gestation, cellular development continues
until birth.- 8 Some organs such as the nervous system, the kidneys, and
the liver, continue to develop even after birth.5 9
B. Reproductive Damage Resulting from Hazardous Exposure
Statistics indicate that the deleterious effects of various environmen-
tal factors such as food, water, minerals, vitamins, drugs, chemicals,
stress, smoking, and climate account for about ten to eleven percent of
all birth defects.60 Heredity-caused malformations, such as gene muta-
tions and chromosomal abnormalities, are the cause for another ten to
fifteen percent of developmental defects. 61 However, approximately
seventy percent of congenital malformations are the result of unknown
causes. 62 Among these unidentified agents, environmental and occupa-
57 A. GuyTON, supra note 31, at 1170; Clement Associates, supra note 30, at 11-5;
See generally Strobino, Kline and Stein, Chemical and Physical Exposures of Parents:
Effects on Human Reproduction and Offspring, 1 EARLY HUMAN DEV. 371 (1978).
" See infra notes 80, 90, 93, 94 and accompanying text.
59 A. GUYTON, supra note 31, at 1170.
60 Manson, Human and Laboratory Animal Test Systems Available For Detection
of Reproductive Failure, 7 PREV. MED. 322 (1978) (citing J. WILSON, ENVIRONMENT AND
BIRTH (1973)); Yager, Congenital Malformations and Environmental Influence: The Oc-
cupational Environment of Laboratory Workers, 15 J. OccuP. MED. 724 (1973).
61 Barr, Rogan and Kline, Summary of the Workshop of Perinatal and Postnatal
Defects and Neurological Abnormalities from Chemical Exposures, 320 ANN. N.Y. ACAD.
SCIENCES 458, 466 (1979); Manson, supra note 60, at 323.
62 Yager, supra note 60, at 724, Clement Associates, supra note 30, at 111-5-10; Man-
son, supra note 60, at 322. Data indicate that between five and seven percent of all live
infants born in the United States have one or more congenital abnormalities. Environmen-
tal Risks to Human Reproduction, supra note 52, at 99; Manson, supra note 60, at 322;
Barr, supra note 61, at 466. The most common form of reproductive failure consists
of spontaneous abortion during the first trimester. It is estimated that approximately
50% of human conceptuses do not reach term due to fetal death resulting from spon-
taneous abortions (under 20 weeks) and still births (over 20 weeks). Environmental Risks
to Human Reproduction, supra note 52, at 99; Barr, supra note 61, at 462; Manson,
supra note 60, at 322. Most of the statistical data that are reported in various studies
are limited in that they were collected for routine statistical recording rather than for
surveillance purposes. Accordingly, the majority of the data reported came from vital
statistics records. Some information may also be obtained from studies set up for
surveillance of pregnancy outcomes. The major factor that limits the use of statistical
data for the purpose of correlating reproductive impairments to toxic exposure is the
incompleteness of the information. For example, it is likely that a substantial number
of spontaneous abortions occur, but are never recorded because the mother is unaware
of what has happened. Fetal deaths during the second and third trimesters are usually
recorded on death certificates. Congenital malformations, however, are not always record-
ed on birth certificates, especially those which are not necessarily diagnosed during a
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tional exposure to toxic chemicals are the most frequently suspected
causes. 63
Even though compilation of medical evidence regarding the effects of
such substances upon the human reproductive systems is still in the in-
cipient stages, a strong correlation has already been established between
occupational exposure to such substances and the deleterious
physiological effects. 6 4 Most of the data acquired derive from animal ex-
perimentation aimed at identifying those chemicals which cause reproduc-
tive damage.6- Unfortunately, there are inherent problems in the ex-
trapolation of animal test results to the existence of human reproduc-
tive risks. These problems stem from interspecies differences between
humans and various other mammals. Therefore, animal data are con-
sidered valid only when there appears to be a concordance between animal
experimental test results across various species and observed physiological
effects of the same chemical on human subjects.66
routine examination after birth, such as biochemical, behavioral or immunologic defects.
Clement Associates, supra note 30, at 111-2-3.
63 Manson, supra note 60, at 323; V. HUNT, WORK AND THE HEALTH OF WOMEN 98
(1979). Unfortunately only a small number of chemical substances have conclusively
been identified as being sufficiently toxic to the human reproductive system to cause
congenital malformations. Environmental Risks to Human Reproduction, supra note
52 at 100; Barr, supra note 61, at 458.
64 The limited but convincing evidence and information regarding the effect of
workers' exposure to toxic work places has been obtained from four different sources:
case reports, ecologic studies, case-control studies, and cohort studies. Case reports usually
alert medical professionals to the possible deleterious effects of certain chemicals by
establishing an anecdotal connection between the effect and the toxin. Ecologic studies
correlate rates of malformation with the frequency of exposure. However, case reports
and ecologic studies are not to be interpreted as definitive findings, but rather as points
of departure for further investigation consisting of epidemiological studies. Case-control
studies are epidemiological investigations which compare the frequency of exposure to
a suspected agent of persons with a particular disease to the frequency of exposure of
comparable disease-free persons. Cohort studies entail the comparison of different groups
based on the composition of each group. Although epidemiological studies are more
reliable than case reports or ecologic studies, the information generated by them is still
not considered conclusive until results are confirmed by other studies. The major
drawback of this scenario is that very few chemicals have been studied thus far with
sufficient thoroughness. Clemert Associates, supra note 30, at IV-1-5; Barr, supra note
61, at 459-60.
65 Data gathered from animal experimentation is considered to be the best available
source to predict risk of reproductive damage as a consequence of exposure to toxic
chemicals. The information obtained from such testing may help establish the safe levels
for human exposure. Environmental Risks to Human Reproduction, supra note 52, at
100; J. WILSON AND F. FRASER, 3 HANDBOOK OF TERATOLOGY 123 (1977).
66 The degree of concordance between animal and human data regarding the response
to exposure to the chemicals tested provides the theoretical basis for further research;
that is-the closer the concordance, the better the predictability of the animal experimental
data. Concordance has two components: concordance of effect and concordance of dose.
Concordance of effect deals with the similarity in response between humans and animals
regarding the effects of the same or similar chemicals. Concordance of dose relates to
the issue of whether humans and animals are affected at the same or similar dose amounts.
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Chemical substances which may be toxic to the reproductive system
may be classified into two main categories, pre-conception and post-
conception agents, 67 depending on when the exposure occurs. Pre-
conception agents, such as mutagens, act directly upon the parents' germ
cells by causing various malformations including genetic defects.68 Such
reproductive damage may lead to infertility, 69 spontaneous abortions, 70
and/or fetal anomalies, some of which are transmitted genetically.71
Because mutagens are chemicals which cause heritable alterations in
the DNA of the egg and sperm prior to fertilization, their long-range
effect may be insidious as mutations may appear in succeeding genera-
tions. 72 Further, without a comprehensive monitoring system 73 such
It should be noted that especially in the case of reproductive failure, the most sensitive
species should be tested so as to constitute a better predictor for the sensitive human
embryo. Clement Associates, supra note 30, at VI 1-3.
17 Strobino, Kline and Stein, Chemical and Physical Exposures of Parents: Effects
on Human Reproduction and Offspring, in 1 EARLY HUMAN DEV. 371, 374 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Strobino], at 461.
68 Strobino, supra note 67, at 373; Barr, supra note 61, at 461-62.
69 Reduction in fertility or complete infertility is caused in either sex by a failure
of the gametocytes to develop into viable gametes. In the sexually mature male the
gametogenetic process takes place continuously through meiotic division. The process
may be impaired or disrupted by the action of various chemical agents. In the female,
because of the great number of primary oocytes available for conversion into viable
ova, it appears unlikely that complete infertility would occur following exposure to toxins.
In any case, infertility or a reduction in fertility is easier to diagnose in males than in
females. Barr, supra note 61, at 462; Environmental Risks to Human Reproduction, supra
note 52, at 42. See also infra note 48 and accompanying text.
70 Spontaneous abortions occurring during the first trimester are due to various causes
including failure of implantation of the blastocyst, and expulsion of the fetus. Scientific
investigations have concluded that approximately 30% of spontaneous abortions are
caused by chromosomal abnormalities such as aneuploidy (an abnormal number of
chromosomes). Many more are caused by anatomical deformities. Barr, supra note 61,
at 462-63; Messite & Bond, Reproductive Toxicology and Occupational Exposure in
DEVELOPMENTS IN OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 61 (C. Zenz ed. 1980); Yager, Congenital
Malformations and Environmental Influence, 15 J. OccuP. MED. 724 (1973). See also
Stein, Susser, Warburton, Wittes and Kline, Spontaneous Abortion as a Screening Device:
The Effect of Fetal Survival on the Incidence of Birth Defects, 102 AM. J. EPIDEM. 275
(1975).
" See notes 101, 102, 127-132 and accompanying text infra.
72 Claxton and Barry, Chemical Mutagenesis: An Emerging Issue for Public Health,
67 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1037 (1977); Buffler and Aase, Genetic Risks and Environmen-
tal Surveillance: Epidemiological Aspects of Monitoring Industrial Populations for En-
vironmental Mutagens, 24 J. OccuP. MED. 305 (1982).
73 There are several methods for monitoring human populations for genetic defects:
cytogenetic studies, which measure the rate of either numerical or structural chromosomal
abnormalities; surveillance of birth defects for major and minor congenital malforma-
tions; and monitoring to ascertain the causes of spontaneous abortions and infertility.
Industrial populations are considered very well suited for such monitoring because of
the many substances workers are exposed to and the possibility of ascertaining, with
a certain degree of precision, the level and the length of exposure. Industrial workers
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genetic changes may go unnoticed for years. Dominant and recessive
mutations may affect germ and somatic cells of either parent or of the
fetus. 74 Dominant cell mutations appear in the direct descendant of the
affected individual (parent or fetus) while recessive cell mutations may
stay hidden for years and appear only in future generations. 71
There is substantial evidence to suggest that many mutagenic substances
may also be carcinogenic. 76 This connection is manifested by the increased
predisposition for leukemia in patients affected by genetic disorders such
as Down's syndrome, Trisomy D, Kleinfelter's syndrome, Falconi syn-
drome and Bloom's syndrome. 77
Post-conception agents are chemicals which cross the placenta through
diffusion and thus affect the fetus during all the stages of gestation. 78
These substances may be divided into three categories: embryo-fetotoxins,
teratogens, and carcinogens. 79 Embryo-fetotoxic chemicals may cause
fetal death, morphologic and metabolic malformations, growth retar-
dation, and various post-natal developmental disabilities including
psychological and behavioral impairments.8"
may also be more willing to cooperate with the monitoring process since they and their
offspring are the ones ultimately affected. Buffler and Aase, supra note 72, at 312. See
also French and Bierman, Probabilities of Fetal Mortality, 77 PUB. HEALTH REP. 835 (1962);
Taylor, On the Methodology of Measuring the Probability of Fetal Death in a Prospec-
tive Study, 36 HuMAN BIOL. 86 (1964).
71 Buffler and Aase, supra note 72, at 312.
75 Id.
76 See, Ames, Lee and Durston, An Improved Bacterial Test System for the Detec-
tion and Classification of Mutagens and Carcinogens, 70 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. Sci. 782-83
(1973). Dr. Ames of the University of California at Berkeley developed a Salmonella
test for screening chemicals for cancer-causing properties. The Ames test protocol ex-
amines mutagenicity as an indicator of carcinogenicity based on the hypothesis that a
chemical which causes mutations in bacteria may cause cancer in animals and humans.
The test of 300 chemicals indicated that 90% of human carcinogens are mutagenic in
bacterial systems. McCann, Choi, Yamasaki and Ames, Detection of Carcinogens as
Mutagens in the Salmonella Microsome Test: Assay of 300 Chemicals, 72 PROC. NAT'L.
ACAD. Sci. 5135, 5137 (1975). The Environmental Protection Agency Office of Pesticides
and Toxic Substances (OPTS) has established a program "GENE-TOX" to evaluate the
current status of bioassays in genetic toxicology. One of the aims of GENE-TOX is to
appraise the performance of various test systems as predictors of chemical mutagenicity
and carcinogenicity. Josephson, Data Base for Genotoxicology, 15 ENv. Sci. & TECHN.
143 (1981).
7 See Kundson, Mutation and Human Cancer, 17 ADV. CANCER REs. 317-352 (1973),
(cited in Claxton and Barry, supra note 72, at 1037).
71 Karrh, Carmody, Clyne, Gould, Portela-Cubria, Smith and Freifeld, Guidance
for the Evaluation Risk Assessment and Control of Chemical Embryo - Fetotoxics, 23
J. OccUP. MED. 397 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Karrh]; Yager, supra note 70, at 724;
Strobino, supra note 67, at 376.
7 Karrh, supra note 78, at 397; Barr, supra note 61, at 461; Manson, supra note
60, at 326.
80 Karrh, supra note 78, at 397.
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Teratogens are toxic substances which act upon the fetus either in-
directly by affecting the male or female before conception, or by distur-
bing the mother's metabolism during pregnancy. They also act directly
by damaging the embryonic tissue. 81 These substances have been defin-
ed as the causes, mechanisms, and manifestations of developmental devia-
tions of either structural or functional nature. 82 Teratogens affect the fetus
at different stages of organ development (organogenesis). 83 The toxic effect
upon the embryo and the fetus may vary depending upon the precise
period of time during the organogenetic process that the exposure takes
place. 84 This situation is indeed dangerous because it is during this time
interval (i.e., the first weeks of gestation) that the woman is the least
likely to know she is pregnant. 85 Therefore, policies which exclude preg-
nant women from environments in which they may be exposed to
teratogens may not be sufficient to protect the fetus from harm.8 6
Carcinogens are substances which are capable of crossing the placen-
ta and causing transformations in the cells of the fetus, thus causing cancer
11 Strobino, supra note 67, at 376; Manson, supra note 60, at 327.
82 J. WILSON, ENVIRONMENT AND BIRTH DEFECTS (1973), cited in Haas and Schot-
tenfeld, Risks to the Offspring from Parental Occupational Exposures, 21 J. OccuP. MED.
607 (1979).
11 See generally Nishimura and Shiota, Summary of Comparative Embryology and
Teratology in J. WILSON AND F. FRASER, 3 HANDBOOK OF TERATOLOGY 119-154; Yager,
supra note 70, at 724; V. HUNT, supra note 63, at 112.
84 Scientific studies regarding teratogenic effects of chemicals on various mammals
have concluded that: 1) the stage of embryonic development is determinative regarding
the effect of the chemical; 2) the magnitude of the outcome is dose-dependent; 3) the
effect of the teratogen depends upon the genotype; and 4) a teratogenic agent's action
in a particular mode on the cell metabolism results in either damage to the genetic
mechanism or to the cell physiology. J. LANGMAN, MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 98-100 (1969),
cited in Yager, supra note 70, at 724. The precise mechanism that causes abnormal em-
bryonic development is not yet well understood because the primary site of toxic action
has not been completely identified. Teratogenic agents are believed to act above a cer-
tain threshold level. Therefore, "teratogenesis in simplest terms depends upon destruc-
tion of a critical number of cells in excess of those which the embryo can restore by
later proliferation." Wilson, Current Status of Teratology - General Principles and
Mechanisms Derived from Animal Studies in J. WILSON AND F. FRASER, 1 HANDBOOK
OF TERATOLOGY, cited in Manson, supra note 60, at 325.
The critical period of exposure to teratogens occurs during the early organ differen-
tiation (eighteenth through thirtieth day). Severe injuries during the first seventeen days
of gestation may result in death of the fertilized ovum. Lower-level exposures for longer
period of time may produce long-term malformations which may or may not be ob-
vious at birth. The period of heightened sensitivity to exposure to teratogens continues
through the sixtieth day of gestation. During the following period of development the
susceptibility of the fetus to teratogens decreases. Karrh supra note 78, at 398.
"5 Warshaw, Non-Medical Issues Presented by the Pregnant Worker, 21 J. OccuP.
MED. 89, 90 (1979); Stillman, Women in the Workplace: A Legal Perspective, 20 J. Oc-
cuP. MED. 605, 608 (1978); Manson, supra note 60, at 327.
6 See infra notes 252-65 and accompanying text.
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in the offspring.87 Transplacental carcinogens may act either directly on
the fetal tissue, or indirectly, by activation of fetal or maternal enzymes.88
Animal experimentation has indicated that the most critical stage for the
direct action of transplacental carcinogens occurs at the beginning of
organogenesis8 9 The identification of carcinogens can be difficult because
of a long latency period between the original exposure and the time the
tumor is diagnosed.9o Some scientists suggest that transplacental car-
cinogenesis should not be viewed apart from adult human carcinogenesis,
but rather as a related phenomenon which occurs during gestation. Thus
far, no agents have been identified which act as carcinogens exclusively
on the fetus, but it is clear that the fetus is more susceptible than the
adult organism to transplacental carcinogens, 91 particularly with respect
to the exposure dose levels.
Mutagenesis, teratogenesis, and carcinogenesis are related phenomena,
but the precise structure of the interrelation is not yet completely
understood.9 2 It is possible that the same chemical that causes spontaneous
abortion in the early stages of pregnancy may produce malformations
during organogenesis and neoplasia (cancer) when exposure occurs later
in the pregnancy.9 3 At least one scientist has argued that screening for
transplacental hazards should include, whenever possible, the entire range
of fetal response, including cancers that may develop sometime after
birth.9 4
87 Haas and Schottenfeld, supra note 82, at 607; Manson, supra note 60, at 326.
88 Rice, Carcinogenesis: A Late Effect of Irreversible Toxic Damage During Develop-
ment, 18 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 133, 134-35 (1976). The only substance that has
been identified so far as a transplacental carcinogen is diethylstillbesterol (DES). This
drug was perscribed in the 50's to pregnant women for the prevention of spontaneous
abortions. Female offspring of these women displayed an increase in vaginal and cer-
vical clear - cell adenocarcinoma, vaginal adenosis,and ridges. Clement Associates, supra
note 30, at A-14; Ulfelder, The Stillbesterol-Adenosis-Carcinoma Syndrome, 38 CANCER
426-31 (1976) cited in Manson, supra note 60, at 327. See generally Welch, Barnes, Robby
& Herbst, Transplacental Carcinogenesis: Prenatal Diethyl-Stillbestrol (DES) Exposure,
Clear Cell Carcinoma and Related Anomalies of the Genital Tract in Young Females,
in SOCIETY FOR OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE
ON WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE. 47-50 (E. Bingham ed. 1976).
89 Manson, supra note 60, at 327. Transplacental carcinogens which require metabolic
activation act during the second trimester and generally late in gestation after the critical
period for teratogens. Rice, supra note 88, at 133, 135; Manson, supra note 60, at 327.
90 Rice, An Overview of Transplacental Chemical Carcinogenisis 8 TERATOLOGY
113-26 (1973) (cited in Manson, supra note 60, at 327); Fraumeni, Chemicals in Human
Teratogenesis and Transplacental Carcinogenesis, 58 PEDIATRICS 807 (1974).
9 Rice, supra note 88, at 137-38; Manson, supra note 60, at 327.
92 Haas and Schottenfeld, supra note 82, at 607; Manson, supra note 60, at 326.




It should be noted that even though the scientific literature has con-
centrated on the effects of toxic substances on the female, 9s there is some
literature that addresses the reproductive impact of paternal exposure
to these substances.6 There appear to be two mechanisms that may
establish a connection between male exposure to toxic chemicals and
detrimental reproductive consequences. First, paternal exposure, either
in conjunction with maternal exposure or independently, may affect the
female and thus the fetus 97 Second, an exposure which damages the sperm
may cause either infertility or a malformed conceptus.9 8
C. Toxic Chemical Substances
1. Vinyl Chloride
Vinyl chloride (VC) is a chemical which is used as a raw material in
the manufacture of plastics, vinyl and synthetic rubbers.9 9 Exposure to
VC has been linked to various abnormalities, including chromosomal
aberrations, and also to birth defects, such as malformations of the cen-
tral nervous system and of the genital organs.100
Chromosomal abnormalities have been observed in men employed in
VC manufacturing plants. Studies have matched exposed workers and
healthy controls to ascertain the magnitude and the extent of the aber-
rations. Some of these studies indicated that there was a high correla-
tion between the length and the level of the exposure and the incidence
and magnitude of the abnormalities.101 Follow-up investigations have
reported that the degree of abnormalities returned to normal after the
11 See supra notes 23, 30, 57, 60, 61, 67, 70, 78, 88 and accompanying text.
96 See, e.g., Strobino, supra note 67, at 388; Manson and Simons, supra note 30,
at 155-79.
97 Strobino, supra note 67, at 388. The semen may serve as a route to excretion
of toxic chemical substances which are transmitted to the female during intercourse and
absorbed through the vaginal mucosa. Clement Associates, supra note 30, at H-3; Man-
son and Simons, supra note 30, at 171.
98 Strobino, supra note 67, at 388. See also infra notes 101, 103, 108, 112-15 and
accompanying text.
91 Technology: Industry's Latest Cancer Scare. Bus. WEEK Feb. 23, 1984, at 100, 102.
100 Purchase, Richardson, Anderson, Paddle and Adams, Chromosomal Analyses
in Vinyl Chloride - Exposed Workers, 57 MUTAT. RES. 325 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Purchase]; Anderson, Richardson, Weight, Purchase and Adams, Chromosomal Analysis
in Vinyl Chloride Exposed Workers Resulting from Analysis 18 and 42 Months after
an Initial Sampling, 79 MUTAT. REs. 151 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Anderson]; Infante,
Wagoner and Waxweiler, Carcinogenic, Mutagenic and Teratogenic Risks Associated
with Vinyl Chloride, 41 MUTAT. RES. 131 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Infante].
101 One study involving 57 workers who had been employed in VC industries for
six to fifteen years reported that the workers had an increase in the incidence of
chromosomal abnormalities in their lymphoctyes by comparison with 24 control workers.
The increase in all types of abnormalities was observed and it was greater in groups
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airborne VC levels were lowered through industrial hygiene engineer-
ing controls. However, this decrease in chromosomal aberrations was
achieved only at least 2.5 years after the high exposure levels. 10 2 It ap-
pears, therefore, that at least for a limited period of time, exposure to
high dose levels of VC causes injury to the germ cells of the father.
Some studies have also suggested a correlation between paternal ex-
posure to VC and fetal loss due to spontaneous abortions in their wives. 13
Pregnancy outcomes in the wives of men exposed to vinyl chloride
monomer (VCM) were even less favorable than those experienced by
wives of a group of polymerization and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) fabrica-
tion workers. 104 These observations have been challenged by other resear-
chers on the basis that the data were obtained without sufficient
safeguards, such as the elimination of intervening factors which could
have also affected pregnancy negatively.105
The significance of the data obtained to date regarding both
chromosomal abnormalities and negative pregnancy outcomes resulting
from paternal exposures to VC is still open to question because of the
inconclusiveness of such data.10 6 Even so, vinyl chloride represents a good
example of the dilemma involved in the study and regulation of toxic
chemicals particularly with regard to reproductive hazards.07
expected to have a high exposure, such as autoclave operators. Purchase, supra note
100, at 328-31. Another study correlated known heavy levels of exposure to statistically
significant higher frequency of chromosome breakage (3.7% vs. 1.79% in controls). Hans-
teen, Hillestad, Thiis-Evenseer and Heldaas, Effects of Vinyl Chloride in Man: A
Cytogenetic Follow-up Study, 51 MUTAT. REs. 271, 279-81 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Hansteen]. See also Fleig and Theiss, Mutagenicity of Vinyl Chloride, 20 J. OccuP. MED.
557 (1978).
102 Anderson, supra note 100, at 161-62, Hansteen, supra note 101, at 278.
101 Waxweiler, Falk, McMichael, Mallor and Grivas, A Cross-Sectional Epidemiologic
Survey of Vinyl Chloride Workers, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
Division of Surveillance, Hazard Evaluation,and Field Studies (1977) cited in Clement
Associates, supra note 30, at IV-26; Infante, Wagoner, McMichael, Waxweiler and Falk,
Genetic Risks of Vinyl Chloride, 1 LANCET 734-35 (1976); Infante, supra note 100, at
140-41.
104 Infante, supra note 103, at 734-35.
105 Clement Associates, supra note 30, at IV-26; Haas and Schottenfeld, supra note
92, at 610.
106 Clement Associates, supra note 30, at IV-26.
107 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) had issued stan-
dards regulating workplace exposure to vinyl chloride when it was discovered that VC
was a carcinogen. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017 (1983). See also Society of the Plastics Indus.
v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). The court upheld
the validity of the standards despite the industry's claims that the OSHA standard was
not substantiated by firm medical evidence. The court commented that "the evidence
is quite sufficient to warrant the [OSHA] Secretary's choice.... [Ilt must be remembered
that we are dealing ... with human lives, and the record reveals that 11 manufacturing
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Occupational exposure to chloroprene, which is similar in chemical
structure to vinyl chloride, has been linked with a decrease in the fertili-
ty of and the number of sperm in male workers. It has also been linked
to a significant increase in miscarriages suffered by their wives. 108
Chloroprene has also been identified as being mutagenic and possibly
carcinogenic. 109
2. Dibromochloropropane
Dibromochloropropane (DBCP) is a widely used agricultural fumigant
and pesticide. DBCP has been recognized as an animal testicular toxin'10
and as a mutagen, 1 1 but until 1977 workers engaged in the manufac-
ture or use of this chemical were not tested for reproductive impairments.
When these workers were finally examined the test results showed that
even though they were normal, many had no viable sperm in their semen
(agospermia) and showed elevated levels of follicle stimulating hormone
(FSH), an indication of testicular damage. Other workers had low sperm
counts, below 20 million sperms per millimeter (oligospermia) . 2 Another
study showed that after the exposure had started three times as many
plant workers ... have died from the effects of the potent chemical." Id. at 1308. See
also Doerr v. B.F. Goodrich, 484 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (discussing the justifica-
tion for the company's exclusionary policies with regard to female employees based on
the evidence regarding the correlation between the risks of congenital malformations
and exposure to VC). Id. at 321.
108 Infante, Wagoner and Young, Chloroprene: Observations of Carcinogenesis and
Mutagenesis, presented at the Meeting on Origins of Human Cancer, Cold Spring Har-
bor Laboratory, Cold Spring Harbor, cited in Strobino, supra note 67, at 387; Infante,
Wagoner and Young, Chloroprene: Observations of Carcinogenesis and Mutagenesis,
presented at the Workshop on Methodology for Assessing Reproductive Hazards in the
Workplace, NiosH - SOEH, April 19-22, 1978, cited in Manson, supra note 60, at 328.
109 Infante, Mutagenic and Carcinogenic Risks Associated with Halogenated Olefins,
21 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 251 (1977); Infante, Wagoner and Young, supra note 108.
110 Torkelson, Sadek, Rowe, Kodama, Anderson, Lozuvam and Hine, Toxicologic
Investigations of 1, 2 -dibromochloropropane, 3 J. ToxICOL. APPL. PHARMACOL. 549,
558-89 (1961).
I" Rosencranz, Genetic Activity of 1, 2 -dibromo-3-chloro- propane, a Widely Us-
ed Fumigant, 14 BUL. ENVIRON. CONTAM. ToxiCOL. 8-12 (1975) (cited in Goldsmith,
Potashnik and Israeli, Reproductive Outcomes in Families of DBCP-Exposed Men, 39
ARCH. ENVTL. HEALTH 85 (March/April 1984) [hereinafter cited as Goldsmith]).
"I Whorton, Krauss, Marshall and Milby, Infertility in Male Pesticide Workers,
2 LANCET 12, 89-61 (1977); Whorton, Milby, Krauss and Stubbs, Testicular Function
in DBCP Exposed Pesticide Workers 21 J. OccuP. MED. 161, 166 (1979). A one year
follow-up study of 12 azospermic and 9 oligospermic production workers showed no
recovery of spermatogenesis and no pregnancies among the wives of azospermic men,
but the sperm count of 7 of the oligospermic men increased and 4 of them had children.
Whorton and Milby, Recovery of Testicular Function Among DBCP Workers, 22 J. Oc-
CUP. MED. 177-79 (1980).
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pregnancies of wives of DBCP exposed workers ended in spontaneous
abortions as before the exposure had occurred.113
A recent five year follow-up study of DBCP exposed workers and their
families showed that spermatogenic recovery does occur after the cessa-
tion of exposure to the chemical.114 Also, children born to wives of these
men appear to be in good health. It seems, therefore, that DBCP may
not have long lasting or permanent effects.115
3. Polychlorinated Biphenyls
Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's) have been in production for ap-
proximately forty years and are now universally considered to be a ma-
jor environmental pollutant.1 16 Animal experiments have indicated a
variety of reproductive consequences linked to exposure to PCB's. Some
of these repercussions include low birth weights,117 spontaneous abor-
tions, still births, perinatal death,"' irregular menstrual cycles, and ex-
cessive bleeding.1 9 Some studies conclude that PCB's are teratogenic.1 20
113 Kharrazi, Potashnik and Goldsmith, Reproductive Effects of
Dibromochloropropane, 16 ISR. J. MED. Sci. 403-06 (1980) cited in Goldsmith, supra
note 111, at 86.
114 Goldsmith, supra note 111, at 86-89. Other studies showed that there was recovery
of spermatogenesis in 4 of 13 azospermic men four years after the exposure had ended
and 5 of the 8 men who were initially oligospermic fathered children. Potashnik, Yanai-
lubar and Sober, Recovery of Human Testicular Function Suppression Caused by
Dibromo-chloropropane in 5 ADVANCES IN DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF INFERTILITY
313-20 (V. Insler and G. Belterdorf eds. 1981) cited in Goldsmith, supra note 111, at 86.
"I1 Goldsmith, supra note 111, at 89.
116 PCB POISONING AND POLLUTION (K. Higuchi ed. 1976) cited in Urabe, Koda and
Asahi, Present State of Yusho Patients, 320 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. ScI. 273 (1979). In 1968
there was a case of mass PCB poisoning in Japan caused by the distribution of cooking
oil contaminated with PCB. Among the many other catastrophic consequences of the
poisoning, children displayed retarded growth and abnormal tooth development.
Newborn babies showed systemic pigmentation and SFD (small for date). Urabe, Koda
and Asahi, at 273-74.
117 Shiota, Tanimura and Nishimura, Effects of Polychlorinated Biphenyls on Pre-
and Postnatal Development in Rats, 10 TERATOLOGY 97 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Shiota];
Villeneuve, Grant, Khera, Clegg, Baer and Phillips, The Fetotoxicity of Polychlorinated
Biphenyls Mixture (Aroclor 1254) in the Rabbit and in the Rat, 1 ENVIRON. PHYSIOL.
67, 69-71 (1971).
11 Allen and Barsotti, The Effects of Transplacental and Mammary Movement of
PCBs on Infant Rhesus Monkeys, 6 ToxIcoLoGY 331, 340 (1976); Shiota, supra note 117,
at 71.
19 Barsotti, Marlar and Allen, Reproductive Dysfunction in Rhesus Monkeys Ex-
posed to Low Levels of Polychlorinated Biphenyls (Aroclor 1248), 14 FOOD COSMET. Tox-
ICOL. 99 (1976).
120 National Institutes for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Criteria for
A Recommended Standard - Occupational Exposure to Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs)
(1977).
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Another serious consequence of exposure to PCB's is ability of the
chemical to be transmitted to the newborn animal through the mother's
milk. 121
Many of the deleterious effects observed in animal experimentation
have also been verified in human subjects subsequent to major acciden-
tal exposures. 122 Women exposed to PCB-contaminated rice oil have
shown such symptoms as abnormal or irregular menstrual cycles which
are indicative of abnormal ovarian function. 123 One recent study examined
the transfer of PCB from the mother to the infant either perinatally
through the placenta or postpartum through the milk. 124 The results of
the study showed that the PCB levels increased in the mother's blood
during pregnancy, and at delivery they were significantly higher than
in the umbilical cord blood. The PCB levels in breast-fed infants rose
markedly with the ingestion of human milk, exceeding at age three months
the level in the blood of their mothers, and that it continued to increase
until the infants reached one year of age. However, the PCB levels in
bottle-fed infants remained at a low concentration level during the same
period. The study seems to suggest that the quantity of PCB transferred
to infants from their mothers through the milk is much greater than that
transferred via the placenta. 125
121 Allen, Barsotti, Lambrecht and Van Miller, Reproductive Effects of Halogenated
Aromatic Hydrocarbons on Nonhuman Primates, 320 ANN. N.Y. ACA. Sci. 419, 424
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Allen]. The neonates displayed such symptoms of exposure
to the toxin as swollen eyelids and reduced growth rate while they were nursing. These
symptoms disappeared after weaning. Significantly, fetotoxicity was observed in PCB-
treated monkeys even when the mothers were removed from the experimental diets and
all overt signs of reproductive dysfunction had disappeared. Further complications of
exposure to PCBs in utero and from mother's milk have been suggested in the studies
on nonhuman primates. In addition to the development of acne, swollen eyelids, loss
of eyelashes, and reduced growth rate, these infants have inadequately developed lym-
phoid tissues which seemingly were responsible for the increased susceptibility to infec-
tion. More subtle effects of PCB exposure on the fetus and neonate occurred in the cen-
tral nervous system. Some data indicate that permanent learning and behavioral defi-
ciencies are complications resulting from PCB exposure during fetal and neonatal develop-
ment in nonhuman primates. Id. at 424.
122 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
123 Hirayama, Chemical Aspects of PCB Poisoning in PCB POISONING AND PULLU-
TION (K. Higuchi ed. 1976) cited in Allen, supra note 20, at 424; Kuratsume, Yoshimura,
Matsuzaka and Yamaguchi, Epidemiologic Study on Yusho, a Poisoning Caused by In-
gestion of Rice Oil Contaminated with Commercial Brand of Polychlorinated Biphenyls,
1 ENVIRON. HEALTH PERSP. 119, 127-28 (1972).
124 Kodama and Ota, Transfer of Polychlorinated Biphenyls to Infants from their
Mothers, 35 ARCH. ENVIRON. HEALTH 95 (1980).
125 Id. at 100.
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4. Hydrocarbons
Benzene, which is one of the chemicals most used by the American
petrochemical industry, has been identified as a potential mutagen causing
chromosomal aberrations following heavy occupational exposure. 126 One
study of twenty male workers exposed to benzene for over twenty years
has shown the existence of chromosomal abnormalities in 2.5% of all
cells, compared to 1.0% to 1.4% for unexposed controls. Most of the
excess was attributable to aberrations of the unstable types. 127 Also the
number of unstable alterations per normal cell was higher in the cells
of the exposed workers than in those of the controls. 128
Another study addressed the effects on workers of sequential exposures
to benzene, toluene, and xylene respectively. Workers who were expos-
ed exclusively to toluene were also examined.129 The study showed a
significantly higher proportion of abnormal cells in the benzene-exposed
workers than in the matched controls. In the group of workers exposed
to toluene only, no such excess was present.130
Generally, these studies indicate that the exposure to high levels of
benzene results in an increased incidence of chromosomal aberrations
which might persist for years after the exposure has ended.' 3 ' These
chromosomal aberrations might also occur in the germ cells of exposed
workers and consequently be genetically transmitted to next generations
thus resulting in fetal death, congenital malformations, or cancer. 132
Several studies have examined the possibility of establishing a correla-
tion between the incidence of cancer in children of parents employed
in hydrocarbon-related occupations and their parents' occupational ex-
posures to hydrocarbons. 13 3 The first such study concluded that the
16 Tough and Court Brown, Chromosome Aberrations and Exposure to Ambient
Benzene, 1 LANCET 684 (1965); Forni, Pacifico and Limonta, Chromosome Studies in
Workers Exposed to Benezene or Toluene or Both, 22 ARCH. ENVIRON. HEALTi 373 (1971);
Forni, Cappellini, Pacifico and Vigliani, Chromosome Changes and their Evaluation in
Subjects With Past Exposure to Benzene, 23 ARCH. ENVIRON. HEALTH 385 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Fornil.
127 Tough and Court Brown, supra note 126, at 684.
128 Id.
129 Forni, supra note 126, at 376-78.
130 The group of subjects exposed to toluene did show a somewhat higher rate of
unstable chromosome changes compared to the controls, but the difference was not
statistically significant. Id. at 377-78.
131 Forni, supra note 126, at 390.
13I See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
133 Fabia and Thuy, Occupation of Father at Time of Birth of Children Dying of
Malignant Diseases, 28 BR. J. PREY. Soc. MED. 98 (1974); Hakulinen, Salonen and Tep-
po, Cancer in the Offspring of Fathers in Hydrocarbon - Related Occupations, 30 BR.
J. PREy. Soc. MED. 138 (1976); Zack, Cannon, Loyd, Heath, Falletta, Jones, Housworth
and Crowley, Cancer in Children of Parents Exposed to Hydrocarbon - Related Industries
and Occupations, 111 AM. J. EPIDEM. 329 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Zack].
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relative odds of cancer in the children of men involved in hydrocarbon-
related jobs were higher than for children in a matched control group. 3 4
Two other studies have found no such correlation, but as the results of
these investigations suggest, the data regarding the possible link between
cancer in the offspring and the parents' occupation are not completely
understood or sufficiently addressed.135
5. Lead
The deleterious reproductive effects resulting from industrial exposure
to lead have been known since the end of the nineteenth century and
the beginning of the twentieth century 136 when European factory health
inspectors reported an increase in the incidence of infertility, abortion,
stillbirths, fetal death, and macrocephaly in women occupationally ex-
posed to lead. 137 Lead has been linked to reproductive dysfunction in
both men and women 13 8 who absorbed it mainly through inhalation. 139
134 Fabia and Thuy, supra note 133, at 98. The study considered the following oc-
cupations as being hydrocarbon-related: motor vehical mechanic, service station at-
tendant, machinist, miner, lumberman, painter, dyer and cleaner. The series was com-
prised of 386 children who had died of malignant disease under the age of five during
the years of 1965-70 in Quebec, and a matched control group of 772 children. Com-
parison of these cases with the controls showed that in the test group there was a signifi-
cant excess of fathers in hydrocarbon-related occupations; the relative risk was 2.1. The
types of cancers found in the test group included: leukemia-lymphoma, nervous system
malignancy, and other tumors. The investigation was based on children under age five.
Id. at 100.
135 A similar study was conducted in Finland but it included in its sampling pool
children up to the age of 15. Contrary to the Quebec study, the risk ratio in this study
was one which suggested that the "hydrocarbon-related" occupation of the father at the
time of conception was not a risk factor for subsequent malignant disease in the offspr-
ing. However the Finnish researchers remarked that they "were unable to exclude the
risk ratio of 2.1 ... for children under five years of age." Hakulinen, Salonen and Tep-
po, supra note 133, at 140. The same results were obtained by Zack, supra note 133,
at 333-36.
136 V. HUNT, supra note 30, at 201-02; Needleman, Rabinowitz, Leviton, Linn and
Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between Prenatal Exposure to Lead and Congenital
Anomalies, 251 J.A.M.A. 2956 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Needleman]. See generally
Y. SoR, EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDY ON THE EFFECTS OF MERCURY AND LEAD UPON THE INCIDENCE
OF NEUROLOGICAL CONGENITAL MALFORMATIONS, CEREBRAL PALSY AND FETAL DEATH (1972).
137Oliver, A Lecture on Lead Poisoning and the Race; 1 BR. MED. J. 1096-98 (1911),
cited in Needleman, supra note 136, at 2956.
138 See generally U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Air Quality Criteria
for Lead (1977) [hereinafter cited as USEPA LEAD]; Clement Associates, supra note 30,
at IV-25-26.
139 See Kehoe, Standards for the Prevention of Occupational Lead Poisoning, 23
ARCH. ENV. HEALTH 245 (1971); Urbanowicz, Occupational Exposure to Inorganic Com-
pounds of Lead, 23 ARCH. ENV. HEALTH 284 (1971); Malcolm, Prevention of Long-Term
Sequelae Following the Absorption of Lead, 23 ARCH. ENV. HEALTH 292 (1971); See
generally 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 App. A. (1984).
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Medical evidence regarding occupational exposure of males to lead in-
dicates that such exposure may lead to impotence, sterility, and decreased
fertility. 140 Paternal exposure has also been associated with incidence of
Wilm's tumor in the offspring.141 Wives of men employed in the lead
industry have also suffered increased abortions, stillbirths, and miscar-
riages. 142
Both men and women occupationally exposed to lead have been shown
to suffer from chromatid and chromosomal aberrations. 143 Medical
evidence regarding the effect of lead on female reproductive outcomes
indicates that exposure to this metal may lead to increased spontaneous
abortions, stillbirths, and prenatal death. 144 Lead also has the ability to
cross the placenta and act upon the fetus as a teratogen. 145 Neurological
140 One study has shown that long-term exposure of male workers to lead has resulted
in alterations in spermatogenesis, thus leading to a substantial decrease in fertility. This
germinal insufficiency was caused by the direct toxic effect of lead on the gonads rather
than through hypothalamic intervention. Lancranjan, Popescu, Gavanescu, Klepsch and
Serbanescu, Reproductive Ability of Workmen Occupationally Exposed to Lead, 30 ARCH.
ENV. HEALTH 396, 400 (1975); See also Bell and Thomas, Effects of Lead on Mammalian
Reproduction, in LEAD TOXICITY 169, 174 (Singhal and Thomas eds. 1980).
141 Kantor, Curnen, Meigs and Flannery, Occupations of Fathers of Patients with
Wilm's Turnour, 33 J. EPIDEMIOL. COMMUNITY HEALTH 253, 255 (1979).
142 This may be due to passage of lead from the male through the semen which could
influence the fetus directly. Bell and Thomas, supra note 140, at 169. See also USEPA
Lead, supra note 138, at 9; Manson and Simons, supra note 30, at 171-73.
143 Forni, Sciame, Bertazzi and Alessio, Chromosome and Bio-chemical Studies in
Women Occupationally Exposed to Lead, 35 ARCH. ENV. HEALTH 139, 144-45 (1980);
Deknudt, Leonard and Ivanov, Chromosome Aberrations Observed in Male Workers
Occupationally Exposed to Lead, 3 ENVIRON. PHYSIOL. BIOCHEM. 132, 137-38 (1973); Forni,
Cambiaghi and Secchi, Initial Occupational Exposure to Lead: Chromosome and
Biochemical Findings, 31 ARCH. ENv. HEALTH 73, 77-78 (1976).
144 USEPA Lead, supra note 138, at 9-15; Needleman, supra note 136, at 2956; Angle
and Mclntire, Lead Poisoning During Pregnancy, 108 AM. J. Dis. CHILD. 436, 439 (1964);
Clement Associates,supra note 30 at IV-25; Y. SOR, supra note 136, at 106-07.
145 Lauwerys, Buchet, Roels and Hubermont, Placental Transfer of Lead, Mercury,
Cadmium, and Carbon Monoxide in Women, I. Comparison of the Frequency Distribu-
tions of the Biological Indices in Maternal and Umbilical Cord Blood, 15 ENV. RES. 278,
280 (1978); Roels, Hubermont, Buchet and Lauwerys, Placental Transfer of Lead, Mer-
cury, Cadmium and Carbon Monoxide in Women, III. Factors Influencing the Accumula-
tion of Heavy Metals in the Placenta and the Relationship Between Metal Concentra-
tions in the Placenta and in Maternal and Cord Blood, 16 ENV. REs. 236, 240 (1978).
This study has shown that there is a relationship between umbilical cord blood lead levels
and the risk of minor congenital anomaly. Also the overall incidence of various con-
genital anomalies was increased in newborns with high lead levels in their blood.
Needleman, supra note 136, at 2958. See also Rabinowitz, Leviton and Needleman,
Variability of Blood Lead Concentrations During Infancy, 39 ARCH. ENv. HEALTH 74
(1984); Gerber, Leonard and Jacquet, Toxicity, Mutagenicity and Teratogenicity of Lead,
76 MUTAT. RES. 115-41 (1977).
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and psychological impairments in the offspring of lead-exposed mothers
have also been reported.146
Because of the overwhelming scientific evidence regarding the reproduc-
tive effects of lead, many industrial employers have chosen to exclude
females from workplaces where they might be negatively affected by lead.
In the lead and zinc industries, fertile women workers have been transfer-
red or dismissed from jobs where they might be exposed to high levels
of airborne lead. Some of the companies reported to have instituted such
policies are Allied Chemical, American Cyanamid, B.F. Goodrich, Dow
Chemical, DuPont, General Motors, Monsanto and Olin.147 Sadly, in
some instances, women have chosen to undergo surgical sterilizations
such as tubal litigations or hysterectomies to retain their jobs.148
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration has issued stan-
dards and regulations regarding workplace lead levels. 49 The Lead Stan-
dard is a worthwhile attempt to regulate a reproductive toxin. However,
as will be shown later in this article,1-0 it is an inadequate model for future
guidelines which must be aimed at striking a balance between the health
of the fetus and the interests of the woman in having equal access to
employment opportunities.
146 Y. SOR, supra note 136, at 107; Rennert, Weiner and Madden, Asymptomatic
Lead Poisoning in 85 Chicago Children, 9 CLIN. PEDIAT. 9 (1970); Rajegowda, Lead Con-
centrations in the Newborn Infant, 82 J. PEDIAT. 60 (1982); Beattie, Moore, Goldberg,
Finlayson et al., Role of Chronic Low-Level Lead Exposure in the Aetiology of Mental
Retardation, 1 LANCET 589, 592 (1975). Neurological impairment has also been observ-
ed in animals who were administered low levels of lead during neurogenesis. Aveill and
Needleman, Neonatal Lead Exposure Retards Cortical Synaptogenesis in the Rat, in Low
LEVEL LEAD ExPosURE: THE CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT RESEARCH 201, 208-10
(H. Needleman ed. 1980). Behavioral studies conducted on the offspring of rats exposed
to lead before conception showed impaired learning suggesting that the gametotoxic ef-
fects of lead can be expressed in behavioral impairment at doses well below those which
produce macroscopic anatomic abnormality. Brady, Herrera and Zenick, Influence of
Parental Lead Exposure on Subsequent Learning Ability of Offspring, 3 PHARMOCOL.
BIOCHEM. BEHAV. 561, 563-65 (1975).
147 Bayer, Women, Work and Reproductive Hazards, THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT,
Oct. 1982, at 14, 15; Rawls, Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace, CHEM. & ENG.
NEWS 30 (Feb. 11, 1980); McGhee, Workplace Hazards: No Women Need Apply, THE
PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 1977, at 20, 21; Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus:
The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Ti-
tle VII, 69 GEO. L. J. 641, 647-53 (1981); Merenson, Women Workers Are Sterilized or
They Lose Their Jobs, CIVIL LIBERTIES, (July 1982). Bronson, Issue of Fetal Damage Stirs
Women Workers at Chemical Plants, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1979, at 1, col. 1; Bronson,
Allied Chemical Compensates Five Women Laid Off to Protect Child Bearing Ability,
Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1979, at 6 col. 5.
148 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
149 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1984).
150 See infra notes 255-65 and accompanying text.
1986-87]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
6. Other Chemicals
Many other chemicals have been suspected of causing reproductive
damage to both men and women. For example, occupational exposure
to carbon disulfide has been linked to spermatogenic impairment in
men.'51 It has also been linked to numerous disorders of the menstrual
and ovarian functions, increased incidence of spontaneous abortions,
and premature births in women. 5 2 Similarly, wives of men employed
in plants using ethylene dibromide have displayed a marked decrease
in fertility.5 3 Men working in kepone manufacturing plants have been
affected by reproductive failure caused by a substantial reduction in sperm
mobility.1 54 Occupational exposure to pesticides has been associated with
incidences of chromosomal aberrations,1- 5 increased frequency of miscar-
riages, toxemia, low birth weights, and histopathological changes in
placentas I S6 Further, there is considerable medical evidence that operating
room exposure to anesthetic gases causes an increase in the incidence
of spontaneous abortions'5 7 and of birth defects, 158 as well as decreased
birth weights.'5 9
151 Lancranjan, Popescu and Klepsch, Changes in Gonadic Function in Chronic Car-
bon Disulfide Poisoning, 60 MED. LAV. 566-571 (1969), cited in Clement Associates, supra
note 30, at A-11; See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH, CRITERIA FOR A RECOMMENDED STANDARD-OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO CARBON
DISULFIDE 10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NIOSH, CARBON DISULFIDEJ.
152 NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH CRITERIA FOR A
RECOMMENDED STANDARD-OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO WASTE ANESTHETIC GASES AND
VAPORS 12-14 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NIOSH - GASES AND VAPORS].
153 Wong, Utidjian and Karten, Retrospective Evaluation of Reproductive Perfor-
mance of Workers Exposed to Ethylene Dibromide (EDB), 21 J. OccuP. MED. 98, 101-02
(1979).
154 Taylor, Selhorst, Houff and Martinez, Chordecane Intoxication in Man: 1. Clinical
Observations, 28 NEUROLOGY 626, 629-30 (1978).
155 Yoder, Watson and Benson, Lymphocyte Chromosome Analysis of Agricultural
Workers During Extensive Occupational Exposure to Pesticides, 21 MUTAT. RES. 335,
(1973); Rabello, Becak, DeAlmeida, Pigati, Ungaro, Murata and Pereira, Cytogenetic
Study on Individuals Occupationally Exposed to DDT, 28 MUTAT. REs. 449, 453-54 (1975);
Kiraly, Szentesi, Ruzicska, and Czeize, Chromosome Studies in Workers Producing
Organophosphate Insecticides, 8 ARCH. ENVIRON. CONT. ToxICOL. 309, 317-18 (1979).
156 Clement Associates, supra note 30, at A-28.
157 NIOSH-GAsES AND VAPORS, supra note 152; Cohen, Bellville and Brown,
Anesthesia, Pregnancy and Miscarriage: A Study of Operating Room Nurses and
Anesthetics, 35 ANESTHESIOLOGY 343, 345 (1971); Knill-Jones, Rodrigues, Moir, and
Spence, Anesthetic Practice and Pregnancy, 1972 LANCET 1326, 1328 [hereinafter cited
as Knill-Jones].
158 Corbett, Cornell, Endres and Lieding, Birth Defects Among Children of Nurse-
Anesthetists, 41 ANESTHESIOLOGY 341, 343 (1974); Knill-Jones, supra note 157, at 1328.
159 Pharoah, Alberman, Doyle and Chamberlain, Outcome of Pregnancy Among
Women in Anesthetic Practice, 1977 LANCET 34, 36; Anesthesiologists Point Out Hazards




The discussion presented above regarding the toxic effects of certain
industrial chemicals upon the reproductive functions of humans indicates
that the workforce and particularly their progeny are in serious danger
due to the long term consequences of occupational exposures to toxic
substances. Faced with the enormity of this problem many industrial
employers have chosen to implement policies which exclude pregnant
workers from areas in which they may be exposed to reproductive tox-
ins. These policies are clearly inadequate because many of the toxic in-
dustrial chemicals affect the fetus during organogenesis occurring in the
first weeks of gestation 1 60 when the woman is least likely to know she
is pregnant. 161 Additionally, some of these substances affect both men
and women. 162 Therefore, companies must seek and design different
policies to adequately address and deal with these concerns.
A solution which appears attractive from all points of view, is lower-
ing the level of airborne concentrations of toxic substances. Unfortunately,
even if employers were able to achieve lower concentrations and therefore
lower the level of toxicity, the conceptus would still be threatened with
teratogenic damage, since no conclusive scientific answers are available
regarding the existence of threshold levels for exposure to teratogens.163
If a threshold exposure level does not exist, then any airborne concen-
tration above zero could have deleterious effects upon the embryo or
the fetus. 164
Even though it appears that there may not be any definitive or com-
pletely satisfactory solution to the problem of fetal protection, one fact
is quite clear - excluding only pregnant women from toxic environments
is not an acceptable answer.' 65 Based on these considerations, designing
a policy that would strike a realistic balance between women's employ-
ment rights and safeguarding the health of their progeny is a problem
that awaits a reasoned and principled solution.
160 Kuntz, The Pregnant Woman in Industry, AM. IND. HYG. A. J. 423, 424 (1976);
Yager, Congenital Malformations and Environmental Influence, 15 J. OccuP. MED. 724
(1973); Stellman, The Effects of Toxic Agents on Reproduction, Occup. HEALTH AND
SAFETY, April, 1979, at 36, 42; Manson, Human and Laboratory Animal Test Systems
Available for Detection of Reproductive Failure, 7 PREVENTIVE MED. 322, 325-26 (1978).
161 Generally pregnancy may not be conclusively detected in the first weeks after
conception, although one study indicates that it may be possible to detect it as soon
as nine days into the gestational period. Marshall, Hammond, Ross, Jacobson, Rayford
and Odell, Plasma and Urinary Chorionic Gonadotropin During Early Human Pregnancy,
32 OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 760 (1968), See also Noceti, supra note 31, at 999-1000.
162 See supra notes 100-06, 111-15, 108-46 and accompanying text.
163 Wilson, Current Status of Teratology - General Principles and Mechanisms Deriv-
ed from Animal Studies, 1 HANDBOOK or TERATOLOGY (J. Wilson and F. Fraser eds. 1977).
164 Id. See also Manson, supra note 160, at 324-25.
161 See infra notes 355-76 and accompanying text.
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III. REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
The problem of protecting workers' reproductive ability and the health
of their unborn children will be examined further in light of applicable
statutes. This analysis will show that the present legislative scheme,
although adequate for achieving its avowed goals, is not sufficient to
provide protection for the health of the offspring of the present day
workforce.
A. The Occupational Safety and Health Act
The issue of regulating workplace hazards has received considerable
scholarly66 and legislative attention. 167 Whatever the legislative approach
taken, it has to balance scientific and technological knowledge with the
reality of economic and political pragmatism. 16' The first such comprehen-
sive legislation aimed at protecting the health and safety of the American
workforce was the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHAct) of
1970.169
The Act represented the response of Congress to the overwhelming
evidence regarding the number of workers killed or disabled each year
in work-related incidents,17° and the economic impact caused by such
death or disability.17 1 The purpose of the Act is to assure: "so far as possi-
166 Some companies have implemented policies which exlude all women of child
bearing age from jobs involving exposure to toxic chemicals. Such policies are fraught
with as many if not more ethical and legal problems as the ones affecting pregnant women
only. Rothstein, Reproductive Hazards and Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: New
Legal Concerns in Industry and on Campus, 10 J. COLL. & U.L. 495, 510 (1984).
167 See e.g., N. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE: OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND
INJURY (1976); Hoerger, Beamer and Hanson, The Cumulative Impact of Health, En-
vironmental and Safety Concerns on the Chemical Industry During the Seventies, 46
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1983, at 59; Ashford and Heaton, Regulation and
Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Sum-
mer 1983, at 109; Bohrer, Fear and Trembling in the Twentieth Century: Technological
Risk, Uncertainty and Emotional Stress, 1984 WIs. L. REV. 83; Schroeder and Shapiro,
Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of Markets Regulation, and Information,
72 CEO. L.J. 1231 (1983); Tuohy, Regulation and Scientific Complexity: Decision Rules
and Processes in the Occupational Health Area, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 563 (1982).
169 See infra notes 186-202, 203-45 and accompaying text.
'6 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1983).
110 According to testimony presented by former Labor Secretary Shultz approximately
14,500 workers were killed annually in industrial accidents and 2.2 million workers were
disabled in work related mishaps. Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare (submitted to accompany S. 2193, the Williams Bill) S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong.
2d Sess. at 1-5 (1970) cited in M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW
4 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT - ROTHSTEIN].
171 The economic impact of these deaths and disabilities has been calculated to amount
to over $1.5 billion annually in lost wages and an annual loss of over $8 billion in the
Gross National Product. SENATE REPORT - ROTHSTEIN, supra note 170, at 4. The House
Education and Labor Committee Report concluded that the "well-being of every American
working man and woman is an essential human right which we can no longer deny."
H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 35 (1970).
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ble every working man and woman in the nation safe and healthful work-
ing conditions and to preserve our human resources. " 172 This purpose
is to be accomplished by encouraging employers and employees to
minimize workplace hazards through the institution of safety programs,
by developing and promulgating mandatory occupational safety and
health standards, and by providing for research in the field of industrial
hygiene and occupational diseases. 173
The Act imposes duties on employers to: 1) comply with the occupa-
tional safety and health standards established by the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA); 174 and 2) under the "general duty
clause" to furnish employees a workplace free from recognized hazards. 75
The analysis presented below will demonstrate that neither the health
standards nor the obligations imposed by the "general duty clause" pro-
vide adequate protection for the reproductive health of employees or
their offspring.
1. Standard-Setting Function
The Act defines the term "occupational safety and health standard"
as a "standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one
of more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably
necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and
places of employment. "176 There are special provisions which deal with
setting standards for exposures to toxic substances which "most adequate-
ly assure, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence,
that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity.' 77 These standards are to be established based on several con-
siderations including the attainment of the highest degree of health and
safety for employees, the latest available scientific data, and the feasibility
of the standard. Given the peculiar nature of toxic chemicals, their ef-
fects might become apparent only after years of exposure. This is par-
ticularly true in the case of carcinogens which usually have long latency
periods. 178 Under the theory that any exposure to certain chemicals might
cause cancer, the better reasoned approach is that these substances have
172 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982).
173 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1)-(13) (1982).
174 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1982).
175 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982).
176 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1982).
177 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982).
"I See generally Jasanoff, Science and the Limits of Administrative Rule-Making:
Lessons from the OSHA Cancer Policy, 20 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 536, 543 (1982); ASHFORD,
supra note 167, at 118-19.
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a zero exposure threshold and are therefore not safe at any level. 179 The
theory that threshold exposure levels were applicable to all toxic
substances led to the establishment of Threshold Limit Values (TLVs)
which were to serve as guidelines for OSHA to establish standards for
controlling the level of hazardous chemical substances in industrial
workplaces. 18° TLVs represent time-weighted average airborne concen-
trations for specific chemical substances for a seven or eight hour work
day and a forty hour work week. It is believed that nearly all workers
may be repeatedly exposed to these TLVs without adverse effects.1"' While
these exposure standards may be adequate to protect the overall health
of most workers, they are clearly not intended to address the issue of
fetal health protection. This constitutes just one of several reasons why
OSHA standards do not provide a sufficiently adequate solution to the
problem of safeguarding the health of the unborn in the context of paren-
tal exposure to fetotoxic chemicals.
Another reason why the Act is insufficient to protect the health of
the present workforce in general, and the reproductive health of the
workforce in particular, is the degree of OSHA's inefficiency in pro-
mulgating standards. To date OSHA has set TLVs for less than 500 of
the approximately 20,000 industrial chemicals already identified as tox-
ic, and for only sixteen of the approximately 2500 substances suspected
of being carcinogenic. 1 2 Given this lack of progress in establishing ex-
posure standards for hazardous chemicals, it appears that the issue of
fetal health is not about to be resolved satisfactorily by the standard-
17' This concept was first articulated from a regulatory view point in 1958 by New
York Congressman James Delaney as an amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act providing that no food additive should be allowed to be used "[i]f it is found to
induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are
appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man
or animal." 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1962). See generally Blank, The Delaney Clause:
Technical Naivete and Scientific Advocacy in the Formulation of Public Health Policies,
62 CALIF. L. REV. 1084 (1974); Martin, The Delaney Clause and Zero Risk Tolerance,
34 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 43 (1979).
180 THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUES OF AIRBORNE CONTAMINANTS AND PHYSICAL AGENTS WITH
INTENDED CHANGES ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL INDUSTRIAL
HYGIENISTS (ACGIH) for 1983.
"I Actually the ACGIH cautions that TLVs do not represent a precise line of demar-
cation between what constitute safe and unsafe levels of exposure. TLVs are not establish-
ed to protect all workers, particularly the most sensitive ones, but only the majority
of workers. Consequently, TLVs, as established, do not meet the mandate of the OSHAct
"that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity."
ASHFORD, supra note 167, at 118-21.
182 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (tables Z-1 and Z-2 1984). See also Page and Munsing,
Occupational Health and the Federal Government: The Wages are Still Bitter, 38 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer-Autumn 1974, at 651, where the authors characterize the
pace of standard development by the Federal government as "tortoise-like." Id. at 667.
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setting function of OSHA. This result is not inconsistent with the avowed
purpose of the Act, which is to protect the health of today's workers,
not that of future generations. Therefore, consistent with the language
of the statute, whatever standards are established will be specifically
designed to accomplish this immediate goal.1"
Another major factor that OSHA needs to consider is the statutory
requirement that the promulgated standards be feasible.184 The concept
of feasibility has both a technological and an economic component. 185
a. Technological Feasibility
The notion of feasibility appears in the statute in two separate
references. 18 6 Federal courts have interpretated this component of the
standard setting function of OSHA in various ways. The Second Cir-
cuit gave a most comprehensive judicial interpretation to the concept
of feasibility in Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc, v. OSHA. 187 The
petitioners, manufacturers of vinyl chloride and vinyl chloride products,
challenged OSHA's one part per million (ppm) VC exposure level on
the basis that: 1) the available scientific and medical evidence did not
establish that the standard was required by health or safety considera-
tions; and 2) that OSHA violated section 6(b)(5) of the Act (the feasibility
requirement) by adopting a standard which industry claimed was
technologically and economically unfeasible.188
113Another problem associated with setting standards for exposure to toxic chemicals
is the fact that workers are usually exposed to more than one substance at a time and
therefore there is synergism which probably enhances the ultimate harmful effects of
these toxins. ASHFORD, supra note 167, at 123. These synergistic effects are even more
applicable in the case of reproductive toxins where the same substance may act differently
given both the stage of gestation and the other substances the mother is being exposed
to during the pregnancy. Manson, supra note 160, at 324-26.
184 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982).
"I See generally Berger and Riskin, Economic and Technological Feasibility in
Regulating Toxic Substances Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 7 ECOLOGY
L. Q. 285 (1978); G. NOTHSTEIN, THE LAW OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 438-43
(1981); SENATE REPORT - ROTHSTEIN, supra note 170, at 82-86.
186 Section 655(b)(5) states, "The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with
toxic materials or harmful physical agents . .. shall set the standard which most ade-
quately assures, to the extent feasible .... that no employee will suffer material impair-
ment of health or functional capacity .... In addition to the attainment of the highest
degree of health and safety protection for the employee, other considerations shall be
... the feasilibity of the standards .... " 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (emphasis added).
187509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975). See generally Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl
Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY
L.J. 497 (1978).
188 509 F.2d at 1303.
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The Agency promulgated the stringent standard in view of medical
evidence that linked VC to the death of several workers affected by
angiosarcoma, a rare form of liver cancer. 189 The implementation of the
one ppm time-weighted standard required expensive engineering and work
practice changes to be supplemented wherever available controls were
insufficient.110 The court found that even though the medical and scien-
tific evidence in the case was "on the frontier of scientific knowledge"'191
it was sufficient to warrant the standard since human lives were at stake. 192
In response to the petitioner's contention that the standard was not
technologically feasible, the court stated that the industry needed "more
faith in their own technology." 1 93 Even though significant reductions in
exposure levels had already been put in place, a number of additional
engineering changes which were available to the industry had not yet
been implemented. The court held that in the area of safety "the ...
Secretary is not restricted by the status quo. He may raise standards which
require the improvements in existing technologies or which require the
development of new technology. " 194
Using the same reasoning, the Third Circuit arrived at a different con-
clusion in AFL-CIO v. Brennan.195 In Brennan, the court analyzed the
feasibility of the mechanical power press standards and concluded that
"at least to a limited extent, OSHA is to be viewed as a technology-forcing
piece of legislation." 196 The court nonetheless held that the standard was
not technologically feasible since OSHA was to be restricted to technology
that "looms on today's horizon. " 197
This issue was again before the Third Circuit in American Iron & Steel
Institute v. OSHA, 198 where the court applied its interpretation of
technological feasibility to OSHA's coke oven standards. The court held
that OSHA need only establish that the desired exposure level "could
be reached" within the industry. 199 According to the petitioners, OSHA
imposed a duty on employers to research and develop new technology
189 Id. at 1306.
110 Id. at 1307.
191 Id. at 1308.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 1309.
194 Id.
195 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975).
196 Id. at 121.
197 Id.
198 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed sub nor. Republic Steel Corpora-
tion v. OSHA, 448 U.S. 917 (1980).
199 Id. at 835.
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if implementation of all required controls did not achieve the permissi-
ble exposure limit for coke oven emissions. 200 The court agreed with the
petitioners that section 6(b)(5) was technology forcing, but it stated that
OSHA could only require employers "to implement technology 'loom-
ing on today's horizon'." 201 The Third Circuit held that the OSHAct did
not empower the Agency "to place an affirmative duty on each employer
to research and develop new technology."202 The question that was not
answered by these decisions though, was exactly how new technology
designed to protect the health of the workers was to be developed and
who was to invent and develop such technology.
b. Economic Feasibility
Economic feasibility constraints on OSHA's rulemaking authority were
first suggested by the D.C. Circuit in Industrial Union Department, AFL-
CIO v. Hodgson, 203 one of the first cases to challenge a health standard.
The court ruled that economic feasibility is a proper consideration in
the standard setting process:
There can be no question that OSHA represents a decision to
require safeguards for the health of employees even if such
measures substantially increase production costs. This is not,
however, the same thing as saying that Congress intended to re-
quire immediate implementation of all protective measures
technologically achievable without regard to economic impact.
To the contrary, it would comport with common usage to say
that a standard that is prohibitively expensive is not "feasible".
• . .Congress does not appear to have intended to protect
employees by putting their employers out of business-either by
requiring protective devices unavailable under existing technology
or by making financial viability generally impossible.204
The Hodgson court did limit the economic infeasibility defense to cases
in which the standards would be more than simply "financially burden-
some and affect profit margins adversely."2 ° Further, it commented that
200 Id. at 838.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
204 Id. at 477-78 (emphasis added).
20 Id. at 478. See also Florida Peach Growers Ass'n Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974) where the Fifth Circuit stated that: "[tlhe promulga-
tion of any standard will depend upon a balance between the protection afforded by
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standards may be economically feasible even though they may affect the
continued existence of some individual employers.206 The court stated
that such a cpnsequence was consistent with the purpose of the Act since
an employer "who lagged behind the rest of the industry in protecting
the health and safety of employees [would] consequently [be] unable to
comply with new standards.2 °7
The Third Circuit further limited the concept of economic feasibility
in Industrial Union Dep't. v. Brennan,2"8 by stating that: "Congress did
contemplate that the Secretary's rulemaking would put out of business
some businesses so marginally efficient or productive as to be unable
to follow standards otherwise universally feasible.."20 9 The court defin-
ed infeasibility as "massive economic dislocation" of an industry, 210 and
concluded that OSHA could not disregard such consequences since an
industry would otherwise be forced to evade rather than comply with
a regulation that threatened its existence211
The cases discussed thus far reflect judicial concern for the policy
underlying the Act-the urgent need to protect the health and safety of
American workers tempered by a realistic economic view. The decisions
that will be examined below reflect a reordering of priorities by an at-
tempt to create a balance between the need for the standard and the
economic hardship imposed on the employer who must comply with it.
One of the most controversial decisions212 concerning the limits of
OSHA's standard setting authority is Industrial Union Department, AFL-
CIO v. American Petroleum Institute,21 3 where the Supreme Court in
a five to four ruling affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision to set aside the
benzene standard promulgated by OSHA. The Fifth Circuit analyzed
the validity of the standard in light of section 3(8) of the Act 21 4 which
the requirement and the effect upon economic and market conditions in the industry.
•.. It is essential that employees be protected against exposure to highly toxic materials,
but this should be done without eliminating the agriculture enterprise and the associated
jobs." Id. at 130.
206 499 F.2d at 478.
207 Id.
20 530 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1975).
209 Id. at 123.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 See generally Cranor, Epidemiology and Procedural Protections for Workplace
Health in the Aftermath of the Benzene Case, 5 INDUS. REL. L. J. 372 (1983); Latin, The
"Significance"'of Toxic Health Risks: An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncer-
tainty, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339 (1982); Comment, Regulation of Toxic Substances in the
Workplace, 18 HouSTON L. REV. 884 (1981).
213 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
214 American Petroleum v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom.
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
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defines health standards as those which require "conditions ... prac-
tices, means, methods, operations or processes reasonably necessary or
appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment. '"215 The Fifth Circuit held:
Although 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) requires the goal of attaining the
highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee,
it does not give OSHA the unbridled discretion to adopt stan-
dards designed to create absolutely risk-free workplaces regardless
of cost. To the contrary, that section requires standards to be
feasible, and it contains a number of pragmatic limitations in the
form of specific kinds of information OSHA must consider in
enacting standards dealing with toxic materials.216
The appellate court seemed to indicate the need for a cost-benefit analysis
in the promulgation of standards.217
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Stevens, indicated that the
selection of the one ppm exposure limit over other limits "was establish-
ed not on the basis of a proven hazard at ten ppm, but rather on the
basis of OSHA's best judgment . . . [olf feasibility of compliance with
the proposed standard."2118 This approach was consistent with the Agen-
cy's carcinogen policy to set an exposure limit at the lowest technologically
feasible level that did not affect the viability of the industry regulated. 19
The Court ruled that this standard was not supported by appropriate
scientific findings in that OSHA's rationale for lowering the permissible
exposure limit to one ppm had no scientific basis. Specifically, there was
no evidence that leukemia, a form of cancer, has ever been caused by
exposure to ten ppm of benzene or that it will not be caused by exposure
to one ppm, but rather "on a series of assumptions indicating that some
leukemias might result from exposure to ten ppm and that the number
of cases might be reduced by reducing the exposure to one ppm. " 220
The plurality interpreted section 6(b)(5), which empowers OSHA to
promulgate occupational health standards "reasonably necessary or ap-
propriate to provide safe or healthful employment," to require the
Secretary to make a "threshold finding '' 22 1 that a workplace is unsafe
in the sense that "significant risks are present and can be eliminated or
lessened by a change in practices. " 222 The Court interpreted the intent
of the statute as not mandating employers to provide "absolutely risk-
free"223 workplaces whenever technologically and economically feasible.
215 581 F.2d at 502 (quoting 29 U.S.C.A. § 652(8)).
216 Id. (emphasis added).
217 Id. at 502-03.
215 448 U.S. at 625.
219 Id. at 613.
221 Id. at 634 (emphasis added).
221 Id. at 642.
222 Id. (emphasis added).
223 Id. at 641.
1986-871
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
Rather the statute was intended to require the elimination "as far as feasi-
ble, of significant risks of harm. "224 The Court concluded that:
Only after the Secretary has made the threshold determination
that such a [significant] risk exists with respect to a toxic
substance, would it be necessary to decide whether Section 6(b)(5)
requires him to select the most protective standard he can con-
sistent with economic and technological feasibility or whether
• . .the benefits of the regulation must be commensurate with
the costs of its implementation. 22s
The American Petroleum Court challenged OSHA's apparent policy
to ensure that not even one employee will be subject to any risk of serious
harm, no matter how small that risk may be. 226 In perhaps the most
significant language of the opinion, the plurality declared that this theory
was "at odds with Congress' express recognition of the futility of trying
to make all workplaces totally risk free. "22 7 Essentially, the Court
substituted OSHA's approach to diminishing or eliminating workers' ex-
posure to carcinogens, with its own newly proclaimed "significant risk"
standard. The implication of this test is that it imposes upon OSHA the
burden of evaluating whether substantial scientific evidence exists that
the proposed health standard is reasonably necessary or appropriate (at
least more likely than not) to remedy a significant risk of material health
impairment. 228 While such a policy may be adequate in the case of many
toxic substances, it is definitely callous in the case of carcinogens. Fur-
thermore, we should not be forced to make an evaluation of what con-
stitutes "significant risk" in this context before establishing the most ef-
fective standards to minimize or completely eliminate the exposure to
cancer causing agents.
The American Petroleum decision left unresolved the issue of whether
the feasibility parameter required a cost-benefit analysis. Writing separate-
ly, Justice Powell concluded that the statute requires OSHA to deter-
mine that the economic effects of its standard bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to the expected benefits, and therefore "[an occupational health
standard is neither 'reasonably necessary' nor 'feasible' . . . if it calls for
expenditures wholly disproportionate to the expected health . .
benefits."229 He recommended that the standard-setting process take
economic factors into consideration and that the promulgation of stan-
dards be achieved with reference to comparable benefits available at a
lower cost.230 The logic intrinsic in such reasoning is that a worker's op-
224 Id.
225 Id. at 639-40.
226 Id. at 650.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 653.
229 Id. at 667.
230 Id. at 670. Justice Powell's argument seems to support an interpretation of
economic feasibility as something short of massive dislocation. He stated that a cost-
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portunity for employment in an environment free from the risk of cancer
has a specific price to which one may ascribe a particular monetary value.
The direct implication of such logic is that each human life has a specific
economic value which is subordinate to the economic worth of the
corporation.
Under the "significant risk" analysis as applied to the fetal protection
issue it appears that the fetus would lose since the scientific evidence
available in the field does not meet the stringent criteria required by the
plurality in American Petroleum. Also, any OSHA standard promulgated
solely to safeguard the health of fertile women and their fetuses might
be struck down as not being reasonably necessary or appropriate. The
same result would ensue if Justice Powell's cost-benefit analysis were to
be used since the tangible cost to industry of providing a fetus-safe work
environment might not be justified by its speculative, intangible societal
benefits.
The issues of economic feasibility and cost-benefit analysis were fur-
ther examined by the District of Columbia Circuit in American Federa-
tion of Labor v. Marshall231 where the court upheld most of OSHA's
cotton dust standard. The Marshall court held that the Act did not re-
quire OSHA to undertake a "systematic evaluation of costs and
benefits. '232 The court further stated that Congress itself balanced the
costs and benefits in its mandate to OSHA under section 6(b)(5) to adopt
the most feasible protective standard. 233
The court then engaged in a cogent discussion on the disadvantages
of cost-benefit studies.2 3 4 According to the court, costs and benefits are
often expressed arbitrarily, and numerical estimates may hide assump-
tions and qualifications that create bias. 23s A cost-benefit analysis regar-
ding health or environmental quality is particularly difficult since it would
require a comparison between present readily calculable costs and less
easily ascertainable benefits spread over time and people. 236 Applying
benefit analysis would ensure that an industry remained competitive. Id. at 668-69 n.4
& 6. He quotes Senator Williams, a sponsor of the Act, as advocating a balance bet-
ween providing a healthy work environment and allowing industry to function "without
undue interference." Id. at 668 n.5. 'Without undue interference" may require something
less than massive dislocation, but not necessarily a cost-benefit analysis. Justice Powell's
own comments reveal this distinction: "[t ]here could be no such 'balance' if OSHA were
authorized to impose standards without regard to economic consequences short of serious
dislocation." Id. at 668-69 n.5 (emphasis added). He also stated, that Congress did not
intend to advocate health and safety at the expense of maintaining a strong national
economy. Id. at 669 n.6.
231 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979) aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub
nom. Textile Mfr. Inst. Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
232 617 F.2d at 663.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 665.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 665-66 n.172.
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this analysis to the issue of fetal protection raises some rather perplex-
ing questions. One cannot calculate or assign a monetary value to the
health of future generations. Should society have to balance employ-
ment opportunities with the cost of avoiding birth defects?
In American Textile Mfr. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan,237 the Supreme Court
left most of American Fed'n of Labor v. Marshall intact. In a five-three
ruling, the Court stated:
Congress itself defined the basic relationship between costs and
benefits, by placing the "benefit" of worker health above all other
considerations save those making attainment of this benefit
unachievable. Any standard based on a balancing of costs and
benefits by the Secretary that strikes a different balance than that
struck by Congress would be inconsistent with the command set
forth in section 6(b)(5). Thus, cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is
not required by the statute because feasibility analysis is. 238
The Court limited its inquiry to considering the type of analysis the
Agency is to perform in setting standards for toxic materials or harmful
physical agents. It concluded that since Congress specified that these stan-
dards be promulgated to the extent feasible, Congress did not intend to
impose an additional and overriding cost-benefit analysis requirement
on the issuance of those standards . 23 9 The Court construed the legislative
history of the Act to stand for the proposition that Congress intended
to emphasize the importance of insuring the health and safety of the coun-
try's labor force, while maintaining that the additional costs incurred
by employers to clean up the workplace were necessary costs of doing
business 240
Subsequent to the American Textile decision, OSHA developed a four-
step process for the development and promulgation of standards for ex-
posure to toxic substances under section 6(b)(5). 241 This process incor-
porates some of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in both
American Petroleum and American Textile. The Agency is to 1) establish
whether a significant risk to the health of workers exists; 2) show that
compliance with the standard will reduce the risk; 3) consider all rele-
vant technical, medical, and economic data in setting the appropriate
237 452 U.S. 490 (1981). See generally Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis and the Cotton Dust Standard: A Matter of Life and Death, 35 RUTGERS L.
REV. 133 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis].
238 452 U.S. at 509 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
239 Id. at 513.
240 Id. at 521.




permissible exposure level (PEL); and 4) use cost-effectiveness analysis
to decide the best means of implementing the PEL. 242 OSHA thus replaced
the concept of cost-benefit with that of cost-effectiveness. The difference
between the two analytical approaches involves the specific point in time
when the economic test is to be performed. Cost-benefit analysis is ap-
plied at the time of the promulgation of the standard, while cost-
effectiveness analysis is used at the time of implementation of the stan-
dard to find the best means of achieving the desired goal.243 One com-
mentator has suggested that in the context of the Act, cost-effectiveness
analysis is as inappropriate as cost-benefit analysis since it would shift
the burden of achieving the standard to the employee rather than leav-
ing it on the employer as Congress had intended.244
The American Textile analysis and the cost-effectiveness test could be
applied to the issue of fetal health to justify the establishment of stringent
standards that would protect both mother and fetus at considerable cost
to the employer. Under the cost-effectiveness analysis, standards for fetal
protection might be promulgated, but the fertile worker would have to
affirmatively participate in the implementation of the standard. Such
participation might even include voluntary removal of employees from
the toxic environment. 24 The Lead Standard246 promulgated by OSHA
might be considered representative of the types of provisions such a stan-
dard should contain. But, as will be seen from the analysis presented
in the next section, the intrinsic inconsistencies in this standard make
it inadequate to protect the health of the fetus.247
c. The Lead Standard
A careful analysis of the Lead Standard will demonstrate its ineffec-
tiveness in safeguarding the health of the fetus. The standard establish-
ed a permissible lead exposure limit (PEL) of 50 micrograms/m 3 (Ig/m 3 )
average over an eight hour period, 248 and a 30 /,g/m 3 action
242 Id.
243 Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 237, at 149.
244 Id. at 151.
245 OSHA has issued guidelines regarding a voluntary compliance program which
provides that a company is eligible for the program if the following conditions exist:
(1) an ongoing safety program; (2) an internal employee complaint mechanism; (3)
assurances that workers who file complaints will not be subject to discrimination; (4)
a cooperative atmosphere between workers and the employer; (5) no discrimination of
employee rights under the Act; and (6) a good injury rate record. 47 Fed. Reg. 29,025
(1982). See generally Chelius & Stark, OSHA's Voluntary Protection Program, 35 LAB.
L.J. 167 (1984).
246 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1984).
247 See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
248 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1984). This constitutes the highest level of lead in the
air to which workers may be exposed over an eight hour workday. Id. Appendix B.
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level.249 According to OSHA the PEL was established with the intent
of maintaining the workers' blood lead level at or below 40 /g/100g, 250
a level at which most workers will be protected from adverse health ef-
fects. 25
1
The Agency recognized the serious effects lead has on the reproduc-
tive system of both men and women and on the health of the offspring.
Such overexposure may result in decreased sex drive, impotence, and
sterility in men. Lead can alter the structure of sperm cells increasing
the risk of birth defects. The Agency further stated that lead exposure
also may result in decreased fertility and abnormal menstrual cycles in
women. The course of pregnancy may be adversely affected by exposure
to lead since it crosses the placental barrier and poses risk to the develop-
ing fetus. In discussing the effects of lead on the progeny of parents ex-
posed to this toxin, the Agency remarked that children born of parents,
either one of whom had been exposed to excess lead levels, have an in-
creased risk of being born with birth defects, mental retardation, or
behavioral disorders, or of dying during the first year of childhood. 25 2
Even though the 50 p g/m 3 exposure level might protect workers by
maintaining their blood lead level at 40 Ig/100g, this PEL is inadequate
to protect workers who plan to become parents. OSHA states that the
blood lead levels of both male and female workers who intend to have
children should be maintained below 30 /Lg/100g to minimize adverse
reproductive health effects upon the parents and the developing fetus.253
This lower level is also necessary to protect the fetus from neurological
impairment since, as discussed above, lead infiltrates the placenta. Lead
levels in the mother's blood are comparable to concentrations of lead
in the umbilical cord at birth. According to OSHA, despite the fact that
there are insufficient direct data on damage to the fetus from exposure
to lead, it is generally assumed that the fetus and newborn are at least
as susceptible to neurological damage as young children. Therefore,
OSHA recommended that the blood lead level in children as well as
newborns and fetuses should be maintained below 30 p4g/100g. 254
Although OSHA has specifically recognized that the 30 pig/100g blood
lead level is necessary to protect workers' reproductive abilities and to
ensure fetal health, the standard in no way enforces or guarantees the
I
The 50 jkg/m 3 level represents the lowest feasible level. 43 Fed. Reg. 52,963 (1978). The
Lead Standard was upheld in United Steel Workers of America v). Marshall, 647 F.2d
1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
249 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(b) (1984). This level initiates exposure monitoring, medical
surveillance, and training and education. Id. at Appendix A.




254 Id. at Appendix C.
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achievement of this level. 2 5 The inadequacy of the Lead Standard in this
area was summarized rather pragmatically, if not callously, in the follow-
ing statement: "While OSHA believes that a standard should be set which
protects all persons affected - male and female workers, and the fetus
- the agency is limited by the requirement that a standard be feasible."2 56
A further indication that the Lead Standard is apparently ineffective
in safeguarding fetal health or workers' reproductive abilities, is the pro-
vision for medical removal of pregnant workers and of male and female
workers who are planning to have children.257 Removal under the medical
removal protective provision (MRP) is triggered as a result of either
elevated blood lead levels 2-8 discovered during examinations under the
biological monitoring system2 59 or of "a detected medical condition which
places the employees at increased risk of material impairment to health"260
discovered during a medical examination under the medical surveillance
provisions of the standard.261 Under the provisions of the standard,
automatic removal occurs only when the blood lead level is at or above
50 gg/100g, 62 which is well above the safe level for fetal health and
reproductive integrity. Therefore, a worker, male or female, concerned
about the health of his or her offspring, who wanted to be removed from
hazardous exposure to unsafe lead levels, would have to submit
themselves voluntarily 263 to medical examinations. 264
In summary, the worker bears the burden and primary responsibility
for the health of future generations since there can be no removal based
on concern for fetal health without employer participation in medical
surveillance. 26- A medical removal protective system might be successful
255 In the Preamble to the Lead Standard, OSHA acknowledged that the 50 /,g/m 3
will not result in a 301tg/100g blood lead level, but rather in a 35/g/100g level. 43 Fed.
Reg. 52,966 (1978).
256 Id. (emphasis added).
257 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025, Appendix C (1984).
258 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(k)(i) (1984).
260 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(k)(ii) (1984).
261 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(j)(3)(C) (1984).
262 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(k)(D) (1984).
263 Medical surveillance is voluntary at the initiation of the worker. 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1025(j)(3)(C) (1984).
264 The standard provides:
The employer shall make available medical examinations and consultations to each
employee [who is or may be exposed above the action level for more than 30 days
a year] . . .as soon as possible, upon notification by an employee . . . that the
employee desires medical advice concerning the effects of . . .exposure to lead
or the employee's ability to procreate a healthy child ....
Id. (emphasis added).
265 The MRP provisions under the Lead Standard were judicially reviewed by the
District of Columbia Circuit in United Steel Workers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d
1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). See infra p. 44 and accompa-
nying notes.
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in providing fetal protection when used specifically for that purpose rather
than as a pretext for discrimination.
d. Medical Removal Protection
The discussion above recognized that neither the legislative history
of the OSHAct nor judicial interpretation of the Act call for OSHA to
promulgate standards that would provide a completely risk-free environ-
ment.2 66 Consequently, the health of some highly sensitive workers who
are susceptible to toxic substances even at low levels of exposure, or of
workers who have been exposed to toxins for an extended period of time,
is not adequately protected by exposure standards. 26 7 Consequently, the
only effective protection against occupational illness for these workers
is a system of health monitoring or medical surveillance that alerts both
the employees and the employer of potential health problems long before
disability becomes either permanent or life-threatening.261
The majority of OSHA's standards contain medical surveillance and
biological monitoring provisions.2 69 In case the results of the medical ex-
amination indicate that the worker's health "would be materially impaired
by continued exposure," the regulations provide for removal of the
266 See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
267 See generally Rothstein, Employee Selection Based on Susceptibility to Occupa-
tional Illness, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1379 (1983): "a wide range of larger ethical and societal
questions are inherent in any effort to address the legal problems raised by employer
screening for susceptibility to occupational illness.... Congress intended that employers
have final responsibility for ensuring employee safety and health by eliminating workplace
hazards, not by eliminating high-risk workers." Id. at 1493-95 (footnote omitted).
268 See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (1982) which provides, in relevant part:
Where appropriate, such standard shall also prescribe suitable protective equip-
ment and control or technological procedures to be used for monitoring or measur-
ing employee exposure at such locations and intervals, and in such manner as may
be necessary for the protection of employees. In addition, where appropriate, any
such standard shall prescribe the type and frequency of medical examinations or
other tests which shall be made available, by the employer or at his cost, to
employees exposed to such hazards in order to most effectively determine whether
the health of such employees is adversely affected by such exposure.
269 See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1003(g) (1984) (medical surveillance for exposure to 4 -
Nitrobiphenyl - a suspected carcinogen); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1004(g) (1984) (medical
surveillance for exposure to alpha-Naphthylamine - suspected carcinogen); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1006 (1984) (medical exposure to Methylchloromethyl ether-a suspected car-
cinogen); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1007(g) (1984) (medical surveillance for exposure for 3,3'-
Dichlorobenzidine - a suspected carcinogen); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1008(g) (1984) (medical
surveillance for exposure to bis-Chloromethyl ether-a suspected carcinogen); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1009(g) (1984) (medical surveillance for exposure to beta-Naphthylamine-a
suspected carcinogen); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1010(g) (1984) (medical surveillance for exposure
to Benzidine - a suspected carcinogen); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1011(g) (1984) (medical
surveillance for exposure to 4-Aminodiphenyl - a suspected carcinogen); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.101 2(g) (1984) (medical surveillance for exposure to Ethyleneimine-a suspected
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employee from the hazardous work environment until it is medically safe
for the employee to return to his or her regular job. 270 Generally the
Medical Removal Protection (MRP) provisions attempt to safeguard
workers' health without economic dislocation. 271
The Lead Standard272 provides for rather comprehensive MRP
measures. 273 The District of Columbia Circuit upheld the validity of these
provisions in United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall.274 This case
is the only one to consider OSHA's authority to establish the MRP pro-
gram that provides for mandatory payments of benefits to workers, even
if they do not work.27' The Lead Industry Association argued that OSHA
carcinogen); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1014(g) (1984) (medical surveillance for exposure to
2-Acetylaminofluorene - a suspected carcinogen); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1055(g) (1984) (medical
surveillance for exposure to 4-Dimethylaminoazobenzene-a suspected carcinogen); 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1016(g) (1984) (medical exposure for N-Nitrosodimethylamine-a suspected
carcinogen); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017(k) (1984) (medical surveillance for exposure to vinyl
chloride); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1018(n) (1984) (medical surveillance for exposure to inorganic
arsenic); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(k) (1984) (medical surveillance for exposure to lead);
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(j) (1984) (medical surveillance for exposure to coke oven emis-
sions); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043(h) (1984) (medical surveillance for exposure to cotton dust);
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1044(m) (1984) (medical surveillance for exposure to
1,2-dibromo-3-chloropropane-a carcinogen); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1045(m) (1984) (medical
surveillance for exposure to acrylonitrile-a carcinogen).
270 See generally Mahoney and Kendall, OSHA 's Medical Surveillance and Removal
Programs: Implications and Validity, 42 U. PiTT. L. REv. 779 (1981); Note, The Validi-
ty of Medical Removal Protection in OSHA's Lead Standard, 58 TEx. L. REV. 1461 (1981).
271 See e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 App. B which explains the Medical Removal
Protection in the context of response to lead:
In most cases, employers will likely transfer removed employees to other jobs with
sufficiently low lead exposure .... MRP benefits must be provided during the
period of removal - i.e. [the employee will] continue to receive the same earnings,
seniority, and other rights and benefits [he/she] would have received if [he/she]
had not been removed .... When [the employee] is medically eligible to return
to [his/her] former job, [the employer] must return [him/her] to [his/her] former
job status.
272 See supra notes 254-64 and accompanying text.
273 The MRP program under the Lead Standard has the added feature, as compared
with simple removal programs, that it guarantees the employee's economic welfare as
well as health:
The employer shall provide to an employee up to eighteen (18) months of medical
removal protection benefits on each occasion that an employee is removed from
exposure to lead .... [T]he requirement that an employer provide medical removal
protection benefits means that employee shall maintain the earnings, seniority and
other employment rights and benefits of an employee as though the employee had
not been removed from normal exposure to lead.
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(k)(2)(i)(ii) (1984). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(d)(2)(iv)(c) (1984)
(asbestos medical removal provisions).
274 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
275 See Mahoney and Kendall, supra note 270, at 782; Rothstein, supra note 267,
at 1379, 1430.
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was not empowered by Congress under the Act to establish MRP pro-
grams since the Act was silent on this subject. 276 The court upheld OSHA's
right to require removal of employees from the workplace without loss
of pay or benefits since it concluded that the Act gives OSHA "almost
unlimited discretion to devise means to achieve the congressionally man-
dated goal.' 2 77 This goal is "to assure so far as possible every working
man and woman in the nation safe and healthful working conditions
. . . by developing innovative methods . . . for dealing with occupa-
tional safety and health problems.."278 .
Perhaps MRP programs represent the type of "innovative methods"
Congress intended to be implemented by OSHA in order to achieve the
goal of ensuring a healthy and safe workplace where employees are pro-
tected from debilitating or life threatening occupational disease. The
United Steelworkers court further stated that the test for promulgating
any measures or standards under the Act was that they should be
"reasonably necessary. "279 In defining OSHA's burden of proof in
establishing reasonableness the court stated:
OSHA must demonstrate substantial evidence to support any con-
clusions of determinable fact that underlie the program and, where
the new provision cannot rely on factual certainty, must carefully
explain the bases of its legislative decision to create it. This test
essentially reinforces the principle that where a statute empowers
an agency to make rules necessary to carry out the provisions
of the statute, the court will uphold such a rule, if it is reasonably
related to the purpose of the enabling legislation. 280
MRP provisions of the type promulgated under the Lead Standard
would minimize or eliminate workers' reluctance to submit themselves
to medical examinations because of fear of job loss or decrease in pay
due to transfer. 281 This reluctance might be exacerbated in the case of
276 The Preamble to the Lead Standard states:
OSHA's legal authority to adopt MRP was perhaps the greatest source of con-
troversy during the lead proceeding, with industry representatives uniformly argu-
ing that no legal authority for MRP exists. It is true that the Occupational Safety
and Health Act contains no language which either explicitly requires or expressly
authorizes the inclusion of MRP in OSHA health standards. The legislative history
of the Act reveals no evidence that Congress gave any consideration to the ap-
propriateness of MRP as a protective health mechanism.
43 Fed. Reg. 52,976 (1978).
277 647 F.2d at 1230 (emphasis added).
278 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(5) (1982).
279 647 F.2d at 1231.
280 Id. at 1237 (citation omitted).
281 See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 537-39 (1981) where
the Court struck down the MRP provision of the cotton dust standard. The Court declined
to decide "whether or not OSHA had [the underlying authority] to require employers
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workers who plan to become parents. Since the future generations are
not protected under the Act,28" removal benefits may not even be
available.
2. The General Duty Clause
Congress recognized that section 6(b) of the Act establishing the
standard-setting procedure may not be sufficient to address all possible
health and safety hazards present in the workplace. Therefore, it included
in the Act a general duty clause which provides that each employer shall
"furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employ-
ment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely
to cause, death or serious physical harm to his employees. "283
Preventing reproductive hazards and the deleterious consequences or
parental exposure to toxic substances on the fetus could come within
the general duty clause, when such medical risks constitute "known"
hazards 84 which a "reasonably prudent employer '" 285 would have taken
adequate precautions to eliminate or minimize. In 1979 OSHA charged
that American Cyanamid's fetal protection policies which forced five
women to choose to be sterilized rather than lose their jobs, were in viola-
to guarantee employees' wage and employment benefits" because the Agency failed to
publish a statutorily required statement of reasons that its "wage guarantee requirement
is related to the achievement of a safe and healthful work environment." Id. at 537-38.
OSHA had argued that: "[elxperience under the Act has shown that employees are reluc-
tant to disclose symptoms of disease and tend to minimize work-related health problems
for fear of being discharged or transferred to a lower paying job .... Brief for Federal
Respondent 67." Id. at 539.
282 But see Public Citizen v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (proceedings
to set the standard for ethylene oxide) where the court commented that both "workers"
and "the children they will hereafter conceive" must be taken into consideration by OSHA
when setting standards.
28329 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982). See generally Morgan and Duvall, OSHA's General
Duty Clause: An Analysis of Its Use and Abuse, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 293 (1983); Drapkin,
OSHA 's General Duty Clause: Its Use is Not Abuse -A Response to Morgan and Duvall,
5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 322 (1983).
284 See National Realty and Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir.
1973) where the court interpreted "recognized hazard" as follows:
An activity may be a "recognized hazard" even if the defendant employer is ig-
norant of the activity's existence or its potential for harm .... A recognized hazard
is a condition that is known to be hazardous and is known not necessarily by
each and every individual employer but is known taking into account the stan-
dard of knowledge in the industry. In other words, whether or not a hazard is
recognized is a matter for objective determination; it does not depend on whether
the particular employer is aware of it. 116 Cong. Rec. (Pt. 28) 38377.
Id. at 1265 n.32.
In Brennan v. OSHRC (Vy Lactor Laboratories, Inc.) 494 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1974) the
court held that an employer's personal knowledge of the existence of a hazard was suffi-
cient to render the hazard "recognized."
25 Donovan v. Royal Logging Co. 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1755, 1762 (9th Cir. 1981).
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tion of the Act's general duty clause.2 8 6 OSHA interpreted the forced
sterilization as work-related injuries to the women's reproductive system.
The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC),
in a two-to-one ruling, held that the general duty clause was not applicable
to American Cyanamid's Fetus Protection Policy.287 The majority rejected
the argument that OSHA's mandate to safeguard the physical well be-
ing of workers "while they are engaged in work-related activities" should
be extended to elective sterilization. According to the Commission: "Con-
gress did not intend the Act to apply to every conceivable aspect of
employer-employee relations and that due to its unique characteristics
this condition of employment is not a hazard within the meaning of the
general duty clause.."288 The majority found that the women's choice to
undergo sterilization to enable them to keep their jobs was not a conse-
quence of corporate policy, but was a personal decision of the individual
woman which "grows out of economic and social factors which operate
primarily outside the workplace [and] the employer neither controls nor
creates those facts. "289
Commissioner Cottine wrote a scathing dissent in which he commented
that the majority unduly narrowed its interpretation of the Act and con-
sequently placed American workers beyond the protective scope of the
law: "One fact is inescapable in this case. Five American Cyanamid
employees have been sterilized. As a matter of law, this irreversible ter-
mination of their childbearing capacities is a material impairment of func-
tional capacity resulting from a condition of employment imposed by
their employer.."290
Rejecting the logic of the majority, the dissent could see no distinc-
tion between the Fetus Protection Policy and the willful exposure of
workers to toxic substances: "Corporate policy that offers employees
a choice between jobs and surgical sterilization is comparable to cor-
porate policy that offers employees a choice between jobs and exposure
to sterilizing chemicals. "291
286 Secretary of Labor v. American Cyanamid Co. No. 79-5762 (O.S.H.R.C. filed
Oct. 25, 1979).
287 American Cyanamid Co., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1596, 1981 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH)
Paragraph 31,421 (1981). When OSHA did not appeal this decision the union sought
review in the D.C. Circuit, Oil Chem. & Atomic Workers Union, Local 3-499 v. OSHRC,
Docket No. 81-1687. The D.C. Circuit denied American Cyanamid's motion to dismiss,
but held that American Cyanamid and not OSHRC was the proper defendant. 671 F.2d
643 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom American Cyanamid Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Union, Local 3-499, 12 OSH REP. (BNA) 391 (1982).
18 Id. at 1599, 1981 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at Paragraph 31,430.
289 Id. at 1600, 1981 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) at Paragraph 31,431.




The D.C. Circuit upheld the decision of the OSHRC in Oil, Chemical
and Atomic Workers Int'l. Union v. American Cyanamid Co.292 The court
held that the language of the Act could not "be stretched so far as to
hold that the sterilization option of the [company's] fetus protection policy
is a 'hazard of employment' under the general duty clause. " 293 The court
chose to simply interpret the statute rather than get involved in the com-
plex moral issues raised by the case. 294 But, should not moral considera-
tions be part of the promulgation and, especially, interpretation of a
statute? A statute affects people and is supposed to protect their best
interests. The D.C. Circuit, by proclaiming that no moral issues were
going to be addressed by their interpretation of the language of the
OSHAct, chose to ignore the very core of the fetal protection issue.
The American Cyanamid court recognized that the words of the general
duty clause could conceivably be interpreted to cover the sterilization
option offered by American Cyanamid to its female employees, 29- but
it conveniently decided to construe the language of the statute in light
of precedential interpretations. 296 It focused on the definition of "work-
ing conditions" in the context of "the language of industrial relations": 297
"The element of working conditions encompasses two subfactors: 'Sur-
roundings' and 'hazards.' 'Surroundings' measures the elements, such as
toxic chemicals or fumes, regularly encountered by a worker. . . . 'Hazard'
takes into account the physical hazards regularly encountered. . . and
the severity of injury they can cause. " 298 Applying this definition, it con-
cluded that the general duty clause did not apply to a corporate policy
as contrasted with a physical condition of the workplace. 299 Thus, the
court engaged in an exercise of exalting form over substance.
The court also addressed the argument advanced by Commissioner
Cottine in his dissent to the OSHRC decision that the American Cyanamid
fetal protection policy in reality offered to its women employees two
choices: 1) to undergo sterilization or 2) to quit. 300 Such a situation is
analogous to giving an employee a choice between working in the presence
of a sterilizing chemical or resigning. 30 1 The court concluded that "a
292 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
293 Id. at 445.
294 Id.
295 Id. at 447.
296 Id. at 448.
297 Id.
291 Id., (quoting Coming Glass Workers v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 202 (1974)).
299 Id.
300 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
301 741 F.2d at 449.
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chemical is not the same thing as a policy and a congressional decision
to deal with one does not necessarily constitute a decision to deal with
the other."30 2 This conclusion conveniently deals with semantics rather
than the crux of the analogy, namely, whether any employee should con-
tinue to work in a clearly hazardous work environment or be forced to
quit his or her job.
Instead the court chose to decide the issue very narrowly, ruling that
the fetal protection policy is not a hazard within the meaning of the
general duty clause.30 3 The court commented that a different decision
would have resulted in the adoption of "a broad principle of unforseeable
scope: any employer policy which, because of employee economic in-
centives, left open an option exercised outside the workplace that might
be harmful would constitute a 'hazard' that made the employer liable
under the general duty clause.."30 4 Choosing sterilization over unemploy-
ment is not merely a case of simple economic incentives; rather, it is essen-
tially a case of choosing between continuing one's life as a normal human
being and possible starvation. Perhaps, the language of the Act should
be stretched to include this idea within the concept of "hazard."13o5
From the discussion above it is apparent that while the general duty
clause might be interpreted to provide some attractive features in terms
of fetal protection, OSHRC and the D.C. Circuit have chosen not to
apply it to fetal protection programs. Their rather narrow and literal
interpretation of the law only applies to incidents of sterilization. The
Commissioners have suggested that it is "impossible for an employer to
compel employees to undergo sterilization. '" 306 The question is, how does
the Commission define "compel." At least in the case of five women it




301 The court commented that such an augmentation of the language of the Act was
within the purview of Congress not the court. Accordingly the court should not speculate
as to whether Congress contemplated the statute's application to situations such as the
one in this case where an employer-offered choice, leading to injury rather then discharge,
constituted a violation of the statute. The court stated: "That conclusion would have
required a great deal of thought about unforseen liabilities for employers and how far
to let employees decide what is in their own best interest. It is not possible to say that,
in all circumstances imaginable, Congress would have made employers liable for giving
employees an option where the only feasible alternative was discharge." Id.
306 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1599 n.14 (1981).
307 Two opposing views regarding the scope of the General Duty Clause have been
presented. One view suggests that the use of the clause is most appropriate "where the
hazard and its capacity to harm employees are obvious." Under this interpretation of
the clause, extreme care should be given in issuing citations where there is a great deal
of "scientific uncertainty." In these cases it is recommended that OSHA alert the employer
to the existence of the hazard and to urge him to take voluntary measures to reduce




The purpose of the Act is to protect the health and safety of the
American workforce. 308 Reproductive impairment is definitely covered
under the Act since it constitutes a material impairment of the employee's
health. The problem that remains is whether the protection of the statute
extends to the workforce of the future. As demonstrated above, stan-
dards established by OSHA, even when they address the issue of
reproductive health, are still insufficient to protect the fetus. 30 9
The approach American Cyanamid took in its fetus protection policy
is woefully inadequate. First, it is discriminatory against women; and
second, it does not address the contingency that fetal harm may be caused
by the exposure of both parents to lead.
B. Toxic Substances Control Act
In 1976 Congress passed the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)310
to protect human health and the environment from unreasonable risks
presented by chemical substances. 311 The Act empowers the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate the manufacture, processing,
distribution in commerce, use, and disposal of chemical substances and
mixtures. 312 The Administrators of the EPA may require manufacturers
or processors of potentially harmful chemicals to conduct toxicological
tests on these substances. 3 3 Toxicological testing is designed to either
evaluate the characteristics of the chemical, such as persistent or acute
toxicity, or to clarify the health and environmental effects including car-
cinogenic, mutagenic, behavioral, and synergistic effects. 31 4 The Ad-
ministrator must establish the need for such testing based on the follow-
ing criteria: 1) whether the chemical may present unreasonable health
Congressional intent to subordinate the clause to the standard-setting function. Morgan
and Duvall, supra note 283, at 315-18.
The other view urges an expansive interpretation of the clause in view of the slow
pace at which OSHA issues standards. One author states: "If we wait for the promulga-
tion of specific standards, we might as well forget about protecting workers from the
array of new and continuing hazards which constantly plague the workplace." Drapkin,
supra note 283, at 322.
308 See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
119 See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
310 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
311 See generally ASPEN SYSTEMS CORPORATION, CENTER FOR COMPLIANCE INFORMA-
TION, Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL SOURCEBOOK (1978); Gaynor, The Toxic Substances
Control Act: A Regulatory Morass, 30 VAND. L. REv. 1149 (1977).
312 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2) (1982).
313 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (1982).
314 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(2)(A) (1982).
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or environmental risks through exposure to the chemical or otherwise;
2) whether there are insufficient data and experience for determining and
protecting the health and environment from the effects of the chemical;
and 3) whether testing of the chemical is necessary to develop such data."'
A company which manufactures a new chemical or finds a significant
new use for an existing chemical substance must notify the EPA ad-
ministrator 90 days prior to manufacture. 316 This pre-market notifica-
tion must contain sufficient information 31 7 to enable the administrator
to decide whether to allow the market introduction of the chemical, to
order additional testing to establish further details regarding the toxici-
ty of the chemical, or to prohibit the marketing of the specific substance
in the event the chemical is found to present an unreasonable risk.318
In terms of reproductive and fetal protection, the TSCA specifically
provides for the regulation of substances found to be carcinogenic,
mutagenic, or teratogenic:
Upon receipt of ... information ... which indicates to the Ad-
ministrator that there may be a reasonable basis to conclude that
a chemical substance or mixture presents or will present a signifi-
cant risk of serious or widespread harm to human beings from
cancer, gene mutations, or birth defects, the Administrator shall,
within the 180 day period beginning on the date of the receipt
of such data or information, initiate appropriate action . . . to
prevent or reduce to a sufficient extent such risk or publish in
the Federal Register a finding that such risk is not unreasonable.3 19
Findings under this section are to be reported to OSHA for appropriate
action under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, but the EPA Ad-
ministrator has no statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards
or regulations affecting occupational safety and health. 320
Through this provision it is possible for the EPA and OSHA to work
together in identifying and regulating toxic chemicals which are hazar-
dous either to the reproductive system of prospective parents or to the
health of the fetus. To date no such action has been taken. 321
Unfortunately, even though TSCA might have the statutory language
necessary to support a fetal protection program, the Act seems to have
sufficient shortcomings which render it inadequate to safeguard the health
31S 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(A)(i)-(iii) (1982).
316 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1982).
317 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(2)(A)-(D) and 15 U.S.C. § 2604(b)(2)(A)-(B) (1982).
318 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e)-(f) (1982).
31 15 U.S.C. § 2603(f) (1982).
320 15 U.S.C. § 2608(c) (1982).
321 See Ashford and Caldart, The Control of Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace:
A Prescription for Prevention, 5 IND. REL. L.J. 523 (1983).
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of future generations. Such deficiencies include procedural unmanageabili-
ty, an insufficient number of specifically trained individuals capable of
supervising the implementation of the Act, and delays in the enforce-
ment of sanctions against the use of chemicals found to be toxic.3 22
C. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act
The preceding sections of this article analyzed the impact that toxic
substances have on the reproductive capabilities of employees and on
the health of fetuses. Despite the fact that many of these toxins affect
males and females equally, employers, when designing and implemen-
ting exclusionary policies, have used the excuse that females are more
often or more severely affected 23 by these chemicals. 324 Such paternalistic
measures have a long tradition in the American employment scene, and
in the courts. 32- Although these provisions were ostensively aimed at
safeguarding the health of women and their children, they actually became
obstacles to the advancement of women. 326
This section will examine the non-discriminatory employment policies
employers are required to institute and follow under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act with respect to women. It will also examine how industrial
employers might reconcile these measures with health and safety
considerations.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, prohibits
discrimination In employment based on race, religion, national origin,
and sex. 327 Clearly, employment programs which segregate women and
322 Gaynor, supra note 311, at 1189.
323 See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
324 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
325 In 1908 the Supreme Court in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) upheld
the constitutionality of an Oregon statute limiting the maximum number of hours women
could work. What was remarkable about the decision was its departure from precedent,
especially from Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) which proclaimed the supremacy
of the individual's freedom of contract. The Court justified its decision on the theory
that women's reproductive abilities had to be protected in order for women to fulfill
their natural role since "healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical
well-being of the woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve
the strength and vigor of the race." 208 U.S. at 421. The Court concluded that "woman's
physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvan-
tage in the struggle for subsistance." Id. See also Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall)
130 (1873) (upholding the state of Illinois' decision to deny women the right to practice
law since their "paramount destiny and mission" under the "law of the Creator" is "to
fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother"). Id, at 141.
326 See Andrade, The Toxic Workplace: Title VII Protection for the Potentially Preg-
nant Person, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 71, 78 (1981).
327 The Statute provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or priviledges
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circumscribe their access to hazardous jobs are violative of Title VII.
Programs such as the ones adopted by American Cyanamid use a dif-
ferent approach in that they exclude either fertile or pregnant females
from exposure to toxic substances, not on the basis of their sex, but on
the basis of their medical condition. 328 The results are the same: depriv-
ing women of employment opportunities. The 1978 Pregnancy
Amendment3 29 to Title VII was passed to address specifically the issue
of discrimination due to pregnancy. 330
1. The Pregnancy Amendment
The Pregnancy Amendment was passed by Congress in response to
the Supreme Court decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.331 In
Gilbert, the Court held that disability plans that did not cover pregnancy-
related disabilities were not violative of Title VII. 332 The Court's reasoning
was based mainly on its prior decision in Geduldig v. Aiello,3 33 where
the validity of "a strikingly similar disability plan" was upheld under
the fourteenth amendment. 334 In Geduldig, the Court stated that:
[Tihe insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit
eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical
condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities.
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW (1983).
328 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
329 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. V 1981). The amendment states:
The terms 'because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, child-birth, or related medical condi-
tions; and women affected by pregnancy, child-birth, or related medical condi-
tions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt or benefits under fringe benefits programs, as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in § 703(h) of this
title shall be interpreted to present otherwise.
See Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 COLUM. L. REv.
690 (1983).
330 HousE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, PROHIBITION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
BASED ON PREGNANCY, H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1979
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4752.
331 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
332 Id. at 138-39.
333 417 U.S. 484 (1974), cited in 429 U.S. 132-38.
134 417 U.S. at 496-97, cited in 429 U.S. 132-38.
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not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnan-
cy is a sex-based classification. 3 5s
The exclusion of pregnancy from the coverage of the benefit plan in
Geduldig was characterized by the Court as not constituting discrimina-
tion based on sex. 336 The Court therefore concluded that even though
"[piregnancy is, of course, confined to women, " 337 it could not infer "that
the exclusion of pregnancy disability benefits from [the plan] is a
pretext for discriminating against women. " 338
The Supreme Court's lack of direction and inconsistency in this area
became evident in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty. 339 Satty involved the issue
of whether a company policy that required pregnant employees to take
a "voluntary" leave of absence, without pay and with a subsequent loss
of seniority benefits, was discrimination. 340 Under the company policy,
a pregnant woman was treated in a manner similar to an employee who
wanted to go back to school.341 Employees with "any disability other
than pregnancy" not only retained their seniority during their absence,
but accumulated additional seniority while on leave. 3 4 2 The Court held
that the seniority provisions of the leave policy constituted a prima facie
violation of Title VII for which the employer failed to present a valid
business necessity defense. 34 3
The majority found that unlike the situation in Gilbert, the policy in
Satty did have a discriminatory impact on women. The employer's
classification imposed a substantial burden on women that men did not
suffer since it deprived women of employment opportunities in viola-
tion of Title VII. 344 The Court reiterated the position adopted in Gilbert
that a classification scheme that treated pregnancy different from other
disabilities was not "on its face a discriminatory policy;" 345 and therefore,
differential treatment based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination.
346
Satty was remanded on the issue of the discriminatory effect of the
denial of maternity benefits during the pregnancy leave since the lower
courts had not addressed the question of whether differentiation based
335 417 U.S. at 496, n.20, cited in 429 U.S. 134.
336 429 U.S. at 135.
337 Id. at 136.
338 Id.
339 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
340 Id. at 137.
311 Id. at 1340 n.2.
342 Id. at 140.
343 Id. at 143.
344 Id. at 142.
345 Id. at 140.
346 Id. at 143.
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on pregnancy was a pretext for sex discrimination. 347 The Court did,
however, comment that the denial of payments was "merely a loss of
income for the period the employee is not at work [and that] such an
exclusion has no direct effect upon employment opportunities or job
status.
348
As stated above, the controversy sparked by Gilbert led to swift ac-
tion by Congress. 34 9 The legislative history of the amendment 350 reflects
the concern of Congress which led it to denounce and reject the
stereotypes that have traditionally plagued working women. 35 ' The
amendment forbids making employment distinctions based on these types
of criteria. It requires employers to base their decisions affecting preg-
nant workers solely on the woman's ability to perform the job. 35 2
The issue of how pregnant employers should be treated in toxic work
environments was not seriously addressed during the Congressional
debates on the amendment. Though the legislative history indicates that
this problem was only briefly discussed, 353 Congress affirmatively decided
that pregnant women should be treated no differently from other workers
147 Id. at 145-46.
348 Id. at 145.
319 See Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977: Hearings on S. 995 Before
the Subcom. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
31 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings] where Senator Williams stated that the
Gilbert decision "came as a critical blow to working women across the country. It con-
stituted a major setback in the battle for women's rights and poses a serious threat to
the development of antidiscrimination policies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act." Id.
330 For a complete legislative history of the Pregnancy Amendment, see Furnish,
Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments, The Dilemma of the 1978
Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IowA L. REV.
63, 77-82 (1980).
I" Such stereotypes include the contention that women work only until they get
married and fulfill their "true role" as wives and mothers. This hypothesis is used by
employers to treat women as second class or marginal workers: "[Tihe assumption that
women will become pregnant and leave the labor market is at the core of the sex-
stereotyping resulting in unfavorable disparate treatment of women in the workplace."
Senate Hearings, supra note 349, at 1.
352 See generally Scales, Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L. J. 375 (1981);
Wald, Judicial Construction of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title
VII: Ignoring Congressional Intent, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 591 (1982); Note, Sexual Equali-
ty Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 690 (1983).
'53 The Chamber of Commerce expressed concerns that bill S. 995 (the Senate ver-
sion of the amendment) might pose job related health problems by requiring that "women
affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions shall be treated the same
for all employment related purposes." This would preclude employers from excluding
pregnant employees from jobs which might present a threat to the health of either the
prospective mother or her unborn child. Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hear-
ings on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Human Resources,
95th Cong. 1st Sess. 482 (1977). See also Senate Hearings, supra note 349, where it was
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similarly situated. 3- 4 Therefore, if the pregnant woman is as capable of
performing the job as any other employee, the employer is prohibited
under section 701(k) from instituting any exclusionary policies. While
the amendment safeguards the rights of pregnant employees, it may
jeopardize the health of the mother-to-be and of the fetus, thus ultimately
putting the financial burden of birth defects and deformed children on
society as a whole.
Given the clear language of the amendment and the fact that Con-
gress did not squarely address the issue of fetal safety, the issue arises
as to whether employers should be permitted to excuse their exclusionary
policies based on the danger presented to the fetus by toxic work en-
vironments. An affirmative answer would force courts and juries to
balance women's rights to equal employment against the apocalyptic vi-
sion of a generation affected by toxic chemicals. The speculation regar-
ding defective offspring should not be the basis for making decisions regar-
ding employment opportunity. Anti-discrimination advocates claim that
employers use the emotionally laden argument of societal need for fetal
protection as the pretextual excuse for policies designed to remove fer-
tile women from jobs for which they might otherwise be qualified. This
justification is advanced in lieu of cleaning up the workplace and mak-
ing it safe for all employees and their offspring. 35 Given the reality that
it may not be technologically possible to render all workplaces completely
safe for the fetus, society has to ensure through our legal system the health
of future generations without jeopardizing women's employment rights.
The Pregnancy Amendment represents some inroads towards this goal,
but it is unsatisfactory in terms of fetal protection. The intrinsic conflict
between women's equal employment opportunities and the need for pro-
tecting the fetus from harm that might result from such employment
should be resolved in an ordered and compassionate manner.
2. EEOC Proposed Guidelines
In February 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) in conjunction with the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs (OFCCP) and the Department of Labor proposed Interpretative
Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive Hazards. 3s6
The guidelines were aimed at addressing the relationship between the
stated that "under [the amendment] employers will no longer be permitted to force women
who become pregnant to stop working regardless of their ability to continue . . . and
they will not be able to refuse to . . . promote women simply because they are preg-
nant-" Id. at 6.
354 HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, PROHIBITION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
BASED ON PREGNANCY, H.R. Rep. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 47-49 (1978).
355 See, e.g., Petchesky, Workers Reproductive Hazards, and the Politics of Protec-
tion: An Introduction, 5 FEMINIST STUDIES 232 (1979); MacGhee, Workplace Hazards;
No Women Need Apply, THE PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 1977, at 20.
356 45 Fed. Reg. 7,514 (1980) (as corrected in 45 Fed. Reg. 16,501) (1980) [hereinafter
cited as EEOC Proposed Guidelines].
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policies protecting workers from reproductive hazards in toxic work en-
vironments and the employment rights of pregnant women. 357 Although
the proposed guidelines were subsequently withdrawn,358 their methodical
approach to resolving the problems associated with workers' exposure
to the reproductively toxic workplace presents a useful paradigm for
analysis.
The proposed guidelines assumed extensive consultation and coopera-
tion between the various sponsoring agencies. 35 9 It appears that these
agencies saw no irreconcilable differences between equal employment
legislation and legislation aimed at safeguarding the health and safety
of the American workforce.360 They were issued for the purpose of com-
municating to employers the appropriate policies to be implemented in
order to strike a balance between employees' reproductive health and
equal employment opportunities. 361 The proposed guidelines stated that
the wholesale exclusion of one sex-based class constitutes a per se viola-
tion of Title VII and Executive Order 11246.362 This statement was in
direct response to the conclusion drawn by the EEOC and the OFCCP
that "an increasing number of employers had initiated policies excluding
all women of childbearing capacity from certain jobs because they in-
volved exposure to hazardous substances.."363 These exclusionary policies
resulted in the termination or transfer of women to lower paying jobs.
Just as disconcerting to the agencies was the fact that employers had often
shown a lack of concern for similar effects on men and their offspring.364
Based on these considerations the guidelines recommended that
employers establish gender neutral policies aimed at protecting all
employees from reproductive harm.365 If the hazard is known to affect
the fetus through either parent, the implementation of an exclusionary
policy directed only at women would violate Title VII. Additionally,
if through "reputable scientific evidence" it is established that the hazard
31' The guidelines state: "This document sets forth for the first time proposed inter-
pretations of the relationship between employment discrimination and the application
of employer/contract or policies, practices and plans regarding reproductive hazards."
EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 356, at 7,514.
I'l 46 Fed. Reg. 3,916 (1981).
319 EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 356, at 7,514. The guidelines provided
the role of OSHA to be: "one of consultation and coordination with EEOC and OFCCP,
particularly with reference to scientific data." Id.
360 "These Guidelines and the objectives of Title VII and E.O. 11246 are premised
on the assumption that laws prohibiting discrimination in employment are consistent
with those laws designed to assure a workplace free of conditions that threaten the health
or safety of employees." Id.
361 Id.
363 Id. at 7,515.
363 Id. at 7,514.
364 Id.
365 Id. at 7,515.
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to the fetus results from the exposure of the mother only, the employer's
policy must be directed towards pregnant women only and not towards
all women of childbearing age. 366
In instances where an employer had "reputable scientific evidence" of
reproductive harm to one sex-based class only, the guidelines permitted
an employer to institute a "temporary emergency exclusion" policy pro-
tecting the endangered sex-based class of employees, provided that the
policy was: "a) narrowly tailored to those individuals to whom harm
is indicated; b) reflect[ed] consideration and adoption of suitable alter-
natives; and c) provide[d] for timely completion of research on the other
sex-based class." 367 Furthermore, the guidelines permitted an employer
to temporarily remove employees from work areas where reproductive
hazards were present, if the employees made their intention to have
children known and voluntarily requested such an exclusion. 368
The guidelines also addressed the interplay between the employers'
policies with regard to reproductive hazards and the defenses they might
raise to justify their exclusionary policies. The guidelines suggested that
conduct which treats members of a sex-based class raise a presumption
of violation of Title VII.369 Where such a presumption is raised, an
employer would be given the opportunity to "articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the policy." 370 The guidelines allowed the agen-
cies to determine whether that reason was in fact a pretext for discrimina-
tion. 3" In addition, the guidelines addressed situations involving the
"traditional" concept of the adverse impact created in cases where a facial-
ly neutral employment policy has an adverse impact upon a specific sex-
based class. 372 Such policies constituted unlawful employment practices
unless the policy was truly neutral. 373 This was particularly true in light
of the Pregnancy Amendment 374 which prohibited discrimination against
women based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. 375
The guidelines stated that in light of this amendment, all women, preg-




365 Id. at f 7,516.






371 See supra notes 330, 348-54 and accompanying text.
376 EEOC Proposed Guidelines, supra note 356, at ff 7,515.
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The proposed guidelines, although not perfect in terms of addressing
all of the problems connected with workers' exposure to toxic work en-
vironments, were a praiseworthy attempt at devising a principled balance
between employees' reproductive health and their equal employment
rights. 377 Since the guidelines were never implemented, due to numerous
objections, 378 alternative regulatory means must now be promulgated
to achieve the same goal.
3. Employer Defenses to Title VII Violations
A plaintiff employee seeking relief under Title VII has the initial burden
of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 379 Employment
discrimination claims may be based on three theories: 1) facial (overt)
discrimination; 2) disparate treatment; and 3) disparate impact. 380
Facial discrimination results from an employer's policy that treats
employees who are members of a protected class differently from other
377 Id.
376 One commentator criticized the proposed guidelines based on the premise that
despite their praiseworthy goal of protecting future generations from workplace hazards,
they were flawed. They did not identify how such employer considerations leading to
the potential exclusion of pregnant workers could serve as recognized defenses to Title
VII violations. This is particularly true in light of the clear and unequivocal mandate
of the Pregnancy Amendment that an employer may not differentiate among employees
based on pregnancy, child-birth, or related medical conditions except when the differential
treatment reflects the workers' ability to perform the job. According to this commen-
tator, the proposed guidelines came into direct conflict with this requirement and did
not offer any principled means of solving this dilemma, in terms of statutory or judicially
recognized Title VII defenses. Furnish, supra note 350, at 114-15.
11" In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Court held that to
establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority [or protected class]; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii)
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802.
The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving discrimination by a preponderance
of the evidence throughout the trial. See, e.g., Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, (1981) (quoting from the Court's syllabus), where the Court held:
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence
a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving
the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's rejection. [citation omit-
ted]" Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have
an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate
reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.
Id. at 252 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802).
380 Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 725 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1984). See
generally Williams, supra note 25, at 668-73; See also Furnish, A Path Through the Maze:
Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C. L. REv. 419 (1982).
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employees.31 In such cases, proof of discriminatory intent is required.382
In cases of disparate treatment, the employer intentionally discriminates
against a member of a protected class by instituting ostensibly neutral
policies which in fact result in less favorable treatment of those
members.31 3 In such cases, proof of discriminatory motive must be
presented.3 4 An employee may bring a Title VII action under a disparate
impact theory in situations where the employer promulgates a "facially
neutral" employment policy which has a disproportionate, adverse ef-
fect on a protected class. 385 Proof of discriminatory intent is not
necessary.
386
381 See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (refusal to hire men as flight attendants); Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (refusal to hire women as corrections officers in a male correc-
tional facility).
382 See International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15
(1977); United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 103 S. Ct. 1078 (1983).
See generally Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VII; United States
Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1201 (1982).
313 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (employer's use of past
criminal conduct as the excuse for failure to rehire a black employee may only be pretext
for racially motivated refusal to hire); Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567
(1978) (employee asserted that excuse by employer that its refusing to hire unknown
black applicants on job site was necessitated by requirement for knowing employees,
may be only a pretext for racial discrimination). See also International Bd. of Teamsters,
431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
384 International Bd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15. See also McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801.
385 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court held that if an employ-
ment test which was a prerequisite to hiring was failed by a much higher percentage
of blacks than whites, then its effects created a disparate impact and thereby discriminated
against blacks. Id. Justice Burger, writing for an unanimous Court, stated that Title VII
required: "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
where the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of raGial or other
impermissable classification .... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the conse-
quences of employment practices, not simply their motivation." Id. at 432. See also
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (maternity leave policy requiring im-
mediate leave and surrender of all accumulated seniority created a disparate impact on
women); Dothard, 433 U.S. 321 (height/ weight requirements of 5 '2" and 120 lbs. for
employment as corrections officer have disparate impact on women).
386 See Griggs, where the Court asserted that "[Good] intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms
that operate as, built-in head winds, for minority groups and are unrelated to measur-
ing job capability." 401 U.S. at 432. See also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329. The Supreme
Court summarized the difference between these two methods of analyzing discriminatory
employment practices in the following terms:
Disparate treatment ... is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is
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Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination,
the employer may assert different defenses depending on the specific
discrimination theory advanced by the employee. In cases of facial
discrimination, employers may raise the affirmative statutory defense
that religion, sex, or national origin is a "bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that par-
ticular business or enterprise. '" 387
In discrimination cases based on the covert disparate treatment theory,
once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination
the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate non-
discriminatory reason" to justify his action.388 The burden then shifts
back to the employee to establish that the stated reason was a mere pretext
for the discriminatory policy.389
In cases of disparate impact, the employer may defend on the basis
that the employment practice is justified as a "business necessity. '" 390 The
employee may rebut such a defense by showing that the employer could
have availed itself of less restrictive alternatives to achieve the same
result. 391
a. Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Section 703(e) of Title VII provides that "it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice ... to hire and employ employees.., on the basis
of . . . sex . . . in those instances where ... sex . . . is a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification (BFOQ) reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise. " 392 In this section the
issue of whether the BFOQ defense may be asserted by employers who
exclude women from hazardous work environments will be analyzed from
critical although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of dif-
ferences in treatment .... Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished
from claims that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment prac-
tices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact
fall more harshly in one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity.... Proof of discriminatory motive.., is not required under disparate-
impact theory.
International Bd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S., at 335-36 n.15.
387 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
388 Furnco, 438 U.S., at 578 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
189 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03; Furnco, 483 U.S. at 577.
390 See infra notes 447-57 and accompanying text.
391 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). If the employer proves
that the challenged requirements are job related, the plaintiff may then show that other
selection devices without discriminatory effect would also "serve the employer's legitimate
interest in efficient and trustworthy workmanship." Id. at 425 (quoting McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). See also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329.
392 42 U.S.C. § 2 00 0e-2(e) (1981).
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both an administrative and a judicial perspective. The analysis will con-
clude that the BFOQ defense may not be available to such employers.
The EEOC guidelines narrowly interpret the BFOQ defense in the con-
text of sex discrimination. 393 According to the guidelines, there are three
instances under which the defense does not apply. First, an employer
may not use the BFOQ defense when its hiring policy is based on assump-
tions about the comparative employment characteristics of women in
general. 394 Second, the defense is inapposite in cases where the employer's
policy is based on stereotypical characterizations of the sexes. 395 Examples
of such stereotypes are that men are less capable of assembling intricate
equipment, or that women are less capable of aggressive salesmanship.
Third, refusal to hire based on the gender preference of co-workers or
customers of the employer will not give rise to a BFOQ defense. 396 The
EEOC guidelines also state that Title VII supersedes conflicting state pro-
tective labor legislation and as such, state law may not be used as part
of a BFOQ defense. 3 97
Based on these guidelines it appears that employers may not be able
to use the BFOQ justification to defend their exclusionary policies. Such
policies are clearly based on the stereotype of women being more
vulnerable and in need of greater protection than the male counterpart. 398
The lower federal courts have developed two approaches to the analysis
of the BFOQ defense in sex discrimination cases. One approach was for-
mulated by the Fifth Circuit in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co.399
and Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.4 0 0 In Weeks, a woman was
denied a switchman's job simply because of her gender and not because
of her lack of ability to perform the job. 01' The court stated that the com-
pany had the burden of proving that its decision was within the nar-
313 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1984).
394 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(i) (1984).
39- 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (1984).
396 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (1984).
397 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iv) (1984).
398 This type of reasoning is reminiscent of state protective labor legislation as ex-
emplified by the following pronouncement from the Nebraska Supreme Court:
Women and children have always to a certain extent been wards of the state.
• . . They are unable, by reason of their physical limitations, to endure the same
hours of exhaustive labor as may be endured by adult males. Certain kinds of
work, which may be performed by men without injury to their health, would wreck
the constitutions and destroy the health of women, and render them incapable
of bearing their share of the burdens of the family and the home. The state must
be accorded the right to guard and protect women as a class, against such a
condition.
Wenhan v. State, 65 Neb. 394, 400 (1902). See generally J. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PRO-
TECTION (1978); Andrade, The Toxic Workplace: Title VII Protection for the Potentially
Pregnant Person, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 71, 75-79 (1981).
199 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
400 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
401 408 F.2d at 231.
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rowly interpreted "bona fide occupational qualification" exception. 40 2
The court held that:
[T]he principle of nondiscrimination requires that .. .in order
to rely on the bona fide occupational qualification exception an
employer has the burden of proving that he had reasonable cause
to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substan-
tially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently
the duties of the job involved. 40 3
The employer in Weeks did not satisfy his burden because he did not
introduce evidence regarding the inability of women to lift certain weights,
while unquestionably assuming that men are usually stronger than
women. 404
In Diaz the Fifth Circuit expanded upon the Weeks holding regarding
the parameters of the BFOQ defense. At issue in Diaz was Pan American's
denial of employment to men as flight attendants based on perceived
passenger preference. 40 5 The court held that the airline could not exclude
"all males simply because most males may not perform adequately.
... Before sex discrimination can be practiced, it must not only be shown
that it is impracticable to find men who possess the abilities that most
women possess, but that the abilities are necessary to the business, not
merely tangential.."40 6 It concluded that discrimination based on sex is
valid only if the essence of the business would be undermined by not
restricting the hiring to members of one sex exclusively. 40 7 Under the
Weeks-Diaz test, 408 the BFOQ defense does not pass muster as a justifica-
tion for employer-promulgated exclusionary policies. Scientific evidence
is inconclusive regarding the toxic effects of certain chemicals on all
women. Therefore, their wholesale exclusion does not meet the criterion
that all women may be unable to perform the job safely, or more
402 Id. at 232 (footnote omitted).
403 Id. at 235.
404 Id. at 235-36.
405 442 F.2d at 387.
406 Id. at 388-89.
407 Id. at 338.
401 In Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va 1978), the Weeks-
Diaz test was formulated as follows:
[An employer asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of showing (1) that its
policy ... is reasonably necessary to the essence of its business ... and that (2)
the employer has a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons
within the class ... would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties
of the job involved, or that it is impossible or impractical to deal with persons
....on an individual basis. . ..
Id. at 497, (citing Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd in part




specifically that not hiring women of childbearing age is essential to any
successful business operation.
The other approach to the BFOQ defense was developed by the Ninth
Circuit in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co. 409 In Rosenfeld, the employer
implemented a policy whereby women were excluded from certain jobs
that were considered too arduous. In fact, assigning women to these posi-
tions would have violated protective state labor legislation.410 The court
seemed prepared to recognize that the BFOQ defense may be applicable
in cases where "sexual characteristics of the employee are as crucial to
the successful performance of the job, as they would be for the position
of wet-nurse. '" 41 The court found, however, that this was not the case
in Roseinfeld.412 It therefore enunciated a different test: "[S]exual
characteristics, rather than characteristics that might, to one degree or
another, correlate with a particular sex, must be the basis for the ap-
plication of the BFOQ exception." 41 3
Under the Rosenfeld test, exclusionary policies which apply strictly
to women of childbearing age merely because they are more susceptible
to reproductive damage would not constitute a BFOQ. A woman's
reproductive ability may not be any more vulnerable to toxic assault
than that of a man.41 4 As such, exclusionary policies based on this criterion
do not come within the narrow scope of the Rosenfeld test for a valid
BFOQ defense.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of what constitutes a valid
BFOQ defense to a claim of sex discrimination in Dothard v. Rawlin-
son.415 Dothard involved two employment policies implemented by the
Department of Safety of Alabama which resulted in the exclusion of
female applicants from the position of prison guard. One policy involv-
ed a minimum height and weight requirement for prison guards and the
other involved an official regulation which excluded women from "con-
tact" positions in the prison. 416 The Court applied the disparate impact
test to the facially neutral policy of a minimum height and weight re-
quirement and concluded that this practice had a disproportionate im-
pact on women and was therefore discriminatory. 417
409 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
410 Id. at 1223.
411 Id. at 1224.
412 In this case, the airline made its decision based on the "commonly accepted
characterization of women as the 'weaker sex' "which it raised to the level of a BFOQ. Id.
413 Id. at 1225.
414 SLe supra notes 99-159 and accompanying text.
415 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
416 Id. at 324-25.
417 Id. at 327-29.
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The Dothard Court next considered whether the second policy could
be defended as a legitimate BFOQ. The analysis was akin to that of the
Fifth Circuit's in Weeks and Diaz. Finding that the essence of a prison
guard's job is to maintain prison security, 418 the Dothard Court concluded
that a woman's ability to perform this job safely and effectively would
be seriously curtailed by her "womanhood,' 41 9 particularly given the fact
that many of the inmates were sex offenders. Therefore, it held that the
practice of excluding females from "contact" positions was justified under
the BFOQ defense.420
Employers who have promulgated policies aimed at excluding women
from hazardous work environments might be encouraged by Dothard
to raise. the BFOQ defense as a justification for their otherwise
discriminatory policies. They could argue that the BFOQ is applicable
since women are much more susceptible to reproductive damage than
men and since the health of the offspring is more imperiled by the ex-
posure of women to toxic chemicals than by the exposure of men. But
such an argument is inconsistent with the Dothard rationale. The policy
in Dothard was upheld on the premise that a female applicant's very
womanhood 4 2 constituted an impediment to her performing the essen-
tial duties of the job. The inquiry therefore, was properly focused on
the woman's individual ability to perform the job of correctional officer.
This logic may not be applied in the case of fertile women who are ex-
cluded from fetally hazardous work environments because the exclusions
are not specifically based on the women's ability to do the job. In such
cases therefore, the BFOQ defense may not be invoked.422
The foregoing discussion indicates that the BFOQ defense may be in-
applicable in the reproductive hazard context. An examination of cases
418 Id. at 335.
419 Id.
420 Id. at 336.
421 Justice Marshall in his dissent addressed the fallacy of this argument:
In short the fundamental justification for the decision is that women as guards
will generate sexual assaults .... [T]his rationale ... perpetuates one of the most
insidious of old myths about women - that women, wittingly or not are seductive
sexual objects. The effect of this decision . . .is to punish women because their
very presence might provoke sexual assaults. It is women who are made to pay
the price in lost job opportunities for the threat of depraved conduct by prison
inmates.... To deprive women of job opportunities because of the threatened
behavior of convicted criminals is to turn our social priorities upside down.
Id. at 345-46 (emphasis added).
422 This conclusion is particularly compelling since the Dothard Court emphasized
that the "BFOQ exception was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to
the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex." Id. at 334. Justice Mar-
shall urged that lower courts would recognize that this decision should be construed
very narrowly and limited to its facts, because expansion of this decision beyond its




involving challenges brought by female flight attendants to mandatory
maternity leave policies promulgated by many airlines provides a useful
analytical model. These cases concentrate on the ability of the pregnant
stewardess to perform the duties of her job, i.e., to insure the safety of
her passengers. Some courts have also shown concern for the health of
the pregnant employee herself and that of her unborn child.
The Ninth Circuit addressed this issue in Harriss v. Pan American
Airlines,423 holding that mandatory leave for stewardesses upon
knowledge of pregnancy was justified on the basis of a BFOQ. 424 The
Harriss court also examined the impact of the Pregnancy Amendment
and concluded that under a pre-amendment analysis, discrimination based
on pregnancy created a disparate impact on females, but, because of con-
cerns over passenger safety, discrimination was justifiable as a business
necessity. 425 In the case of post-amendment discrimination, however, the
court found that the language and legislative history of the amendment
required that distinctions based on pregnancy be treated as per se viola-
tions of Title VII.426 Therefore, the Harriss court held that the employer
was limited in his defenses, and could only argue that "nonpregnancy"
was a BFOQ. 427 Although the court recognized this defense as a narrow
one, 428 the concerns regarding passenger safety were sufficient to justify
Pan American's policy. 429
The Fifth Circuit used a similar approach in Levin v. Delta Airlines.430
The test considered by the court was whether 431
the airline had reasonable cause, that is, a factual basis, for believ-
ing that all or substantially all [pregnant flight attendants] would
be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job
involved, or whether it is impossible or impractical to deal with
[pregnant flight attendants] on an individualized basis. 432
The court concluded that the inability of the employer to predict which
flight attendants would be affected by medical problems during flight
423 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
424 Id. at 677.
425 Id. at 675-76.
426 Id. at 676.
427 Id.
428 Id.
429 The Harriss court concluded that Pan Am proved that its stop work policy for
pregnancy was "reasonably necessary to passenger safety" and thus was justified under
a BFOQ analysis. Id. at 677.
430 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984).
"I' The test was originally developed in Usery v. Tamiami Trial Tours, Inc., 531
F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) cited in Levin, 730 F.2d at 997.
432 531 F.2d at 236 cited in Levin, 730 F.2d at 998.
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made it difficult for Delta to deal with pregnant stewardesses on an in-
dividualized basis. Therefore, Delta "justifie[d] its blanket exclusion of
pregnant attendants from flight duty 43 under the second prong of the
test outlined above. Because of these safety considerations, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that exclusion based on pregnancy was justified under the BFOQ
doctrine. 434
Employers using exclusionary practices aimed at protecting pregnant
employees from toxic workplaces might also use a Levin-type justifica-
tion. They could argue that even though not each and every woman ex-
posed to hazardous substances will give birth to deformed babies, the
inability to predict the likelihood of such an incident for individual
workers justifies wholesale exclusions.
A federal district court in Florida, in In re National Airlines, Inc.,435
used a different approach to the BFOQ defense in the airline safety con-
text. The court stated: "the question of harm to the fetus is basically a
decision to be made not by this court, but by the mother of the fetus."43 6
This argument may be used by women who have been excluded from
hazardous work environments because of concern for the health of the
fetus. The health and safety of a woman's offspring is not germane to
the employer's business. Decisions as to the well-being of the fetus should
by right be vested exclusively with the mother.437
More recently, the BFOQ defense was examined in the context of fetal
protection from the consequences of a mother's exposure to a hazardous
433 Levin, 730 F.2d at 998 (emphasis added).
134 Id. at 999. The court cautioned though that "pregnancy is not a BFOQ with respect
to all airlines as a transcendant matter of law." Id.
1 434 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd per curiam, 700 F.2d 695 (11th Cir. 1983).
436 Id. at 259.
137 One commentator has expressed concern that courts might be inclined to suc-
cumb to the argument that concern over the health of the fetus should lead to an expan-
sion of the BFOQ defense. However, this commentator urged that courts continue to
adhere to the traditional analysis which "is likely to prove more beneficial to the health
interests of the fetus than such an expansion." As such, employers would be forced to
protect fetal health by developing and implementing neutral rather than gender specific
policies in order to avoid Title VII liability. Ultimately the health of the offspring would
be protected from the exposure of both parents. Williams, supra note 25, at 681-82. Ti-
tle VII jurisprudence indicates that the BFOQ defense should not be applied to justify
notions of "romantic paternalism":
Title VII rejects . . . romantic paternalism as unduly Victorian and instead vests
,the individual woman with the power to decide whether or not to take on unroman-
tic tasks. Men have always had the right to determine whether the incremental
increase in remuneration for strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious, boring or unroman-
tic tasks is worth the candle. The promise of Title VII is that women are now
to be on an equal footing. We cannot conclude that by including the bona fide
occupational qualification exception Congress intended to renege on the promise.
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969).
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work environment. The case of Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital.3
dealt with the claim of an X-ray technician that the hospital had violated
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act by firing her upon learning of her
pregnancy. The analytical framework the court chose to use in this case
was whether the challenged policy created a rebuttable presumption of
facial discrimination against female employees. 439 The employer may
rebut the presumption by showing that although the policy applies only
to women, it is neutral in the sense that it effectively and equally pro-
tects the offspring of all employees. 440 Therefore, the employer
must show 1) that there is a substantial risk of harm to the fetus
or potential offspring of women employees from the women's
exposure, either during pregnancy or while fertile, to toxic hazards
in the workplaces, and 2) that the hazard applies to fertile or preg-
nant women, but not. to men. 441
If the employer is not able to satisfy these criteria and therefore does
not overcome the burden of proving that the policy is not facially
discriminatory, he may nevertheless raise the BFOQ defense.
The Eleventh Circuit held that: "when a policy designed to protect
employee offspring from workplace hazards proves facially
discriminatory, there is, in effect, no defense, unless the employer shows
a direct relationship between the policy and the actual ability of a preg-
nant or fertile female to perform her job. " 442 Under this analysis, the
court reaffirmed the doctrinal approach that the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act mandates, that an employer treat all employees equally with
respect to policies promulgated to protect the health of the offspring. 443
The court decided that in this case the BFOQ defense was not applicable
because the hospital did not try to prove that the employee's performance
was negatively affected by her fear of harm to the fetus or that her abili-
ty to perform the job was reduced by her pregnancy. 444
This analytical framework may be successfully applied to the case of
women's exposure to fetotoxic chemicals. The employer must first meet
the criteria necessary to prove that the exclusionary policy is not facial-
ly discriminatory. A substantial risk of harm to the fetus which results
exclusively from the exposure of fertile or pregnant women to the toxic
chemicals must be shown. Meeting this burden is a threshold require-
438 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
419 Id. at 1548.
440 Id.
441 Id. (footnote omitted).
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ment. The employer meets this burden by producing sufficient scientific
evidence regarding the risk of harm to the fetus and by showing that
such risk does not exist in the case of paternal exposure to the same
chemicals. 44 5
Industrial employers may not be able to satisfy this burden in many
cases given the paucity of definitive scientific evidence. This is especial-
ly true with regard to the exclusivity of the deleterious consequences of
exposures to toxic chemicals affecting one sex and not the other.
Therefore, these employers would have to try to avail themselves of the
BFOQ defense. But as the Hayes court indicated, such a defense may
be unavailable in these cases unless the employer is able to show a direct
correlation between the policy and the individual ability of the employee
to perform the job. As seen from the Hayes case this may not be possi-
ble since the health of the fetus would not usually adversely affect the
mother's job performance.
In conclusion, it appears that the BFOQ defense may not be generally
available to employers who implement exclusionary policies given the
fact that the focus of the defense is on the employee's ability to perform
the job.4 46 This is particularly true in view of the Pregnancy Amend-
ment which specifically provides that employers may not make distinc-
tions based on pregnancy or related conditions. Unfortunately, even if
the BFOQ defense were to apply in some cases, the problem of safeguar-
ding the health and safety of the fetus would still not be satisfactorily
addressed.
b. Business Necessity Defense
Unlike the statutory BFOQ defense, the business necessity defense was
articulated by the courts to be used in cases of disparate impact. This
theory was first enunciated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 447 where the
Supreme Court held that Title VII: "proscribes not only overt discrimina-
tion, but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion. . . . Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
of the employment practices, not simply the motivation." 448 Once a plain-
tiff is able to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact, the employer
may defend on the ground that the challenged practice was mandated
445 Id. at 1548.
446 See also Fields v. Bolger, 723 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1984). Postal Service employee
did not establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination since light duty policy
was applied equally to all employees regardless of their sex or pregnancy: "There was
no evidence that the policy was applied differently to the [pregnant] plaintiff than to
any other employee with a non-job related disability .... Nothing in Title VII compels
an employer to prefer for alternative employment an employee who, because of pregnan-
cy, is unable to perform her full range of duties." Id. at 1220; see also Fancher v. Nim-
mo, 549 F. Supp. 1324 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
447 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
448 Id. at 431-32 (emphasis original).
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by "business necessity." 449 Thus, according to the Court: "if an employ-
ment practice which operates to exclude [members of a protected group]
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is pro-
hibited. " 450 The business necessity defense requires the employer to show
that the discriminatory policy or requirement has a manifest relation-
ship to the successful performance of the job in question. 451
The Griggs decision contained some ambiguities in terms of the
stringency of the burden the employer had to discharge, 4 5 2 which subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions did not fully clarify. 453 Lower federal
449The Court declared: "The touchstone is business necessity." Id. at 431. See general-
ly Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate Impact Liability under Title
VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 911 (1979); Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the
Search for Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REv. 376 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Business Necessity].
450 401 U.S. at 431.
451 Id.
452 According to one commentator the fundamental ambiguity in the theory of
disparate impact stems from its underlying purpose. The question that needs to be ad-
dressed is whether this theory is only a modest addition to the theory of disparate treat-
ment, designed to prevent pretextual discrimination by shifting part of the burden of
proof to the defendant or if it was meant to be an entirely independent theory intended
to discourage an employer's use of policies which have an adverse impact upon a pro-
tected group. This commentator further explored the consequences of the two alternative
explanations for the theory. If the disparate impact theory is designed to prevent pretextual
discrimination, then the employer would be liable only when there was evidence of
disparate treatment not sufficient to establish discriminating intent. Such a theory could
be rebutted rather easily by a showing that the policy was related to job performance.
If, on the other hand, the disparate impact theory was intended to discourage employ-
ment policies which had an adverse impact on a certain group of employees, then the
employer's liability would result from a proof of discriminatory effects. The employer
would have to discharge a heavy burden of justifying such a policy. G. RJTHERGLEN,
MAJOR ISSUES IN FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 15-16 (1983). Another
commentator suggested that lower court interpretations of the Griggs decision were
hampered by its ambiguous language and therefore had to adopt various lines of reasoning
concerning: 1) which facts should be considered as sufficiently legitimate to override
the prima facie showing of disparate impact; 2) the magnitude of the burden placed upon
the employer to establish the existence of a legitimate need for the challenged practice;
3) the need for the adoption of least discriminatory alternative employment practices
which would meet the legitimate needs of his business. Note, Business Necessity, supra
note 449, at 387.
4" The first disparate impact case after Griggs was Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975) where the Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify "the ap-
propriate standard of proof for job relatedness" with regard to the pre-employment job
testing requirement. The Court held that: "The message of (the EEOC] guidelines is the
same as that of the Griggs case - that discriminatory tests are impermissible unless shown,
by professionally accepted methods, to be predictive of, or significally correlated with,
important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs
for which candidates are being evaluated." Id. at 413 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607-4(c)).
In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) the Supreme Court decided that a policy
which required applicants for the position of correctional counselor to meet a minimum
height and weight requirement, constituted a prima facie showing of disparate impact
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courts have generally held that the challenged discriminatory policy must
be essential to the employer's business 45 4 to be considered sufficiently
job related.
Some lower federal courts have also added a third element to the
analytical framework of disparate impact cases in the form of a less restric-
tive alternative test. 45 This test allows courts to decide which policies
are necessary for the successful management of the business enterprise
and which practices are simply convenient. 456 In Robinson v. Lorillard
discrimination. The defendants were not able to discharge their burden that these re-
quirements were essential to job performance:
If the job-related quality that the appellants identify is bona fide, their purpose
could be achieved by adopting and validating a test for applicants that measures
strength directly. Such a test, fairly administered, would fully satisfy the stan-
dards of Title VII because it would be one that measurels] the person for the job
and not the person in the abstract.
Id. at 332. Justice Rehnquist's concurrence forshadowed the trend the Supreme Court
currently seems to be following:
Appellants, in order to rebut the prima facie case under the statute, had the burden
placed on them to advance job-related reasons for the qualification.... This burden
could be shouldered by offering evidence or by making legal arguments not depen-
dent on any new evidence .... [OQnce the burden has been placed on the defen-
dant, it is then up to the defendant to articulate the asserted job-related reasons
underlying the use of the minim[um job requirements].
Id. at 339-40.
The Court in New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) adopted
the concurring opinion from Dothard and held that a policy promulgated by the defen-
dant to exclude persons on methadone maintenance was justified based on a showing
that it served the employer's legitimate goals of safety and efficiency. Id. at 587. The
dissent criticized the majority opinion in the following terms:
[The pletitioners had the burden of showing job relatedness. They did not show
that the rule results in a higher quality labor force, that the cost of making in-
dividual decisions about those on methodone was prohibitive. ... No one could
reasonably argue that petitioners have made the kind of showing demanded by
Griggs or Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. . . By petitioners own stipulation
... this employment barrier was adopted without meaningful study of [its] rela-
tionship to job performance ability.
Id. at 602.
"I See, e.g., White v. Caroline Paper Bd. Corp., 564 F.2d 1073, 1082 (4th Cir. 1977);
Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. 523 F.2d 1290, 1297-98 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v.
St. Louis - San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1116 (1973); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir.
1971); Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir. 1975); Spurlock
v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 218-19 (10th Cir. 1972).
41- See, e.g., Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1978); Par-
son v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978); Patterson v.
American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976); Muller v. United States Steel Corp.,
509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1975).
436 See Note, Business Necessity, supra note 449, at 397.
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Corp. ,47 the Fourth Circuit enunciated this test as follows:
ITihe applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business
purpose for adhering to a challenged practice. The test is whether
there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that
the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the
business. Thus the business purpose must be sufficiently com-
pelling to override any racial impact; the challenged practice must
effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve;
and there must be available no acceptable alternatives, policies
or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose
advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differen-
tial racial impact. 458
The Robinson test indicates that a successful invocation of the business
necessity defense requires that the employer provide specific proof that
the use of the policy is unavoidable in order to insure the viability of
the business.
Employers who implement facially neutral exclusionary policies aim-
ed at protecting the health of the future offspring of their workers may
invoke the business necessity defense to justify their practices. Under the
analytical paradigm outlined in Griggs, the employer's justification for
the practice would have to transcend the woman's capability of perfor-
ming the job, since normal pregnancies do not impair a woman's ability
to work. 4 59 An employer would also have to overcome the Robinson
test. The first question the employer would have to answer is whether
the exclusionary practice meets an overriding legitimate business pur-
pose. The viability of the enterprise would constitute a legitimate business
purpose. Employers might be able to assert that by not removing women
from hazardous environments, they leave themselves open to liability
resulting from tort litigation brought by deformed babies46° or by parents
Is' 319 F. Supp. 835 (1970), aff'd in part, rev'd. in part, 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971),
cert. dismissed 404 S.Ct. 1006 (1971).
451 Id. at 798.
411 In 1977 the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
published a report entitled: Guidelines on Pregnancy and Work which stated that: "a
normal woman with a normal pregnancy and a normal fetus in a job presenting no greater
potential hazards than those encountered in normal daily life in the community may
continue to work without interruption until the onset of labor, and may resume work-
ing several weeks after an uncomplicated delivery." Cited in Warshaw, Non-Medical
Issues Presented by the Pregnant Worker, 21 J. Occup. MED. 89 (1979).
460 Until 1946 courts consistently refused to recognize a child's cause of action for
prenatal injuries. This doctrine was first established in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Nor-
thampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884) where the court, relying upon lack of precedent in this
area and upon the concept that the fetus was part of the mother, denied recovery for
injuries suffered by a child "en ventre sa mere." However, in Bonbrest v. Katz, 65 F.
Supp. 138 (D.C.C. 1946) the court held that injuries to a viable unborn child were com-
pensable in a tort action brought after the child's birth. The court reasoned that once
it was demonstrated that a fetus could live outside the mother's womb, the concept that
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the fetus was not an independent entity from the mother was no longer applicable. Fur-
ther, the court stated that even if both parents were compensated for their loss "there
is a residuum of injury for which compensation cannot be had save at the suit of the
child." Id. at 140-41. Bonbrest thus originated the viability doctrine under which viability,
including "quickening," became a prerequisite to recovery for prenatal injuries. This doc-
trine was confined for a long time to injuries received by the fetus after conception. See,
e.g., Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 776, 87 S.E.2d 100, 103 (1955); Damasiewiez
v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 438, 79 A.2d 550, 560-61 (1951). One related issue is whether
there can be recovery for the wrongful death of the stillborn child resulting from injury
either before or after viability. The major issue in this context is whether the fetus is
a "person" covered by the wrongful death statutes. Some jurisdictions allow recovery
in such cases: See, e.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So.2d 354, 358
(1974); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406, 408 (Super. Ct. 1966);
Worgan v. Greggo & Fenara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557, 558 (1956); Chrisafogeorgis
v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill.2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88, 92 (1973); Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App.
487, 277 N.E.2d 20, 27 (1971); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d
916 (1975); Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 222 N.W.2d 334 (1974); Moen v. Han-
son, 85 Wash.2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975).
In Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill.2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977), the Illinois
Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether a child born with birth defects may recover
from injuries caused by preconception negligence towards the mother. The court held
that the child could maintain a cause of action against the hospital on the ground that
the child had a right to be born free from prenatal injuries foreseeably caused by a breach
of duty to the infant's mother. Id. at 357-58, 367 N.E.2d at 1255. See also Jorgensen
v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973) (under Oklahoma
law a cause of action was recognized on behalf of mongoloid twins who claimed that
their condition was caused by defective birth control pills). See generally Kader, The
Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REV. 639 (1980); Robert-
son, Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978
DuKE L.J. 1401; Comment, Preconception Negligence: Reconciling an Emerging Tort,
67 GEo. L.J. 1239 (1980); Comment, Prenatal Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM.
J. L. & Soc. PROB. 47 (1978). Comment, Recovery for Prenatal Injuries: The Right of
a Child Against its Mother, 10 SUFF. U. L. REV. 582 (1076). The Renslow rationale may
be used in the cases of fetal injury caused by parental exposure to toxic substances. Several
issues arise in this context especially if liability is to be used as the basis for a business
necessity defense. According to one commentator the child born with birth defects has
to overcome several obstacles to litigation in the context: 1) Some jurisdictions do not
recognize a cause of action for prenatal injuries or for wrongful death for a stillborn
child. 2) The employer's duty under tort law towards the employee is not completely
clear, particularly in situations where the employer meets the OSHA standards and
generally makes an effort to keep a safe and healthy workplace. 3) Difficulty arises in
establishing causation given the limited scientific knowledge in this area.
In the alternative, the child might bring his suit under a strict liability theory consis-
tent with the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) which states that
a person is strictly liable in tort for damage caused by him in the course of an abnormal-
ly dangerous activity that is inappropriate to its location, regardless of its social utility.
But maintaining such an action might be difficult since there may be factual problems
regarding the "abnormally dangerous" quality of toxic chemicals and the inappropriateness
of their use in an industrial enterprise. Comment, Birth Defects Caused by Parental Ex-
posure to Workplace Hazards: The Interface of Title VII with OSHA and Tort Law,
12 MICH. J. L. REFORM 239, 253-56 (1979).
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whose children were born with birth defects.461 Whether such potential
liability would constitute a sufficient business purpose to legitimize a
discriminatory practice is questionable. 462
Another business purpose the employer might assert is the need to com-
ply with the mandate of the OSHAct to insure the health and safety of
the American workforce. 463 But, as discussed previously, the Act pro-
tects the health of today's generation of workers not that of tomorrow's
generation. 464 It is doubtful whether an employer could use this argu-
ment as a justification for the wholesale exclusion and discrimination
against women of childbearing age.
The second prong of the Robinson test requires that the practice in
question effectively carry out the business purpose it is designed to
serve. 46s Assuming that the business purpose is minimizing corporate
liability for birth defects, excluding all women of childbearing age is by
no means an effective approach for achieving this goal. There is suffi-
cient evidence to indicate that such birth defects may result from pater-
nal as well as maternal exposure to toxic substances.466 If the business
purpose to be served is compliance with the spirit of the OSHAct in terms
of insuring the safety of the workplace, excluding women of childbear-
ing age would definitely not serve this purpose. A fertile or pregnant
woman in no way increases the danger of the workplace since the only
entity that might be affected by the exposure to toxic substances is her
unborn child. Therefore, removing such women from hazardous en-
vironments in reality does not serve any business purpose, let alone serve
it efficiently.
The third requirement of the Robinson test calls for a showing of the
non-existence of an acceptable alternative policy or practice that would
accomplish the business purpose either better or equally well with less
461 A parent might have a cause of action against his/her employer on the basis
that his/her reproductive ability was impaired because of the exposure to toxic substances.
The damages would be awarded for the injuries he/she suffered and also possibly for
pain and suffering. Also, parents might be able to bring derivative suits for costs incur-
red in rearing a child born with birth defects. Note, Preconception Torts:. Foreseeing
the Unconceived, 48 U. CoLo. L. REV. 621, 628 n.38 (1977).
462 See generally Sloan, Employer's Tort Liability When a Female Employee is Ex-
posed to Harmful Substances, 3 EMPL. REL. L.J. 506 (1978); Comment, Birth Defects
Caused by Parental Exposure to Workplace Hazards: The Interface of Title VII with
OSHA and Tort Law, 12 U. MicH. J. L. REF. 237 (1979); Rothstein, Reproductive Hazards
and Sex Discrimination in the Workplace New Legal Concerns in Industry and on Cam-
pus, 10 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 495, 505-09 (1984); Swinton, Regulating Reproductive Hazards
in the Workplace: Balancing Equality and Health, 33 U. TORONTO L.J. 45 (1983).
463 See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
464 See supra notes 169-75, 253-56 and accompanying text.
465 See supra note 456 and accompanying text.
466 See supra notes 101-59 and accompanying text.
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discriminatory effect. 467 Given the limited scientific data regarding the
effects of exposure to toxic substances, the employer might have a dif-
ficult time in proposing viable alternatives if there is a consensus that
protection of the health of the employee's offspring is indeed a legitimate
business purpose. This difficulty was encountered in the few decisions
that dealt with this issue.
The Fourth Circuit, in Wright v. Olin Corp., 468 applied the disparate
impact/business necessity analysis to the "Female Employment and Fetal
Vulnerability" policy of Olin Corporation. Under this policy, Olin
adopted a job classification system, placing each position within the plant
into one of three categories: "restricted," "controlled," or "unrestricted.."469
The goal of the policy was to protect the unborn fetuses of pregnant
employees from the damaging toxic effects of certain known toxic
chemicals particularly lead and carbon disulfide. 470
The "restricted" jobs category applied to jobs which required contact
with and exposure to known or suspected abortifacient or teratogenic
agents. 471 All fertile women were precluded from holding these positions.
Women diagnosed as unable to bear children by the company's medical
staff were permitted to be placed in restricted jobs. 47 2 "Controlled" jobs
required only limited exposure to harmful chemicals. 473 Pregnant women
could work in these jobs only after the medical department had con-
ducted individual case-by-case evaluations. Non-pregnant women could
work in "controlled" jobs only after signing a form stating that they
recognized that the job presented "some risk although slight. " 474
Finally, "unrestricted" jobs were those which did not present a hazard
to either the pregnant female or her fetus. 47S They were open to all women.
Men were not restricted from any jobs, although they were warned orally
of the effects of exposure to lead. 476 Olin asserted that it decided to im-
plement this policy after investigating potential alternatives such as
substituting non-toxic materials or improving ventilation, and finding
them impracticable.477
467 444 F.2d at 798.
465 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
469 Id. at 1182. See also Krause, A Company Program to Control Toxic Exposures,
NAT'L. SAFETY NEWS, Feb. 1979, at 52, 55.
470 697 F.2d at 1182.
471 Id. The Company defined "abortifacient agents" as those substances which "may
induce abortions" and "teratogenic agents" as ones which "may produce various fetal
abnormalities." Krause, supra note 470, at 55.








The district court found that the policy was instituted for sound medical
and humane reasons and was based upon competent medical knowledge
and research and years of monitoring levels of chemical exposure at Olin's
plant. Further, the court found that the intent behind the promulgation
of the policy was not to discriminate against women, but rather to pro-
tect the unborn fetus at a time when it was most vulnerable to exposure
to harmful chemicals.478 Therefore, the court concluded as a matter of
law that the policy "does not discriminate against females in violation
of Title VII."'479
On appeal, the two sides proposed different legal approaches for the
circuit court to evaluate and adopt. The plaintiffs claimed that the com-
pany's fetal vulnerability policy, with its exclusive adverse effect upon
the employment of women, was either facially violative of Title VII480
or constituted a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination. 481
The defendant corporation contended that the proper analytical
framework was provided by the disparate treatment theory. 482 Under
this theory, Olin claimed that the expert evidence adduced at trial to
justify the exclusionary policy constituted a 'legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason" to rebut the prima facie case of sex discrimination. 48 3
The district court had analyzed the policy from a disparate treatment
viewpoint which the circuit court rejected as "wholly inappropriate" for
resolving the legal and factual theories involved in the fetal vulnerabili-
ty program. 4 4 The court of appeals rejected the overt discrimina-
tion/BFOQ analytical approach just as summarily,' s' and decided that
the most appropriate analytical framework for the fetal vulnerability pro-
gram was provided by the disparate impact/business necessity theory. 48 6
The court recognized that the fetal vulnerability program while not
"facially neutral" as required by the disparate impact paradigm, did meet
the essential substantive principle underlying this theory in that the policy
had definite disproportionate consequences on women, whether or not
they were intentional.487 Thus, the court concluded that the evidence of
478 EEOC v. Olin Corp., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1646, 1659 .(W.D.N.C.
1980), aff'd in part, and rev'd in part sub nom. Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172
(4th Cir. 1982).
479 Id.
480 697 F.2d at 1183.
48 Id. (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and Nashville Gas
Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977)).
482 Id. at 1183 (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas
Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1971)).
483 Id.
484 Id. at 1185. The court recognized that this factual situation did not precisely
fit within any of the traditional analytical frames for Title VII. Id. at 1184.
485 Id. at 1185.
486 Id.
417 Id. at 1186.
1986-87]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
the existence and operation of the fetal vulnerability program establishes
as a matter of law a prima facie case of Title VII violation. 488
The next issue addressed by the court was whether the business necessi-
ty defense wouldapply, and "if so, on what basis, employment prac-
tices avowedly designed to protect the unborn fetuses of women workers
from workplace dangers can be justified on that basis despite their
disproportionate adverse impact upon women's employment oppor-
tunities "489
The specific question to be resolved by the court was "whether under
any circumstances" the protection of workers' unborn children can pro-
perly be considered a "necessity" within the meaning of the business
necessity defense.490 The court applied the Robinson test which requires
the showing of "an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the
practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business." 491
With respect to the fetal vulnerability program, the puzzling question
was whose safety ought to be considered a matter of business necessity.
The court suggested that proper subjects include the women workers,
personal service customers of the business, and other employees. The
Olin court acknowledged that precedent indicates that the safety of the
customer has been recognized as an overriding business necessity.492
Further, the court stated that "the legitimacy of an employer's pur-
pose to protect by discriminatory means the safety of the unborn children
of workers would appear to lie conceptually somewhere between a pur-
pose to protect the safety of workers themselves and a purpose to pro-
tect that of customers exposed in normal course to workplace hazards.."4 93
The court narrowed its inquiry by analogizing the unborn child to a
special category of invitees and licensees legitimately on the business
premises and exposedto the associated hazards present in the workplace,
481 Id. at 1187.
419 Id. at 1188.
490 Id.
491 Id. (quoting Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), eert. dismiss-
ed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971)).
492 One case that the Olin court used as precedent was Burwell v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981). Such
reliance may be misplaced in that the Olin court ignored a major logical link in the Burwell
decision. In Burwell the court emphatically stated: "Eastern's contention that an element
of business necessity is its consideration for the safety of the pregnant flight attendant
and her unborn child is not persuasive. If this personal compassion can be attributed
to corporate policy it is commendable, but in the area of civil rights, personal risk deci-
sions not affecting business operations are best left to individuals who are the targets
of discrimination." 633 F.2d at 371. The Olin court on the other hand stated that it re-
jected "any contention that under Title VII a woman's right to make her own choices
respecting workplace hazards rather than submit to discriminatory restrictions is exact-
ly paralleled by a right to make the same choices in behalf of her unborn children."
697 F.2d at 1189 n.25.
491 697 F.2d at 1189.
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to that of personal service customers of the business. 4 94 According to
the court, the business necessity of providing for customer safety is of
more "overriding" importance than providing for the safety of visitors.
Further, the legislative intent behind Title VII was interpreted as stan-
ding for the proposition that the Act did not mean to completely deprive
employers of the right to provide any protection for licensees and in-
vitees legitimately on the premises. Expanding its analogy, the court held
that "under appropriate circumstances an employer may, as a matter
of business necessity, impose otherwise impermissible restrictions on
employment opportunity that are reasonably required to protect the
health of unborn children."' 95 It remanded on the issue of whether the
business, necessity defense was applicable to the fetal vulnerability pro-
gram. 496 The Fourth Circuit established several criteria to be used by the
district court in making its decision regarding this issue.
First, the employer must carry the burden of persuasion that toxic
substances which harm the fetus do so exclusively through exposure of
the fertile or pregnant women and that men are unaffected; consequent-
ly, the only means of protection for the fetus is the exclusion or restric-
tion of women from exposure. 49' Second, this burden may not be
discharged simply by proving that the employer subjectively and in good
faith believed the program was necessary and effective for the purpose.
The employer must present objective scientific evidence that the policy
was necessary to achieve its goal of protecting fetal health.498 Such
evidence should be presented exclusively by expert witnesses. 499 The
evidence presented need not reflect a general consensus, but there should
be a sufficient showing "that within [the] community there is so con-
siderable a body of opinion that significant risk exists, and that it is
substantially confined to women workers, that an informed employer
could not responsibly fail to act on the assumption that this opinion might
be an accurate one."100 A successful showing would establish a prima
facie business necessity defense. This prima facie defense may be rebut-
ted by the plaintiffs if they can show the existence of "acceptable alter-
native policies or practices which would better accomplish the business
purpose . . . [of protecting against the risk of harm], or accomplish it
equally well with a lesser differential . . .impact [between women and
men workers]."501 Such rebuttal may result in two distinct means of
recovery for the plaintiff. -02
494 Id.
495 Id.
496 Id. at 1187.
497 Id. at 1189.
498 Id. at 1190.
499 Id.
500 Id. at 1191.
101 Id. (quoting Lorillard, 444 F.2d at 798).
502 Id. at 1191.
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The district court for the Western District of North Carolina applied
these criteria when it decided the case on remand.-03 Olin presented
evidence to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination established by
the plaintiff. The company's expert witnesses testified that the exclu-
sionary policy was the only efficient means for insuring the health of
the fetus..0 4 From the testimony presented, the court concluded that no
such policies needed to be implemented for men. 50 5
Olin was able to establish that the fetal health defects which formed
the basis for the policy in fact occurred only through maternal exposure.
Based on the scientific evidence presented on remand, the district court
found that Olin's policy was not underinclusive: "There is substantial
risk of fetal harm through maternal exposure, as contrasted with a negligi-
ble or theoretical risk through paternal exposure. Clearly .. .the risk
is substantially confined to women. "506
Though neither the Fourth Circuit, nor the law in general, require that
a defendant prove the non-existence of less discriminatory alternatives,0 7
the court nonetheless concluded that the evidence tended to show that
such alternatives were not available to Olin. 508 It stated that it was not
in a position to recommend that Olin seek and adopt such alternatives
to reduce the level of exposure of its women employees to the hazar-
dous substances.50 9
The court held that an employer may justifiably choose a policy of
fetal protection as "a moral obligation" to protect the next .generation
from injury, and that such protection is a social goal that should be en-
503 Wright v. Olin Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D. N.C. 1984).
504 Fletcher Roberts, Olin's director of the Safety Loss Prevention Services and an
expert in the fields of industrial safety and health, testified that the company has tried
to minimize workers' exposure to the chemicals most prevalent at Olin's Pisgah Forest
facility, such as toluene, carbon disulfide, and lead. The company has tried to imple-
ment the following alternatives: 1) possible use of respirators and other personal pro-
tective equipment; 2) provision for better ventilation; 3) substitution of lower toxicity
chemicals such as a better grade of toluene at greater cost because it contained less benzene;
4) maximization of the goals of workers' health and equal employment through the
transfer rather than exclusion of its workers. He also testified that Olin met all of the
OSHA standards. Doctor Sergio Fabro, who was recognized by the court as an expert
in the field of obstetrics-gynecology, expressed the opinion that there were significant
risks of harm to the unborn children of women workers at Olin's facility from their ex-
posure during pregnancy to the toxic hazards of carbon disulfide, benzene, toluene, and
lead. He stated that women of reproductive years should be restricted from an exposure
to such toxic hazards in order to avoid potential harm to the offspring. Id. at 1149-50.
-s Id.s at 1149-50.
506 Id. at 1150-51.
507 Id.




couraged rather than penalized.510 It concluded that Olin had rebutted
the prima facie case of discrimination established by the plaintiff "by
showing through the testimony of independent, objective scientific ex-
pert witnesses a business necessity for its fetal vulnerability program.."511
The Olin case represents the quintessence of the dilemma faced by our
judicial system. On one hand, the courts have a moral obligation to
safeguard the health of the unborn. On the other hand, they are obligated
to enforce the legislative mandate regarding equal employment oppor-
tunities. The Olin court stretched the meaning of the business necessity
defense to encompass the fetal vulnerability program by equating laudable
moral obligations and societal goals with an "overriding business pur-
pose." Such an analysis defies precedent.5 1 2 It introduces even more con-
fusion and inconsistency in an area already filled with controversy and
emotionalism.
In Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp. '513 the Eleventh Circuit likewise
examined the validity of the business necessity defense as applied to a
hospital's policy of firing a pregnant woman based upon the employer's
alleged belief that the woman's continued employment presented a
substantial hazard to her fetus. This court rejected as unnecessary the
legal gyrations adopted by the Fourth Circuit which had equated the fetus
with a business invitee.- 14 The court stated that it "simply recognize[d]
fetal protection as a legitimate area of employer concern to which the
business necessity defense extends."515
The plaintiff contended that the basis for the defense was avoidance
of possibly ruinous litigation. The court found that such emphasis was
misplaced and the defense of business necessity in a fetal protection case
is justified by a genuine desire on the part of the employer to promote
the health of employee offspring, not by self-interest. 516 In a surprising-
ly candid statement, the Hayes court commented that its extension of
510 Id. at 1153.
511 Id. The court held that the plaintiff had not successfully rebutted the business
necessity defense. As such, Olin's fetal vulnerability policy did not discriminate against
the plaintiff.
512 See supra notes 459-62 and accompanying text.
513 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
514 Id. at 1552. n.14. It is interesting to note that this court adopted the principles
developed in Wright v. Olin Corp. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982) regarding what con-
stituted a sufficient showing of "business necessity" and applied these principles to what
constitutes a sufficient proof for a BFOQ defense. 726 F.2d at 1548.
5 726 F.2d at 1552 n.14.
516 Id. at 1553 n.15. See also Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th
Cir. 1982) where an X-ray technician established a prima facie case of sex discrimina-
tion since the policy imposed a burden on women which no man would ever suffer.
The hospital claimed that the potential harm to the fetus from ionizing radiation and
the possibility of a tort suit from a future "damaged" child constituted a business necessity
which justified its termination of the plaintiff's employment. The court did not see the
need to address the issue of whether these considerations constituted a valid business
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the defense, beyond a strict relationship to job performance, 517 was
prompted by considerations of "a higher public policy other than simp-
ly protecting employers from suits."s"
The Eleventh Circuit declared that from the evidence adduced at trial,
the practice constituted disparate impact discrimination. The employer
justified the practice on the basis of an automatic business necessity
defense validated by the scientific evidence regarding the exclusive con-
nection between birth defects and maternal exposure to hazardous work
environments. 519 According to the Hayes court, once an employer defends
his policy, the employee may rebut the defense by proving the existence
of acceptable alternative policies that would better accomplish the pur-
pose of safeguarding fetal health.5 20 Since the hospital employed no alter-
natives to the outright firing of the plaintiff the court decided that the
plaintiff-employee successfully rebutted the business necessity defense.
Hayes represents a further expansion of the business necessity defense
to fetal protection policies. There is a paucity of analytical depth regar-
ding the suitability of this defense to the fetal health context. This situa-
tion reflects the difficulty of trying to fit socially or morally justifiable
employer conduct within an inappropriate statutory setting.
4. Conclusion
The discussion presented in this section indicates that application of
traditional Title VII defenses may not be available to protect an employer
who attempts to safeguard the health of the unborn by excluding women
from exposure to toxic work environments. These defenses have been
either statutorily or judicially developed to protect the employer's
prerogative in conducting business according to his best judgment and
not to insure the health of the next generation. They focus on the
employees' job performance' and not on the employees' or their offspr-
ings' medical condition.
When an employer uses the statutory BFOQ defense, he has to prove
that employees of only a particular sex have the ability to perform the
job in question.5 2 1 Employers using the business necessity defense must
necessity since the plaintiff was able to prove that the alleged business necessity defense
was merely a pretext for discrimination by showing that the hospital failed to utilize
a less discriminatory alternative. Id. at 991-92. The court did comment in dicta that:
"the economic consequences of a tort suit brought against the Hospital by a congenital-
ly malformed child could be financially devastating, seriously disrupting the safe and
efficient operation of the business." Id. at 992 n.10 (citation omitted).
SI See supra notes 515-16 and accompanying text.
I's 726 F.2d at 1553 n.15.
519 Id. at 1553.
520 Id.
"I See supra notes 392-444 and accompanying text.
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show that the challenged practice or policy is necessary for the safe and
efficient performance of the particular job. 522 Insofar as the possibility
for harm to the fetus is not directly or even tangentially related to the
employee's ability to perform the job, the traditional defenses to Title
VII violations do not provide satisfactory solutions to the problems of
safeguarding the health of future generations without penalizing the job
opportunities of the present one.
Olin and Hayes best exemplify the extremes to which courts are
prepared to go to insure the protection of the fetus from the consequences
of the exposure of their mothers to toxic work environments. These cases
bring into focus the quandry the judicial system faces in balancing the
health of the next generation with the rights of the present generation.
The courts have consistently remarked that they need more precise
statutory guidelines to better enable them to answer this challenge. 52
3
IV. STATUTORY PROPOSAL
As the analysis of the existing statutory scheme and the judicial
statutory construction indicate, at the present time neither employees'
reproductive ability nor the health of the fetus appear to be adequately
protected. The very strong societal interest in minimizing or eliminating
the incidence of birth defects due to all causes, including environmental
and occupational hazards, is undisputed.5 2 4 This section will discuss a
statutory proposal aimed at developing a methodology which is design-
ed to protect the health of both male and female employees and that
of their offspring, as well as to safeguard all workers' employment op-
portunities. The proposal will also address means employers might use
to avoid liability under Title VII for excluding pregnant employees or
women of child bearing age from fetally hazardous work environments.
522 See supra notes 459-519 and accompanying text.
523 See, e.g., Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982) where the court
remarked: "we note. . . that the problem of fitting the fetal vulnerability program into
the appropriate theory of claim and defense as developed in Title VII litigation [is com-
plicated in that this] fact situation is one of first impression with the Court and ...
does not fit with absolute precision into any of the developed theories." Id. at 1184;
See also Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. American Cyanamid Co.,
741 F.2d 444 (D.C.C. 1984) where the court stated:
The fetus protection policy ... does not affect employees while they are engaged
in work or work-related activities.... [T~he fetus protection policy is not a hazard
within the meaning of the general duty clause. Were we to decide otherwise, we
would have to adopt a broad principle of unforeseeable scope: any employer policy
which, because of employee economic incentives, left open an option exercised
outside the work-place that might be harmful would constitute a "hazard" that
made the employer liable under the general duty clause. It might be possible to
legislate limitations upon such a principle but that is a task for Congress rather
than courts.
Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
524 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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This legislative proposal is premised upon two hypotheses: 1) under
the present level of technological knowledge and expertise the workplace
may not be rendered completely safe for the fetus; and 2) under current
legal theories the fetus has very few if any rights, particularly before
viability. These two premises will be discussed in detail below.
A. Cleaning Up the. Work Place
There is little doubt that the best solution to the problem of the fetal-
ly toxic work environment would be to eliminate all hazards or at least
minimize them to a level at which the fetus would not be harmed. 525 Such
a situation would address and fulfill the goals that wholesale exclusion
was designed to meet: the protection of workers' reproductive ability
and the insurance of the health of the fetus.
Although this approach appears to be the most attractive resolution
of the problem since it satisfactorily answers all the issues of concern,
it is the least achievable. As seen above, the OSHAct requires that the
Agency institute standards insofar as they are feasible from both a
technological and economic viewpoint.5 26 Furthermore, economic or
technological feasibility may not be the threshold level of inquiry. Rather,
the initial concern is the lack of sufficient scientific understanding of the
issues involved in harm to the fetus resulting from the parents' occupa-
tional exposure to toxic substances.
Given the current level of scientific and technological knowledge, it
appears that the implementation of exclusionary policies may be necessary
in order to safeguard the health of the unborn, since cleanup of the work
environment may not be realistically attainable. However, when such
policies are sex-based, they come into direct conflict with the mandate
of Title VII.527 Therefore, the issue is how to reconcile the uncomfor-
table reality that parental exclusion may be the only solution to protec-
ting the future generation with the right of all workers to equal employ-
ment opportunities as guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act. The question
that must be resolved is whether it is equitable that parents prevail in
this quandry simply because they are currently protected by statute while
the rights of the fetus are not yet recognized.
B. Fetal Rights
In Roe v. Wade,528 the Supreme Court held that the "word 'person,'
as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn."5 29
This holding was tempered by the Court's comment that the state has
an "important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of
525 See supra notes 29, 60-98 and accompanying text.
526 See supra notes 186-247 and accompanying text.
527 See supra notes 323-30 and accompanying text.
528 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
529 Id. at 158.
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human life." 30 Roe thus confirmed the right, if not the duty, of the state
to protect the unborn. 531 The issue not directly addressed by the Court
was what would happen when the interests of parents and those of the
unborn conflict, particularly in instances where the rights of the parents
are assured by statute.
This question is more troublesome in situations involving the pre-viable
fetus. The Court stated that the state's compelling interest in protecting
potential life becomes fully realized at viability "because the fetus then
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's
womb. '5 32 Therefore, it appears that at least up to viability, the rights
and interests of the parents are to prevail.5 33 Such an interpretation is
consistent with traditional legal views regarding the protection of the
unborn. 34 Tort law represents the complexity and inconsistency inherent
130 Id. at 162.
131 See generally Parness & Pitchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn's
Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257 (1982); King, The Judicial Status of the Fetus:
A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1647 (1979); Parness,
The Duty to Prevent Handicaps: Laws Promoting the Prevention of Handicaps to
Newborns, 5 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 431 (1983).
532 410 U.S. at 163.
533 Under this type of analysis, excluding women from hazardous workplaces on
the basis of their pregnancy would be denied. This is particularly true during the first
trimester, since under Roe the interests of the woman are to prevail. This would present
an even greater risk to the embryo who is most susceptible to toxic assault during the
early stages of gestation.
34 The Roe Court commented that inheritance law recognizes the rights of the un-
born to inherit property, but such acquisition is contingent upon live birth. 410 U.S.
at 162. The Uniform Probate Code recognizes the rights of "[rlelatives of the decedent
conceived before his death but born thereafter [to] inherit as if they had been born in
the lifetime of the decedent." Uniform Probate Code § 2-108 (1983). The Probate Code
also provides that a testator's pretermitted child who is born after the execution of the
will is entitled to receive "a share in the estate equal in value to that which he would
have received if the former died intestate." Uniform Probate Code § 2-302 (1983). One
commentator agrees that the code undermines the interests of the unborn by making
the taking of property contingent upon live birth: "The state's legitimate interest in 'pro-
tecting the potentiality of human life', would warrant elimination of the incentive to
abort [such that the spouse inherits the whole estate, rather than her legal share]." Parness
& Pritchard, supra note 531, at 265 (citation omitted).
Criminal law has addressed the issue of whether the fetus is to be afforded legal pro-
tection through the enactment of legislation prohibiting abortion, feticide, homicide,
and manslaughter. One commentator has remarked that these types of statutes are limited
in their ability to protect the unborn because their main focus is the protection of the
mother. Parness & Pritchard, supra note 531, at 267. The Roe rationale regarding viability
has limited the breath of coverage of these statutes. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court,
2 Cal.3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970) where the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia held that a viable fetus was not a human being under the state's homicide laws. Con-
sequently California amended its homicide statute to read: "Murder is the unlawful kill-
ing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187
(West 1983). The revised statute was construed in People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App.3d 751,
129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976) where an appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 1:141
in these legal theories. Recovery in cases involving torts committed against
the fetus may depend upon several factors including: 1) when the injury
occurred; 2) whether the injury occurred prior to conception; and 3) the
type of injury suffered by the fetus.535
Today, the majority of jurisdictions allow recovery in wrongful death
cases involving the unborn, particularly when the injury causing the death
of the fetus occurred after viability.5 36 Recovery has also been granted
in a few cases involving pre-conception torts.57 Though there appears
to be some sporadic court approval for weakening the concept of viability
as a prerequisite for recovery in tort, such a change in legal position does
not seem to be forthcoming in a majority of jurisdictions.
A few courts have found that section 1983538 does not protect the rights
of the fetus, particularly those of the pre-viable fetus.5 39 These cases are
consistent with the Roe decision that the fetus is not a person whose rights
are protected under the fourteenth amendment and, as such, may not
maintain a cause of action under section 1983.540
which dismissed murder charges against a man who allegedly murdered a pre-viable
fetus, based on a mistaken interpretation of the Roe v. Wade rationale:
The underlying rationale of Wade, therefore, is that until viability is reached,
human life in the legal sense has not come into existence. Implicit in Wade is the
conclusion that as a matter of constitutional law the destruction of a non-viable
fetus is not a taking of human life. It follows that such destruction cannot con-
stitute murder or other form of homicide, whether committed by a mother, a father
(as here), or a third person.
Id. at 755, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 502. See also State v. Brown, 378 So.2d 916 (La. 1979).
See generally Parness & Pritchard, supra note 531, at 267-69; King, supra note 531, at
1662-64.
135 See supra notes 531-34 and accompanying text.
536 See supra note 533 and accompanying text.
537 Id.
538 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1982). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, priviledges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
39 See generally Note, The Fetus Under Section 1983: Still Struggling for Recogni-
tion, 34 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1029 (1983).
_4oSee, e.g., McGarvey v. Magee-Women's Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. Pa.
1972), aff'd mem., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973) (suit against hospital claiming that by
providing abortions the hospital deprived children of their lives without due process
of law. The court held that fetal life was not constitutionally protected based on the
rationale that the history of the Constitution and of the Civil Rights Act was not intend-
ed to protect the fetus and that the issue of fetal protection was to be left to the individual
state legislatures); Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd in part
and rem. mem. 516 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1975) (under the Roe rationale a fetus is not en-
titled to benefits under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)); accord, Burns
v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975) (strict statutory construction that "dependent children"
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This short survey dealing with the present status of the law regarding
the legal safeguards provided to the fetus indicates that: 1) the state may
assert its interest in protecting the health of the unborn particularly after
viability; and 2) prior to viability the fetus is generally unprotected and
the interests of the parents are paramount. This legal view comes into
direct conflict with current advances in medicine and in biological sciences
which indicate that viability may occur prior to the twenty-fourth week
of gestation.541
The issue of fetal protection, specifically of insuring the health of the
unborn, comes into even sharper focus in the case of the fetally toxic
environment. One commentator has suggested that in this context a balan-
cing analysis would be appropriate and would lead to four alternative
causes of action:5 42 1) The state could mandate that potential parents
be banned from hazardous work environments; 2) The state could re-
quire that employers clean up the workplace and thus minimize or
eliminate the hazards; 3) The state might require the employer to transfer
employees who are potential parents to less toxic work environments,
wherever possible; and 4) The state might provide the unborn with
remedial tort relief by making the employer or even the parents legally
responsible for the harm resulting from the exposure. 543 The statutory
proposal presented below incorporates some of these suggestions par-
ticularly to the extent that it is premised upon weighing the interests of
employers, employees, and their future offspring.
C. Legislative Proposal
The clash between the toxic work environment and the Pregnancy
Amendment may be solved by Congress through a legislative enactment
aimed specifically at protecting the health of future generations, while
did not encompass fetuses). Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Va. 1981) (birth
defective child may not maintain a cause of action under section 1983 for injuries received
in utero from a police officer's alleged physical mistreatment of the mother); but see
Douglas v. Town of Hartford, 542 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1982) (birth defective in-
fant has a cause of action under section 1983 based on a long tradition in Connecticut
of recognition of fetal rights).
541 See King, supra note 531, at 1673-77.
-41 See Parness & Pritchard, supra note 531, at 295.
54 See generally Comment, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J. L.
& Soc. PROSS. 47, 84 (1978) where the author commented that:
If children can sue their parents for negligent conduct and can sue third parties
for negligence causing prenatal injury, it is logically inconsistent to deny the cause
of action of a child prenatally injured by parental negligence. The discrepancy
between the position of the child prenatally injured by his parents and that of
the child similarly injured by others is unjust. The former are denied a cause of
action whereas the latter may recover as successful plaintiffs. Since the parents
are in a position of being able to inflict at least as much, if not more, harm than
any third party tortfeasor during pregnancy, the discrepancy is even more
disturbing.
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ensuring that women's employment opportunities would not be adversely
affected. Such legislation will be proposed in this section.
The statute to be designated as the Fetal Protection Act (F.P. Act) is
to be promulgated as an amendment to the Occupational Safety and
Health Act and thus to be administered by OSHA. OSHA is to defer
to the EEOC in cases involving violations of Title VII. The F.P. Act is
to provide for the implementation of workplace health and safety policies
reaching both men and women planning to become parents. These policies
are to be based on sound scientific data regarding reproductive im-
pairments and the consequences resulting from parental exposure to a
fetally toxic work environment.
As discussed above,544 the problem with present regulatory schemes
is that they do not specifically address the issue of fetal protection in
the employment context. They concern themselves strictly with the pre-
sent generation of workers and not with their future offspring. The pro-
posed statute is designed to rectify this particular problem. It would pro-
vide for:
1 ) A program of economic incentives to employers. Such incentives are
to include tax incentives54 for employers who provide a fetally safe
work environment through massive engineering changes exceeding
those mandated by compliance with OSHA standards.5 46
2) Voluntary removal of workers from toxic areas. Such removals are
to be granted to employees who request them based on their desire
for parenthood. The removals are not to result in economic losses
to the workers, e.g., they will maintain all of their benefits and ac-
cumulated seniority.
3) Medical monitoring of workers. Regular monitoring of workers is
to be provided by the employer to ascertain incipient reproductive
damage, such as chromosomal aberrations. When such damage is
diagnosed, the affected worker is to be immediately removed from
the hazardous work environment and his/her medical condition shall
continue to be monitored to decide when the worker may safely return
to his/her former job or whether the damage is irreversible.
144 See supra notes 168-520 and accompanying text.
141 Expenditures for such a purpose could qualify for tax credit under I.R.C. § 30
(1985), which states:
(a) GENERAL RULE. There shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed
by this chapter for the taxable year an amount equal to 25 percent of the excess
(if any) of
(1) the qualified research expenses for the taxable year, over
(2) the base period research expenses.
(b) QUALIFIED RESEARCH EXPENSES. The term "qualified research expenses"
means the sum of the following amounts which are paid or incurred by the tax-
payer during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business of the taxpayer
(A) in-house research expenses, and
(B) contract research expenses.
546 See supra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
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4) Mandatory communication to employees regarding the exposure to
toxic substances. Employers are to establish formal procedures to in-
form employees both in writing and in training sessions about the
reproductive hazards presented by exposure to certain toxic chemicals.
Workers are to confirm in writing that they understand the dangers
of exposure to such toxins.
5) Mandatory removal of employees. In instances where it is either scien-
tifically or economically impossible to render the workplace fetally
safe, the employer may exercise the option of temporarily removing
at-risk employees based on their potential for parenthood. When there
is substantial scientific evidence that only one sex-based classifica-
tion of employees is affected, the employer may remove or exclude
members of the sex-based category. Such removals are not to result
in economic hardship or losses to the affected worker.
6) Funding for medical and scientific research. Funding for research in
this area is to be provided by the government to NIOSH and to the
National Institute of Health (NIH). Also research grants are to be
awarded to various academic institutions to conduct basic investiga-
tions in this field.
7) Limitation of the liability of employers to employees. In certain cir-
cumstances the liability of the employer to the employee for birth
defects resulting from exposure to toxins is to be limited. Such cir-
cumstances are to include instances where no scientific evidence ex-
isted at the time of exposure regarding the potential for reproduc-
tive damage and instances where the employee chose to continue
working in the hazardous work environment, even after being in-
formed of his/her options for voluntary removal (assumption of risk).
8) The establishment of a national fund to compensate children born
with birth defects. The statute is to provide for the establishment of
a national fund based on mandatory contributions from affected in-
dustries to compensate children born with birth defects conclusively
resulting from parental exposures to fetally toxic work environments.
The need for such a funding process results from- the virtual im-
possibility of tracing an injury to a specific employer, especially where
the employee has worked for several employers and was exposed to
potential fetotoxic agents at each workplace.
In cases where employers would be forced to remove workers of either
sex from a toxic environment because of overwhelming scientific or
medical evidence, they would have available a BFOQ-type defense to
justify the exclusionary policies. Courts are to interpret this defense as
narrowly as traditional BFOQ defenses. They are to use scientific evidence
presented by experts regarding the unavoidable need for removal of
members of a particular class of employees based upon the unpredic-
tability of the effects of the exposure.5 4 7
117 See supra notes 60-98 and accompanying text.
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D. Conclusion
This Article has attempted to critically analyze the statutory avenues
available to deal with the problem of reproductive hazards in toxic
workplaces. This survey concludes that current legal approaches do not
fully deal with all the parameters of the issue. In order to address the
total spectrum of the problem, a legislative proposal was presented which
is aimed at balancing several competing interests: that of the worker for
a safe and healthful workplace and equal employment opportunities; that
of the employer for continued economic viability and profitability; and
that of society for a healthy future generation.
